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South Africa’s rich mineral endowment makes it a geologically favourable country for 
investment in its mining industry.  However, even countries with geologically favourable 
conditions will not attract investment in its mining sector if the regulatory regime does not 
provide certainty and stability.  One aspect of such a regulatory regime is the provision of 
mineral tenure security.  Studies indicate that strong mineral tenure security is an important 
factor that investors take into account before investing is a country’s mining industry. For 
example a study by J.M Otto found that out of a possible sixty factors influencing investment 
decisions, security of tenure was ranked second during the exploration phase and first during 
the mining phase.1   
Conceptually, mineral tenure security defies a single definition.  The concept requires certainty 
and stability of rights through the entire mining sequence with the aim of providing the best 
opportunity for right holders and investors to develop mines profitably and to maximise returns 
on investments.  In this sense, mineral tenure security requires minimisation of risks and 
uncertainties that may prevent profitable development of mines and maximising returns on 
investments.   
The specific requirements for strong mineral tenure security depends on the theoretical 
underpinnings of the regulatory regime.  This thesis argues that it is likely that in regimes with 
a strong private-law character, private-law rules will be significant for providing mineral tenure 
security.  Conversely, in regimes with a strong public-law character, it is likely that private-
law rules will not be central to the provision of mineral tenure security.  In regimes with a 
strong public-law character, rules of administrative law, for example, are more likely to be 
significant for providing mineral tenure security. 
The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) came into operation in 
2002.  This thesis demonstrates that the Act brought about significant changes to the theoretical 
landscape of mineral law.  Before the MPRDA, the regime pertaining to minerals was based 
on a combination of private holding and public administration of rights to minerals.  The Act 
changed this landscape to one that is based predominantly in public law.   
                                                 





Against this background, this thesis follows two courses of inquiry; the first with a mainly 
theoretical character and the second with a mainly practical character.  The first (theoretical) 
course of inquiry investigates whether the private-law concepts that are traditionally associated 
with mineral tenure security, namely ownership of minerals and mineral resources and real 
rights in property, continue to strengthen mineral tenure security in the current regulatory 
regime.  This course of inquiry also investigates the limitation of a private-law based approach 
to mineral tenure security.  The second (practical) course of inquiry investigates how the 
current predominantly administrative regime strengthens mineral tenure security.  The second 
course of inquiry attempts to identify the shortcomings of the current regulatory regime in 
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Chapter 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
South Africa is a country rich in mineral resources,2 and its mining industry forms an integral 
and critical part of the South African economy.3  By way of example, 80% of the world’s 
platinum is found in South Africa, and the country is, by far, the largest platinum producer in 
the world.4  Furthermore, the country holds 80% of all manganese deposits world-wide.5  
Mining is thus necessarily a significant contributor to the country’s Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP),6 as well as to overall investment in the country.7  In 2013, mining accounted for 19.4% 
of private sector investment and 12.2% of total investment in the economy.8  During the same 
period, the mining industry accounted for 30.5% of South Africa’s total merchandise exports.9 
The mining industry further makes a valuable contribution to employment10 and tax.11  
Although South Africa’s geological endowments render it favourable for mining enterprises, 
investors also consider other factors when deciding whether to invest in South Africa as 
opposed to other mineral rich countries.12  The existence of mineral deposits is only one of 
                                                 
2 See http://chamberofmines.org.za/sa-mining for an exposition of the quantities of different minerals found in 
South Africa.  
3 White Paper on a Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa (1998) 1; Leon 2013 JERL 171 178.  See in 
general Chamber of Mines 2013/2014 Annual Report 2 available at http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/industry-
news/publications/annual-reports; Chamber of Mines 2013/2014 Facts and Figures 4 available at 
http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/industry-news/publications/facts-and-figures.     
4Jones “Platinum Smelting in South Africa” available at 
http://www.mintek.co.za/Pyromet/Platinum/Platinum.htm; Central Intelligence Agency World Fact Book “South 
Africa” available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sf.html.   
5 Creamer “South Africa’s Manganese Geology Superb” 13 Sept 2011 MiningWeekly available at 
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/south-africas-manganese-geology-superb-omh-2011-09-13.  
6 In 2013 the mining sector accounted for 8.3% of GDP directly, on a nominal basis and nominal mining GDP of 
R279.7 billion was recorded.  See Chamber of Mines 2013/2014 Annual Report 3.  In 2012, mining accounted for 
8.3% of GDP directly on a nominal basis.  However, in the same period, “if the indirect multiplier and induced 
effects of mining [were] included then the overall contribution to GDP [was] closer to 17%”.  During the same 
period, nominal mining GDP of R 262.7 billion was recorded.      See Chamber of Mines 2012 Facts and Figures 
2 at available at http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/industry-news/publications/facts-and-figures. 
7 See van der Zwan and Nel 2010 Meditari Accountancy Research 89 90. 
8 Chamber of Mines 2013/2104 Facts and Figures 4. 
9 Chamber of Mines 2013/214 Annual Report 3; Chamber of Mines 2013/2014 Facts and Figures 4. 
10 See Sishen Iron Ore 2014 2 SA 603 (CC) [37] and Leon 2013 JERL 178 and especially fn 42 for the importance 
of the mining industry in job creation. 
11 Chamber of Mines 2013/2014 Annual Report 3. 
12 Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 13 14.  See in general Jackson and Green 2014 Fraser Institute Annual Survey 
of Mining Companies available at http://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/survey-of-mining-companies-
2014.pdf.  According to the Fraser report 17, the Fraser Institute surveys mining and exploration companies in an 
attempt to “assess how mineral endowments and public policy factors such as taxation and regulatory uncertainty 
affect exploration investment”. 




various factors that influence an investor’s decision to invest in the mining industry of a 
particular country.13  Due to strong competition for private sector investment amongst mineral 
rich countries, it is crucial for the South African economy that the country becomes and remains 
an attractive mining investment destination.  
Investment decisions are really “as much idiosyncratic as [they are] scientific”.14  The decision 
is the outcome of an investor’s risk appetite weighed against the potential financial profitability 
of a project.15  This does not mean that a country is powerless to attract investment into its 
mining industry.  Government can create a “legal, fiscal and institutional framework” that is 
attractive to investors where they can “commit their risk capital in relative comfort and 
security”.16  The legal framework is thus one of the key factors that investors take into account 
when making investment decisions.17  All else being equal, investors will favour investing in 
the mining industry of a country where the legal framework provides certainty,18 stability19 and 
predictability.20  The legal framework consists not only of mining law but also of taxation law, 
environmental legislisation and laws relating to land-use planning to name but a few.21  One of 
the central issues that mining law addresses,22 however, and that influences the decision to 
invest, is provision of mineral security of tenure.23  
                                                 
13 Others include considerations about the cost of extraction, the ability to procure equipment and materials from 
local and overseas sources and the ability to sell the products of mining into local and export markets.  See 
UNCTAD “Best Practices in Investment for Development How to Attract and Benefit from FDI in Mining: 
Lessons from Canada and Chile” Investment Advisory Series, Series B, Number 7 (2011) 4 – 6 available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaepcb2010d11_en.pdf; Pritchard in Bastida et al 74 76; Omalu and Zamora 1999 
JERL 14. According to the Fraser report 22 figure 1 table 1, mineral potential weighs 60% while policy 
considerations weigh 40% when companies consider the attractiveness of investing in a country’s mining industry.  
Policy factors in the report include uncertainty concerning the administration of current regulations, environmental 
regulations, regulatory duplication, the legal system , the taxation regime, uncertainty concerning protected areas 
and disputed land claims, infrastructure, socio-economic and community development conditions, trade barriers, 
political stability, labour regulations, quality of the geological database, security, and labour and skills availability.  
See the Fraser report 7 and 22. 
14 Pritchard in Bastida et al 74.  
15 Pritchard in Bastida et al 74 – 75. 
16 Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 14.  
17 Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 13. 
18 Leon 2013 JERL 190. 
19 Pritchard in Bastida et al 75. 
20 Bastida 2001 JERL 31 34; Johnson (Unpublished doctoral thesis) 8.  See also Bastida (PhD thesis) 170 – 171. 
21 See in general Pritchard in Bastida et al 74 – 76; UNCTAD Management of Commodity Resources in the Context 
of Sustainable Development: Governance Issues for the Mineral Sector (1997) 3 and 8.  
22 Naito et al 1999 JERL 1 4.  
23 Leon 2013 JERL 190 opines that “security of tenure is a sine qua non of long-term capital investment in what 
is a high-risk industry” 




1.1. Core concept: Mineral Tenure Security 
Development of a mine normally requires investors to apply for a sequence of rights,24 and 
regulation through such sequential rights translates into different phases for mine development. 
This is referred to as “the mining sequence”.25  Conceptualising mineral tenure security 
depends on an understanding of the “mining sequence”.      
The mining sequence generally involves that investors first apply for rights that will allow them 
to explore or prospect without large-scale extraction of minerals, thus the exploration phase.26  
In South Africa, the exploration phase depends on the granting of reconnaissance permissions 
and prospecting rights in terms of the governing law, i.e. the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA).27  Upon successful discovery of mineral resources,28 investors 
are required to apply for rights that will allow large extraction of minerals.  They thus have to 
apply for the right to mine to continue into the mining phase.29  In South Africa, mining occurs 
by virtue of mining permits30 or mining rights.31 
Mineral law systems regulate the transition from exploration to mining in different ways.  A 
first possibility is for mining rights to be assigned automatically to the discoverer without any 
governmental discretion.32  A second option is for the discoverer to receive priority in the 
                                                 
24 Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 27.  See Bastida 2001 JERL 33; Bastida (PhD thesis) 54 - 55 where the author 
says that in most countries regulation takes place through two main categories of rights, namely exploration 
licenses or permits and exploitation concessions or licences.   
25  Before rights are applied for, investors will develop the idea of developing a mine.  This involves, for example, 
literature research on geological favourability of an area.  This phase is not regulated.  See Otto in Bastida et al 
355 and figure 1 356.   
26 Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 27; Otto in Bastida et al 362.  
27 28 of 2002.  Ss 13 and 14 of the MPRDA regulate application for and granting of reconnaissance permissions 
while ss 16 and 17 regulate prospecting rights. 
28 See Bastida 2001 JERL 33 and Bastida (PhD thesis) 55 where the author says that the discovery of minerals 
determines the transition from one stage to the next.   
29 Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 27. 
30  MPRDA, s 27 regulates applications for and granting of mining permits. According to section 27(1) of the 
MPRDA, a mining permit is granted if “(a) the mineral in question can be mined optimally within a period of two 
years; and (b) the mining area in question does not exceed 5.0 hectares in extent”. Mining permits are thus granted 
for small-scale mining operations.   
31 MPRDA, ss 22 and 23 regulate applications for and granting of mining rights. The MPRDA does not provide a 
definition of mining rights. The difference between mining rights and mining permits is that mining permits are 
granted for small-scale mining operations according to the criteria in section 27(1) of the MPRDA while the Act 
does not place a limitation on the extent of the mining operation for which mining rights are granted. Nothing in 
the MPRDA indicates that applicants for rights are under an obligation to apply for mining permits and not mining 
rights if the criteria of section 27(1) are met. However, mining rights are usually granted for large-scale mining 
operations. 
32 Bastida 2001 JERL 35 - 36, Bastida (PhD thesis) 60; Warden-Fernandez and Waelde “Mining Law in Latin 
America: A Comparative Study of Chile, Peru, Argentina and Bolivia” 2001 Mining Oil and Gas as cited in 
Johnson (Unpublished doctoral thesis) 26 who says that regimes that allow for this are the most attractive.  See 




granting of mining rights.33  A third option is for mining rights to be granted to either the 
discoverer or another at the discretion of the government.34  The second option35 encompasses 
some degree of governmental discretion which is normally based on specified criteria that 
applicants must meet while the decision in the third option is normally based solely on the 
discretion of the government.  For the investor, the first option is probably the most 
favourable.36 
Investors spend large amounts of resources during the exploration phase without certainty that 
they will find commercially viable deposits.37  They will only assume the financial risks 
associated with prospecting if they have reasonable certainty that they will be able to continue 
mining upon the successful discovery of a mineral deposit.38  Consequently, there must be a 
link between investors’ rights to prospect and their ability to continue mining once their 
prospecting activities show potential.39  In other words, there must be continuity between the 
different phases of mine development.40 
Mineral tenure security, firstly, addresses the risks and uncertainties that are associated with 
the transition between prospecting and mining. 41  Security of tenure in the mining industry 
requires that holders of rights must be certain that they will be able continue into the mining 
phase if they discover economically viable mineral deposits.  In this narrow understanding of 
the concept,42 mineral tenure security requires continuity between the different phases of mine 
development.  
                                                 
Ayisi “Ghana 2009 JERL 66 76 for examples of countries that assign the right to mine automatically to successful 
discoverers of mineral resources.  
33 Bastida 2001 JERL 35 - 36; Bastida (PhD thesis) 60 – 61. 
34 See Bastida 2001 JERL 36; Bastida (PhD thesis) 60 - 61; Ayisi 2009 JERL 76; Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 
27 Williams in Bastida et al 741 742 in the context of the Latin American Model. 
35 According to Bastida 2001 JERL 36 this is the option that most countries follow. 
36 Commenting on the mining codes of Peru and Bolivia, Bastida 2001 JERL 40 mentions that the “unification of 
exploration and exploitation rights into a single concession” is “the most important innovations…” of the codes.  
37 De Sa in Bastida et al 494 comments that development requires “huge initial capital outlays”.  Also see 
UNCTAD “Best Practices” 4 and World Bank Strategy for African Mining for a discussion of how much money 
was needed in the exploration phase at the time of the report.   
38 Williams in Bastida et al 51; Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 27; Dale 1996 JERL 298 299 – 300 views 
specification of criteria for the transition from exploration to mining as a method to achieve security of tenure. 
39 See UNCTAD Management of Commodity Resources 11concerning reforms of mining laws in the 1980’s in an 
attempt to attract foreign investment. 
40 Badenhorst 2014 JERL 5 14. 
41 For the success of the Latin American Mining Model to ensure continuity from exploration to exploitation see 
Williams in Bastida et al 752.  Also see Bastida 2001 JERL 40.and Bastida (PhD thesis) 55 for comments on the 
Peruvian and Bolivian regulatory systems in this regard. 
42 Also referred to as “the right to mine” in Johnson 1990 National Resources Forum 178 (n 43 below).  Bastida 
2001 JERL 35; Ayisi 2009 JERL 66 75; Bastida (PhD thesis) 58 refers to this narrow understanding as “the key 




Studies regarding mining companies’ investment preference show that mineral tenure security, 
in this narrow sense, is one of the main criteria that a company takes into account when making 
investment decisions regarding mining projects.43  Even countries with expansive mineral 
wealth will not attract investment unless the regulatory regime ensures security of tenure.44  
Out of a possible sixty factors influencing investment decisions, security of tenure was ranked 
second during the exploration phase45 and first during the mining phase.46  The World Bank 
confirms that security of tenure is a determining factor for investment in and growth of a 
country’s mining industry.47 
Security of mineral tenure requires that investors can develop mines profitably.48  The link 
between prospecting and mining contributes to the possibility of developing mines profitably.  
However, risks associated with profitable development are not limited to the transition between 
prospecting and mining but occur throughout the entire life of a mine.49  Even if mineral 
deposits are found and investors are certain that they will be able to continue into the mining 
phase, there are further investment risks.  These risks are brought about by volatility in mineral 
prices, obstacles in raising funds for mine development, and slow rates of return on 
                                                 
question of security of tenure; Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 27 refer to the narrow construction as the first phase 
of the concept; Badenhorst 2014 JERL 12 describes this as the traditional view.  An example of a narrow definition 
is the one given by Waelde 1991 6 ICSID/ Foreign Investment Law Journal 102 as cited in Bastida 2001 JERL 
35, Bastida (PhD thesis) 50 and Ayisi 2009 JERL 76. Waelde defines security of mineral tenure as “the legal 
entitlement to extraction rights after a successful exploration phase”.   
43 Johnson 1990 National Resources Forum 178 as cited in Ayisi 2009 JERL, Dale 1996 JERL 298, Bastida 2001 
JERL 32; Bastida (PHD thesis) 59, Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-18 and Dale 
in Bastida et al 835.  Another study was done by Otto in ESCAP/UNDP Mineral Investment Conditions in Selected 
Countries of the Asian-Pacific Region 330-342 as cited in Bastida 2001 JERL 32,  Bastida (PHD thesis) 59, Dale 
1996 JERL 298,  Ayisi 2009 JERL 67, Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-18, Dale in 
Bastida et al  835, Otto 1996 JERL 256; UNCTAD “Best Practices” 6, Otto et al Mining Royalties A Global Study 
of their Impact on Investors, Government, and Civil Society (2009) 216 table 5.4.  See UNCTAD Management of 
Commodity Resources 19 table 2 for a synopsis and brief comparison of Johnson’s and Otto’s surveys. 
44 Otto paper presented to the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, Johannesburg, 15 June 1995 2 as cited in Dale 
1996 JERL 298; Ayisi 2009 JERL 67. 
45 In a South African context, rights to minerals in the exploration phase consist of reconnaissance permissions 
and prospecting rights.  Mining legislation in different countries refer to rights to minerals differently.  In Ghana, 
reconnaissance licenses and prospecting licenses are, for example, granted.  See Ayisi 2009 JERL 81.  The 
exploration phase is also referred to as the “discovery phase”.     
46 Otto paper presented to the Chamber of Mines of South Africa 10 table 3 cited in Dale 1996 JERL 298. 
47 World Bank A Mining Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean 14. 
48 Onorato and Fox Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation chap 7 1 - 38 as quoted in Bastida 2001 JERL 32 
and Bastida (PhD thesis) 59.  See Williams in Bastida et al 51 where the author says that the reforms of mining 
laws during the 1990’s were based on the recognition of the importance of security of tenure and accordingly that 
rights had to be granted for lengths of time that would allow the possibility to make “significant profits”.  Profit-
making is more broadly required for foreign investment in a country’s mining sector.  See UNCTAD “Best 
Practices” 4.   According to De Sa in Bastida et al 493 495, the first question that a mining company asks before 
investing is where in the world it can make the greatest profit. 
49 See in general Benning May/June 2000 The Journal of The South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
148.  The author comments on the risks in relation to a bank’s willingness to finance a mining project. 




investments.50  Therefore, although continuity of tenure is essential51 for certainty in the mining 
industry, an investor’s choices are further informed by the risks and uncertainties that may be 
encountered throughout the entire process of mine development.52  Certainty is as important in 
the application-, prospecting- and mining-phases as it is during the transition from prospecting 
to mining.  One can extend the definition of mineral tenure security more broadly to include 
“the stability of rights granted to implement the different phases of the mining sequence”.53 In 
what follows, the more inclusive construction of mineral tenure security is referred to as the 
“broad understanding” of the concept.54 
In this broad understanding of the mineral tenure security concept, key issues include the 
conditions under which investors can lose rights.55  Accordingly, stability and certainty require 
clearly defined rules pertaining to conditions under which rights can be lost. 56  In this regard, 
the duties of holders to keep their rights such as minimum work commitments and reporting 
requirements also influence security of tenure in the mining industry.57  It has been argued that 
tenure security requires registration of title because this assists investors to enforce their 
rights.58  Furthermore, investors may need to transfer their rights to another entity in certain 
circumstances to ensure a profitable return on their investments.  They may also require the 
ability to mortgage rights to raise funds for development of the mine.  Accordingly, mineral 
                                                 
50 Bastida 2001 JERL 32 and Bastida (PhD thesis) 58; Ayisi 2009 JERL 67; UNCTAD Management of Commodity 
Resources 8. 
51 See Bastida 2001 JERL 33; where the author refers to this ability as “the most critical point of all…”, also see 
35 and Bastida (PhD thesis) 60 where the ability is referred to as “the critical transition”;  Omalu and Zamora 
1999 JERL 13 27  refers to the ability as “the prime requisite of any investor. See Williams Bastida et al 51 where 
the author highlights the importance of the ability to obtain rights to exploit after discovering mineral deposits.   
52 Bastida 2001 JERL 32 36 37; Bastida (PhD thesis) 181; Ayisi 2009 JERL 75. 
53 Otto in Bastida et al 362; Bastida 2001 JERL 36; Bastida (PhD thesis) 180; Badenhorst 2014 JERL 13; Otto, 
Chand and Foong gives a broad definition in “Guidelines for a National Mineral Policy” in Mineral Development 
and Policy and Planning Project as cited in Bastida 2001 JERL 36; Bastida PHD thesis 181.  They define security 
of tenure as “the ability to maintain a right to minerals from exploration stage on through mining.  The World 
Bank refers to security of mineral tenure in the broad sense.  Also see World Bank A Mining Strategy for Latin 
America and the Caribbean xv 14. 
54 Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 27 refers to the broad understanding as the “second phase” of the concept.   
Saravia-Frias (LLM Dissertation) 31 as cited in Bastida 2001 JERL 32; Bastida (PhD thesis) 60 refers to this as 
the modern concept of mineral tenure security. 
55 Bastida 2001 JERL 36 37; Bastida (PhD thesis) 181; Dale 1996 JERL 299; Badenhorst 2014 JERL 15; World 
Bank A Mining Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean 14. 
56 Bastida 2001 JERL 37; Bastida (PhD thesis) 181; Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 27; World Bank A Mining 
Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean 14  Also see Williams in Bastida et al 742 in the context of the 
Latin American Model. 
57 Bastida 2001 JERL 33 36.  According to the World Bank Strategy for African Mining 22 minimum work 
requirements must be specified clearly. 
58 Siac in Bastida et al 389 390 397; Wabnitz in Bastida et al 399 400; Badenhorst 2014 JERL mentions registration 
as a feature that enhances mineral tenure security.  In the context of the Latin American Mining Model see 
Williams in Bastida et al 741 748. 




tenure security includes certainty about the conditions under which rights are transferred and 
mortgaged to raise funds for the development of a mine.59  Profitable development further 
requires that investors must have enough time to prospect and mine.60  Another important issue 
in tenure security thus includes the length of time for which rights are granted.61  Further 
temporal requirements are that there must, in general, be time limits on the government to grant 
rights and process key documents.62  Delays during procedures where rights are granted or 
renewed will weaken mineral tenure security.63  Holders of rights further require the ability to 
interrupt operations without losing rights when profitable development is not possible at a 
given time.64  It has been argued that uncertainty is increased by “the existence of contradictory 
rules, procedures open to discretion and excessive regulation”.65  Mineral tenure security thus 
requires minimization of governmental discretion.66  Linked to minimization of governmental 
discretion is the ability to challenge discretionary decisions in court or through arbitration.67  
Lastly, mineral tenure security requires that right holders hold rights exclusively.68 A further 
aspect of mineral tenure security that has connections with property law concerns the question 
whether a regulatory regime provides protection against expropriation.69  
                                                 
59 Badenhorst 2014 JERL 14 mentions the abilities to transfer and mortgage rights as features that enhance mineral 
tenure security; Bastida 2001 JERL 37; Bastida (PhD thesis) 181; Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 28; Dale 1996 
JERL 300; World Bank A Mining Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean xv.  In the context of the Latin 
American Mining Model see Williams in Bastida et al 746.  
60 Badenhorst 2014 JERL 14. 
61 Otto in Bastida et al 354; Dale 1996 JERL 299. 
62 Bastida 2001 JERL 37 38; Bastida (PhD thesis) 183. 
63 Bastida 2001 JERL 38; Bastida (PhD thesis) 183. 
64 Onorato and Fox 41 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 7 – 23 as quoted in Bastida 2001 JERL 38 and 
Bastida (PhD thesis) 183; World Bank Strategy for African Mining 25.  One of the features of the Latin America 
Mining Model is that title holders are “free to decide their own cut-off grades and production levels, as well as 
where and how to process their mineral output”.  See Williams in Bastida et al 742. 
65 Bastida 2001 JERL 37 and Bastida (PhD) thesis 182. 
66 Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 28 37; Dale 1996 JERL 299.  Regarding the need to limit governmental 
discretion is general see World Bank Strategy for African Mining 21 – 22.  
67 Apkan 1998 1 Oil and Gas Law and Taxation Review 26 27 as cited in Ayisi 2009 JERL 77, Bastida 2001 JERL 
37; Bastida (PhD thesis) 183. 
68 See Williams in Bastida et al 742 where the author says that security of tenure in the Latin American model is 
“assured by the exclusivity of rights and the prohibition against overlapping concessions”.  Johnson (Unpublished 
doctoral thesis) 25 opines that the question whether rights are held exclusively is of “initial importance” to 
investors.   Exclusivity requires that the same mineral on the same land cannot be granted to another entity while 
there is an existing rights-holder.  Application procedures influence exclusivity.  See Badenhorst 2014 JERL 20.   
69 Bastida 2001 JERL 34, Dale 1996 JERL 299. Before the MPRDA, the court held in Lebowa Mineral Trust 
Beneficiaries Forum v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 1 BCLR 23 (T) 31 that mineral rights were 
not regarded as property and therefore did not enjoy constitutional protection.  However, the case is criticised and 
it is generally accepted that mineral rights constitute property for the purposes of constitutional protection. See 
Van der Schyff 2008 THRHR 387 388; van der Vyfer 2012 De Jure 125 133.  It has been argued that there is a 
strong indication that the level of regulation the current regime amounts to so-called “creeping or indirect 
expropriations” for purposes of South Africa’s bi-lateral investment treaties.  See Leon 2009 JERL 597 629 – 630. 




A narrow understanding of the concept, i.e. the certainty of a transition from prospecting to 
mining, is too limited.  This is because risks and uncertainties that can cause instability and 
prevent profitable development are not limited to the transition between prospecting and 
mining but are present for the duration of mineral development projects.  The broad 
understanding of the concept is therefore preferable.70 
The above discussion of mineral tenure security relates to regimes where minerals and the 
rights thereto vest in the state and where the basic tenets of mineral law predominantly stem 
from public.71  In contrast, an alternative definition has been advanced that is based on private 
holding of rights to minerals with minimal governmental interference.72  This definition applies 
where the main theoretical underpinnings of mineral law flow from private law. Where private 
law mainly underpins mineral law governmental interference is allowed only to achieve limited 
objectives such as optimal exploitation of mineral resources, health and safety issues and 
protection of the environment.73  
It is arguable that private holding of rights to minerals reduces governmental interference, 
provides more certainty to the miner, and thus strengthens mineral tenure security.74  For South 
Africa, however, a definition of mineral tenure security based on private holding of rights is 
not workable in the current regulatory regime.  The MPRDA, discussed in more detail 
throughout this thesis, does not provide for private holding of rights to minerals or mineral 
resources.  Instead, it “embraces State sovereignty and custodianship over mineral resources”.75  
The government extensively regulates the acquisition, exercise as well as loss of rights in 
                                                 
70 Badenhorst 2014 JERL 14 refers to some of the aspects as features of security of mineral tenure; Bastida 2001 
JERL 37 and Bastida (PhD thesis) 182 refers to” factors that influence certainty in the legal regime.”  
71 Dale 1996 JERL 298 299.  According to Bastida (PhD thesis) 21, “mineral tenure regimes deal with the legal 
problems and terms related to ownership and the acquisition, holding, transfer and termination of rights by private 
individuals, entitling the holder to conduct exploration and exploitation of minerals (own emphasis)”.  At 32 
Bastida makes it clear that ownership includes public ownership of minerals and mineral resources.   
72 Dale 1996 JERL 301 – 307.  At 308 the author accordingly defines tenure security as follows: “Security of 
tenure means the right, without time limitation, subject to free market forces, and free of state intervention, to 
acquire, hold, exercise and dispose of mineral rights, rights to prospect and rights to mine as rights in property, 
subject to the acquisition, suspension and cancellation, judges on criteria inter alia relating to optimal exploitation, 
of licences authorising such exercise, and subject to expropriation of such rights in the interest of optimal 
exploitation and for compensation”. 
73 Dale 1996 JERL 305 – 306. 
74 This is in essence Dale’s argument in 1996 JERL 301 – 303; Badenhorst 2014 JERL 24.  
75 Dale in Bastida et al 823;  According to s 3 of the MPRDA, “mineral and petroleum resources are the common 
heritage of the people of South Africa and the state is the custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans”.  
On the principles of state sovereignty over natural resources see in general Bastida PhD thesis 133 – 138; van der 
Vyfer 2012 De Jure 140 – 142; Omorogbe and Oniemola in McHarg et al 115 122 - 124 




pursuit of a number of complex and, at times, divergent objectives.  An alternative 
conceptualization of mineral tenure security is therefore needed.  
1.2. Premises and challenges 
It is premised that mineral tenure security means the stability of rights granted for the duration 
of the life of a mine and creation of certainty through minimization of risks and uncertainties 
that may prevent profitable development of such mines.  Mineral tenure security includes, on 
this premise, certainty that prospecting and mining can occur, and that it can be interrupted 
when necessary to ensure profitable development.  Profitable development further requires the 
ability to transfer and mortgage rights to raise funds for mineral development projects. 
Two complexities must be highlighted at the outset:  The first, as explained above,76 is that 
mineral tenure security is a very broad concept.  The second is that the basic tenets of regulatory 
regimes differ significantly.77  Regulation varies between, on the one hand, systems that display 
heavy state interference in mineral law, and on the other hand, systems where state interference 
is minimised and mineral law is predominantly left in the private sphere.78  In systems adhering 
to state interference, rigorous regulation where governmental discretion plays a significant role 
in issuing, maintaining and terminating rights are often encountered.79  In such instances public 
law is significant and “reform is aimed at weakening the institutions of private property”.80  On 
the other hand, market economies tend to emphasise private mining rights.81  Where there is 
emphasis on private mining rights with limited governmental interference, property law is an 
important component of mineral law.82 
                                                 
76 S 2.1 above. 
77 Dale in Global Issues in Corporate Mining Strategy and Government Policy, CELMLP Dundee Annual Mining 
Seminar, June 2001 4 – 8 cited in Bastida et al 409 413 and Bastida (PhD thesis) 40 41 developed a classification 
system in terms of which regulatory systems can be classified according to the level of governmental interference 
and the question whether rights to minerals are regulated by private law and public law.  See Naito et al 1999 
JERL 2 where, in the context of uncertainties that regulatory changes in mining laws cause, the authors say that 
different countries adopt different legal approaches.  Barton in McHarg et al 81 citing Thompson in Banks and 
Saunders 1 states that “a natural resource tenure could operate as a conveyance of real property, as a contract and 
by force of statute, and that these characteristics overlap in complex ways”. 
78 See Daintith in Zillman et al 37 – 39 where the author illustrates that in the United States of America mineral 
law is predominantly left in the private sphere and regulated by common-law. 
79 Bastida 2001 JERL 33 34. 
80 Bastida 2001 JERL 33 34.  The author’s argument is wider and includes law reform in general where 
governments play a prominent role in economic development. 
81 Bastida 2001 JERL 34. 
82 Barton in Zillman et al 21 – 22 refers to “default rules” where no legislation is in place to regulate a specific 
activity.  Default rules include rules of property law. 




The type of regulatory regime, and the question whether the basic tenets stem predominantly 
from public law or private law, will determine the measures used to ensure stability and 
profitable development of mines83  For example, regimes where rights to minerals are regulated 
administratively can result in wide governmental discretion.84  In such regimes, tenure security 
will require clear and predictable rules regarding transfer, mortgage and loss of rights as well 
as the ability to challenge discretionary decisions in court or through arbitration.85  It will 
further require clear rules setting out the circumstances in which rights can be lost.86  In regimes 
based on private ownership of mineral resources and private holding of rights, governmental 
interference is naturally limited.87  The nature of rights as real rights can indicate clearly 
whether they are transferred and mortgaged freely, and there might be no need for further 
elucidating rules.88  However, regimes are not often purely administrative or only based on 
private holding of rights to minerals.89  The specific characteristics of every regime will 
determine the measures required to ensure mineral tenure security. 
2. Background to and parameters of the research 
The MPRDA came into operation in 2004.  This Act introduced a new regime for mineral and 
petroleum resource extraction in South Africa. The regime preceding the MPRDA was based 
on a combination of property law and regulatory measures based in public law.90 The pre-
MPRDA regime illustrates how mineral law traditionally straddles public law (especially 
                                                 
83 See in general Bastida 2001 JERL 35.  
84 Dale 1996 JERL 300 opines that ministerial discretion “looms large” in systems where mineral rights vest in 
the state. 
85 Dale 1996 JERL 300. 
86 See Rønne in McHarg et al 60 68 where the author refers to Roggenkamp et al Energy Law in Europe 1281 
who says that in systems where natural resource exploration and production is based on licenses that are issued at 
the discretion of the “responsible authority”, security includes that “the licence cannot be …withdrawn 
arbitrarily”.  This implies specific and clear reasons why rights can be withdrawn (lost). 
87 Dale 1996 JERL 303 mentions this specifically in the context of the transition between prospecting and mining.  
At 301 the author says that privatised mineral right systems avoid the problems identified in state-orientated 
systems.  One of the problems that the author identifies in state-orientated systems is governmental interference.  
At 309 the author concludes that systems that adhere to private ownership of mineral rights avoid discretionary 
elements and minimizes state intervention. 
88 Generally, real rights in property can be the object of a further real right and can be transferred freely.  Regarding 
mortgage see Badenhorst et al Silberberg 360; van der Merwe Sakereg 615; Lubbe in LAWSA par 335.  Regarding 
transfer see van der Merwe Sakereg 16; van der Merwe in LAWSA par 12. 
89 Commenting on regalian and dominal systems of property in Latin America, González in Zillman et al 69 
comments that public law and private law “converge” and that a consequence of this convergence is that “codes 
and laws on natural resources modify civil code provisions…” 
90 See chap 2 par 3.1 for an exposition of the property-law elements and regulatory features in public law in the 
pre-MPRDA regime. 




administrative law) and private law (especially property law).91  The reason is that there are 
various relationships that mineral law must address.92  Property law typically addresses the 
relationship between the landowner and holder of the mineral right93 while public law typically 
addresses the relationship between the state and private stakeholders.94  Due to this dual nature 
of mineral law, aspects of mineral tenure security also fall within the ambit of both public law 
and private law.  There is thus, academically, a strong connection between certain aspects of 
mineral tenure security and the rules of property law in a South African context.  Administrative 
law also provides certain checks and balances, but the extent to which these measures form 
part of a concept of mineral tenure security has not yet been scrutinised thoroughly.  
Even at doctoral research level, it is impossible to analyse all of the aspects of mineral tenure 
security comprehensively.  The analysis here is thus partial, in that the scope of this study is 
limited to those aspects of mineral tenure security that impact profitable development of mines 
and that, in a South African context, are traditionally influenced by property law.  The aspects 
are: (i) the ability to prospect and mine, (ii) the ability to choose not to prospect and mine, (iii) 
the ability to dispose of minerals found during prospecting and mining, (iv) the ability to 
transfer rights to minerals to an eligible third party and (v) the ability to encumber rights.   
Traditionally, private-law ownership of minerals and mineral resources influences the ability 
to prospect and mine, the ability to choose not to prospect and mine and the ability to dispose 
of minerals found during prospecting and mining.  The private-law nature of rights traditionally 
influences the ability to transfer and encumber rights.  A discussion of the private-law nature 
of rights to minerals necessitates investigating registration and enforceability of rights to 
minerals.  The research therefore also allows comments on the registrability and enforceability 
of rights to minerals as an aspect of mineral tenure security. Furthermore, the private-law nature 
of rights can influence the level of governmental interference in mining and prospecting.  An 
                                                 
91 See Mostert Principles and Policies 15.  This is not true in South Africa only, but also in other jurisdictions.  
See Barton in Zillman et al 21 22; McHarg et al in McHarg et al 1.  According to Hamilton and Banks in McHarg 
et al (eds) 19 20 natural resources law was historically s subset of property law, but due to public ownership of 
natural resources in many jurisdictions leads to characterisation of issues regarding use and control of resources 
as administrative law problems. 
92 Mostert Principles and Policies 15.  See regarding competing interests in general (not only in a South African 
context) Bastida in Bastida et al 413; Bastida (PhD thesis) 25 – 28. 
93 The underlying common-law mineral right is referred to here and not the prospecting rights and mining rights 
that derived from the common-law mineral right.  See chapter 2 sec 2. 
94 Mostert Principles and Policies 15.  Also see chap 2 sec 1 and sec 3.2.3. 




investigation into the nature of rights to minerals permits comments on the role of the nature 
of rights in reducing governmental interference in prospecting and mining.  
Limiting the inquiry in this way allows the pursuit of two questions.  The first involves 
investigating the basic tenets of mineral law in the regime created by the MPRDA, to evaluate 
the role that rules of property law continue to play in providing mineral tenure security within 
the current regulatory regime.  This inquiry simultaneously establishes whether the regime is 
predominantly based on principles of public law or private law, and allows comments on 
whether private law is still an appropriate paradigm for mineral law in the current regulatory 
regime.  The second question explores the extent to which the MPRDA itself provides security 
of tenure to right holders for those aspects of the concept that are core to the thesis, thus the 
abilities to prospect and mine, to discontinue operations, to dispose of minerals and the abilities 
to transfer and encumber rights to minerals. 
Thus, the research is concerned both with the academic / theoretical underpinnings of mineral 
tenure security as well as its practical implications.  The research contributes to academic 
debate by commenting on the theoretical basis for mineral law under the MPRDA and by 
analysing the role that rules of property law play in providing tenure security in the current 
regulatory regime.  From an academic point of view, the research also comments on whether 
private law continues to be the appropriate lens through which to view mineral law.  The 
research contributes practically by analysing the extent to which the MPRDA provides security 
of tenure in respect of those aspects of the concept that are within its scope.   
The research is limited in its conclusions regarding the extent to which the MPRDA provides 
security of tenure in the current legislative dispensation because it does not fully analyse all 
aspects of the concept.  However, it draws conclusions as regards the prevalence of tenure 
security for those aspects that fall within its scope.  The research further identifies a series of 
important aspects pertaining to tenure security within the current regulatory regime.  It 
therefore provides a useful starting point for investors who are interested in investing in the 
South African mining industry, and want to determine whether and to what extent tenure 
security prevails.  The thesis also opens the door to future research that may focus on other or 
all of the commonly accepted aspects of mineral tenure security, in a quest to determine 
whether, broadly, tenure security prevails in the current regulatory regime.  




The parameters of the research must be set not only regarding the aspects of mineral tenure 
security but also regarding the rights to minerals95 for which the MPRDA provides i.e. 
reconnaissance permissions,96 prospecting rights,97 permissions to remove and dispose of 
minerals,98 mining rights,99 mining permits100 and retention permits.101  Reconnaissance 
permissions, prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits are the initial rights for 
which entities can apply.  To apply for permissions to remove and dispose of minerals and 
retention permits, applicants must already hold prospecting rights.102  This research focuses on 
security of tenure of holders of initial rights to minerals.  Reconnaissance permissions are 
excluded because the MPRDA does not include security of tenure regarding reconnaissance 
permissions as one of its objectives.103  These permissions are seen as non-exclusive rights that 
exist early in the process of a mineral development project.104  The research thus focuses on 
tenure security of holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits.  Retention 
permits are not analysed separately, but these permits do play a role in providing tenure security 
to holders of prospecting rights.105  Retention permits are thus referred to in relation to the 
tenure security of holders of prospecting rights.  The term “rights to minerals” is used in the 
thesis as a collective term to refer to the rights and permits that fall within the scope of the 
research, thus prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits. 
3. Research question and delimitation 
Given the dual line of inquiry as set out above, the thesis aims to answer the following research 
questions: 
RQ 1. Do the rules of private law strengthen mineral tenure security in the current regulatory 
regime? 
                                                 
95 The MPRDA also regulates the petroleum industry.  This research is limited to tenure security of holders of 
rights to minerals only.  
96 MPRDA, s 13. 
97 MPRDA, s 16. 
98 MPRDA, s 20. 
99 MPRDA, s 22 
100 MPRDA, s 27. 
101 MPRDA, s 32. 
102 MPRDA, s 20 for permissions to remove and dispose of minerals and s 31. 
103 MPRDA, s 2(g) states security of tenure as an objective of the MPRDA in respect of prospecting and mining 
only as far as rights to mineral are concerned.   
104 Johnson (Unpublished doctoral thesis) 25; Bastida (PhD thesis) 55. 
105 See chap 4, sec 2.4.3. 




The private-law concepts that traditionally impacts on mineral tenure security are ownership 
of mineral and mineral resources and classification of right to minerals as real rights in 
property.  To evaluate the role of these concepts in strengthening mineral tenure security, RQ 
1 consists of the following two sub-questions: 
RQ 1.1 What role does ownership of minerals and mineral resources play in providing 
mineral tenure security through creating certainty regarding the ability of 
holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits to prospect and 
mine, to choose not to prospect and mine and to dispose of minerals? 
RQ1.2 What are the limitations of a private-law rights-based approach to rights to 
minerals in providing mineral tenure security in the current regulatory regime? 
RQ 2 How does the current regulatory regime strengthen mineral tenure security for certain 
aspects of the concept that traditionally are connected to the rules of property law? 
The aspects of mineral tenure security that are traditionally associated with mineral tenure 
security are the abilities to prospect and mine, to remove and dispose of minerals, to choose 
not to prospect and mine and to transfer and mortgage rights.  To evaluate how the current 
regulatory regime strengthen mineral tenure security for these aspects, RQ 2 consists of the 
following two sub-questions: 
2.1 What challenges do the current regulatory regime pose to mineral tenure 
security regarding the abilities of right holders to prospect and mine, to choose 
not to prospect and mine, to dispose of minerals found during prospecting and 
mining and to transfer and mortgage their rights? 
2.2 How can the challenges that the current regulatory regime pose for mineral 
tenure security regarding the abilities of right holders to prospect and mine, to 
choose not to prospect and mine, to dispose of minerals found during 
prospecting and mining and to transfer and mortgage their rights be addressed? 
4. Methodology 
To answer the research questions, this thesis primarily undertakes a technical-legal analysis of 
South African mining law. The research also uses the historical method of legal research to an 




extent. The historical method is limited to the regulatory regime that immediately preceded the 
enactment of the MPRDA. The historical method is used to present arguments regarding the 
theoretical underpinnings of the current regime and the continued relevance of the rules of 
private-law ownership in strengthening mineral tenure security.  
A very large part of the research for this thesis consist mainly of a technical legal analysis of 
certain parts of the MPRDA. The analysis is, however, not merely descriptive. The aim of the 
analysis is to provide insight into the weaknesses of the current regulatory regime in 
strengthening mineral tenure security. Furthermore, the outcome of the analysis is a set of 
proposed solutions to overcome the weaknesses of the current regulatory regime. 
This thesis makes use of primary and secondary legal sources for the legal analysis and for the 
historical method.  
5. Course of inquiry  
The thesis is divided into a series of chapters dealing with its two main pursuits. This chapter 
has set out the core concept, background and research questions.  Chapter two investigates the 
main tenets of the current regulatory regime.  It is argued that the MPRDA establishes a 
regulatory regime with a predominantly106 public law character.  The theoretical basis of 
mineral law under the MPRDA is primarily based in public law and specifically administrative 
law.  The chapter thus lays the foundation to answer the research question relating to the role 
that the rules of property law play in providing mineral tenure security within the current 
regulatory regime which is predominantly founded in public law. 
Against this background, chapter three examines the role that ownership, as a private-law 
concept, plays in strengthening mineral tenure security.  Traditionally, ownership of minerals 
and mineral resources impact on the abilities of holders of right to minerals to prospect and 
mine, to remove and dispose of minerals, and to choose not to prospect and mine.  The abilities 
are rudimentary requirements for profitable development of mines.  The chapter provides an 
explanation of how ownership of minerals and mineral resources traditionally protect mineral 
tenure security.  It thereafter considers the continued role of ownership in providing mineral 
tenure security regarding the abilities to prospect and mine, to remove and dispose of minerals 
                                                 
106 The terms “mostly” and “predominantly” are used because their might be aspects of mineral law, other than 
tenure security, which are still influenced by property law.  See chap 2, sec 3.2.3. 




and to cease operations when necessary for profitable development.  Chapter three also 
comments on whether the private-law concept ownership remains suitable as a lens through 
which to view rights to minerals in the current regulatory regime.   
Chapters four aims to comment on how the current regulatory regime provides mineral tenure 
security regarding the abilities of right holders to prospect and mine, to remove and dispose of 
minerals and to cease operation when necessary for profitable development of mines.  The 
chapter provides a detailed analysis of the manner in which the MPRDA regulates the abilities 
to prospect and mines, to remove and dispose of minerals and to choose not to prospect and 
mine when necessary to ensure profitable development of mines.  The chapter takes into 
account that the government may have legitimate interests to limit these abilities of right 
holders.  In this regard, the chapter aims to comment on the extent to which the MPRDA 
minimises risks and uncertainties that may prevent profitable development of mines, and thus 
strengthen mineral tenure security, while acknowledging the legitimate interests of the 
government.  The chapter furthermore attempts to identify the features of the MPRDA that 
weaken mineral tenure security as far as the abilities to prospect and mine , to remove and 
dispose of minerals, and to choose not to prospect and mine are concerned. 
Chapter five offers a detailed analysis, similar to chapter four, regarding the manner in which 
the MPRDA regulates the abilities of holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining 
permits to transfer and encumber their rights and permits.  As with chapter four, chapter five 
acknowledges that the government may have legitimate reasons for limiting these abilities of 
right holders.  The aim of the chapter is to comment on the extent to which the MPRDA 
provides mineral tenure security while taking into account legitimate objectives of the 
government.  As with chapter four, chapter five aims to identify the shortcomings of the 
MPRDA in strengthening mineral tenure security.     
Chapter six investigates the limitations of a private-law rights-based approach in strengthening 
mineral tenure security.  The chapter examines the effect of registration and enforcement of 
real rights, according to the rules of property law, on mineral tenure security.  Having 
established that effect, the chapter appeals for the acceptance of an alternative approach to 
registration and enforcement of rights to minerals granted in terms of the MPRDA that is not 
based on private-law rules.  The chapter lastly explores whether the private-law categories of 




rights, namely real rights and personal rights, continue to be an appropriate paradigm for 
analysing current prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits. 
Chapter 7 proposes a set of solutions for the shortcomings of current regulatory regime in 
strengthening mineral tenure security.  These solutions are based on the rule of law and 
especially the principle of legality.  In this regard, the chapter uses the approach of the 
Constitutional Court in the review of primary legislation for compliance with rationality review 
and the rule against vagueness as starting point.  The chapter pleads for the adoption of the 
principle of legality when the Court reviews primary legislation that does not necessarily 
infringe fundamental rights, but that has an acute negative impact on individuals or entire 
industries.  Such an adoption justifies amendments to the MPRDA to comply with rule-of-law 
standards and to overcome its shortcomings in strengthening mineral tenure security. 
Chapter 8 provides the summative conclusions of the thesis.  
6. Summative remarks  
Provision of tenure security to holders of rights to minerals is an important consideration for 
prospective investors.  The meaning of tenure security in the mining industry is very broad and 
includes aspects that would not fall squarely within the sphere of property law, but instead rely 
on public law for regulation.  The reason for the combination is that mineral law is traditionally 
a combination of public law and property law due to diverging interests in the mining industry.  
In a South African context, there is thus a strong connection between certain aspects of mineral 
tenure security and the rules of property law.   
The next chapter investigates the extent to which the MPRDA changed the theoretical 
landscape of mineral law.  The chapter examines the impact of the MPRDA on the private-law 
character of mineral law. 







THEORETICAL LANDSCAPE OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
MINERAL LAW  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
The research for this thesis was fuelled by curiosity regarding whether the MPRDA provides 
the kind of security of tenure to holders of rights to minerals that would continue to attract 
investment.  The aspects of mineral tenure security include concepts that fall in the sphere of 
private law as well as concepts informed by administrative law.  It is arguable that the 
importance of the concepts that fall in the sphere of private law and public law depend on the 
type of regulatory regime.  It is thus expected that, in regimes that are based predominantly in 
private law, the private-law aspects of mineral tenure security will be essential to strengthen 
mineral tenure security.  Similarly, in regimes that are predominantly based in public law, it is 
expected that the administrative law aspects of the concepts will be vital to strengthen mineral 
tenure security. 
The manner and intensity with which the government regulates the mining industry informs 
the theoretical basis of mineral law.107  If the government plays no regulatory role in the mining 
industry, private law will govern mineral law and the system will be based on private holding 
of rights to minerals.108  Alternatively, regulatory systems that are highly bureaucratic and that 
allow for wide governmental discretion in the issuing, maintenance and termination of rights 
to minerals tend to weaken private property rights.109  In such regulatory systems, public law 
becomes the basis of mineral law.110  Between these two extremes are a myriad of regulatory 
options varying from extensive regulatory control to less extensive regulation.111  The intensity 
                                                 
107 According to Mostert Principles and Policies 15, the nature of mineral law at any specific time depends 
“largely on the type of regulatory interference foreseen by legislation and the manner in which [it effects] common 
law principles”.   
108 Barton in Zillman, et al (eds) 22 refers to “default rules” where no legislation is in place to regulate a specific 
activity.  Default rules include rules of property law. 
109 Bastida 2001 JERL 34. 
110 Bastida 2001 JERL 34; Dale 1996 JERL 300 states that in systems where mineral rights vest in the state and 
are heavily regulated, “mining law” is “wholly within the realm of administrative law”. 
111 Williams “Legal Reform in Mining” in Bastida et al 53. 





of the regulation invariably impacts on the prominence of administrative law and property law 
in a specific regime.112 
South African mineral law traditionally straddles private law and public law.113  Historically, 
mineral law developed from common-law principles and fell within the ambit of private 
property law.114  The regulatory function of government, on the other hand, is an administrative 
one that falls within the ambit of administrative law (and thus public law).  Furthermore, “an 
entire structure of mineral law and mining law evolved” since the discovery of South Africa’s 
mineral resources.115  This structure of mineral law is a hybrid of property law and 
administrative law.  
Governments regulate extraction of mineral resources for different reasons and in pursuit of a 
variety of objectives.116  The manner and intensity of regulation depends on the underlying 
policies and objectives pursued.117  Regulation may for instance aim to ensure optimal 
exploitation of mineral resources,118 protection of the environmental as well as socially-
responsible mining.119  Regulation can further aim to ensure that the government shares in the 
revenue from mining operations.120  Furthermore, the political121 and socio-economic 
environment influence the extent of governmental regulation.122 
Mineral law must also reconcile diverging interests.  Typically the interests of the state and 
private investors and the interests of landowners deserve protection.123  In the South African 
context, the relationship between the state and investors is typically governed by public law, 
                                                 
112 Mostert Principles and Policies 15.  
113 Mostert Principles and Policies 15.  This is also the case in other jurisdictions.  See, for example, González in 
Zillman et al 60 where commenting on the law in Latin American countries the author says “private law rules on 
property in the region were complemented and, in some cases, modified by public law”.   
114 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1 – 1; Mostert Principles and Policies 1. 
115 Mostert Principles and Policies 1; Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy “Minerals and Petroleum” in LAWSA par 
4. 
116 Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al (eds) 91.  See Williams in Bastida et al 38 – 39, 44, 50, 62 for the 
role of goals and objectives of mining reform. 
117 Mostert Principles and Policies 157 – 158. 
118 Mostert Principles and Policies 2.   
119 Mostert and van den Berg in Zillmann et al (eds) 91.  In 2001 Bastida 2001 JERL 43 argued that sustainable 
development and the socio-economic impact of mining presented new regulatory challenges.  As regards 
sustainable development, see Bastida (PhD thesis) chap 6. 
120 Mostert Principles and Policies 2. 
121 Bastida (PhD thesis) 74. 
122 Bastida 2001 JERL 33. 
123 Mostert Principles and Policies 15.  See regarding competing interests in general (not only in a South African 
context) Bastida in Bastida et al 413; Bastida (PhD thesis) 25 – 28. 





while private law governs the relationship between landowners and holders of mineral rights.124  
Regulation of the mining industry is thus not a simple matter, and neither is the law that 
accompanies it.  Regulation, even in pursuit of a single objective, for instance the optimal 
exploitation of mineral resources, can vary between rigorous state control that can lead to full 
scale nationalisation of the mining industry125 and less rigorous forms of regulation.  Less 
rigorous forms of regulation can, for example, attempt to ensure that only entities capable of 
optimal exploitation become holders of rights to minerals.126  Less rigorous forms of regulation 
aimed at optimal exploitation of mineral resources can also force holders of rights to exploit 
mineral deposits for which they have a mining right actively.127  
The objectives and policies underlying regulation of the South African mining industry have 
been extensively dealt with elsewhere,128 which renders a detailed analysis of the policy 
objectives underlying the MPRDA unnecessary here.  Briefly, from the preamble and 
objectives of the Act, it is clear that the Act pursues a complex and inter-related set of 
objectives.  The Act provides for environmentally129 and socially responsible mining.130  The 
MPRDA further aims to address discriminatory policies of the past and to provide equitable 
access to the country’s mineral resources.131  It is thus expected that to realise all of these 
objectives, the MPRDA will extensively and rigorously regulate the mining industry. 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the impact of regulation under the MPRDA on the 
theoretical basis of mineral law.  This chapter aims to evaluate the fundamentals of the current 
regulatory regime, to cast light on its continued dual administrative and proprietary features. 
The inquiry necessitates engagement with the core principles of property law that influenced 
                                                 
124 See Mostert Principles and Policies 11 – 15.  In case of an irreconcilable conflict between the landowner and 
holder of mineral right, the interests of the mineral rights holder takes precedence.  See Trojan Exploration Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg Mines Ltd 1996 4 SA 499 (A) 509; Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie v Fourie en Andere 
1988 2 SA 627 (T) 638; Hudson v Mann and Another 1950 4 SA 485 (T) 488.  
125 Mostert Principles and Policies 2. 
126 Badenhorst 1991 TSAR 122.  
127 See chap 2, sec 2.4 for how the MPRDA ensures that right holders continuously prospect and mine.  
128 Mostert Principles and Policies 75 – 77. 
129 MPRDA, s 2(h). 
130 MPRDA, ss 2(f) and (i). 
131.MPRDA, s 2(c) and (d).  See Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) [1] 
where the court mentions that apartheid put 87% of land AND the mineral resources under the land in 13% of the 
population.  See also [26] and [61], [64] – [65], [73] where the court engages with equitable access to minerals as 
an objective of the MPRDA in the context of expropriation.  See also Minister of Mineral Resources v Sishen Iron 
Ore Company (Pty) Ltd 2014 2 SA 603 (CC) [3], [7] and Waelde 2002 Minerals and Energy 10. 





mineral law.132  The focus is on the manner in which regulation in terms of the MPRDA erodes 
the core principles of mineral law that developed from property law.133   
To achieve its aim, this chapter uses the following structure:  The next section identifies the 
relevant core concepts of property law that influenced the development of mineral law and 
provides a brief explanation thereof.  The core concepts of mineral law that developed due to 
the influence of property law are then analysed.  The remainder of the chapter explores the 
impact of regulation on the core principles of mineral law.   
2. From property law to mineral law: development of the core 
concepts 
Mineral law governs the “nature, content, acquisition, loss and transfer of mineral rights, 
prospecting rights and mining rights”.134  This indicates that the core concepts of mineral law 
are mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights.  Property law, and specifically the 
concepts “ownership” and “limited real rights”, played an important role in the development 
of these core principles of mineral law. 
In common law, ownership is seen as the most comprehensive real right that a person can have 
regarding a thing.135  Traditionally, ownership was seen as absolute and individualistic.136  This 
means, inter alia,that an owner could do as he pleases with the thing that is subject to his 
ownership right.137  However, today it is accepted that ownership is not truly absolute because 
an owner can only exercise his ownership right within the limits imposed by law.138  The 
                                                 
132 See Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-7 – 1-18.  See Mostert Principles 
and Policies 7 – 13 for a detailed analysis of the concepts of property law that influenced mineral law. 
133 The focus is therefore not on the manner in which regulation influences the core principles of property law that 
form part of mineral law. In this regard see Mostert Principles and Policies 164. 
134 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-1. 
135 Gien v Gien 1979 2 SA 1113 (T) 1129.  See van der Merwe Sakereg 171; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 47 91; 
du Bois Wille’s Principles 470. 
136 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 92; van der Merwe Sakereg 170. 
137 Gien v Gien 1120.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 91; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 249. 
138 Gien v Gien 1120.  In Cosmos (Pvt) Ltd v Phillipson 1968 3 SA 121 (R) 126, the court said an owner is entitled 
to “reasonable enjoyment”.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 91; du Bois Wille’s Principles 471 – 476; van der 
Merwe Sakereg 171 173; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-7; Sonnekus and 
Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 249 – 250; Pienaar 2006 TSAR 447. Van der Walt 1999 Koers 264 refers to the 
“ceiling approach” in the context of land reform.  Also see Van der Walt 1992 SAJHR 433 – 435 where the author 
argues that the traditional concept of ownership is not appropriate in the context of transformation and for the 
fundamental re-structuring of society, the legal system and land rights.  





content of ownership is at times described with reference to the entitlements of the owner.139  
An entitlement refers to the content of a right and in particular describes what an owner may 
lawfully do with the thing that is the object of his ownership.140  The entitlements include the 
entitlement to use the thing, the entitlement to consume and destroy the thing and the 
entitlement to dispose of the thing.141  For purposes of mineral law, it is important that mineral 
exploitation is one of the entitlements of landownership.142 
The fact that mineral exploitation is an entitlement of landownership is closely connected to 
the maxim cuius est solum eius usque ad caelum et ad inferos.  According to this maxim, the 
owner of the land is automatically also the owner of the sky and everything contained in the 
soil. 143  This rule has undoubtedly been accepted into South African law and was applicable 
before the MPRDA came into operation in the regime established by the Minerals Act144 and 
the common law. 145  The cuius est solum rule means that the owner of land is automatically 
also owner of minerals in the land.146  Thus, the owner of the land has control over the minerals 
                                                 
139 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 92 – 93; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-8 
– 1-9; van der Merwe Sakereg 173 - 174 acknowledges the entitlements of an owner but rejects a description of 
ownership according to the different entitlements.  In South African law, the entitlements are seen as part of the 
content of ownership as a whole.  Also see Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 249 where the authors 
warn that the description of the entitlements of ownership must not mean that ownership is merely the sum total 
of its entitlements. See Badenhorst 2006 Obiter 552 where, with reference to Elektrisiteitsvoorsieningskommissie 
v Fourie the author argues that an owner’s right to surface support vis a vis a mineral right holder is an entitlement 
of the owner according to the doctrine of rights.  The entitlements also have been referred to as “rights”.  See, for 
example, Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law II: The Law of Property 11 and 27.  For criticism on 
equating “rights” and “entitlements” see van der Vyfer 1988 SALJ 6 – 7.  This thesis is not concerned with a 
definition of ownership and the mainstream South African approach as explained by Mostert Principles and 
Policies 9, namely the “concept of unity with the entitlements…forming part of the whole” is accepted. 
140 Badenhorst 1991 TSAR 114; van der Vyfer 1988 SALJ 1 6. 
141 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 92 – 93; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-
9; van der Merwe Sakereg 173.  
142 Agri SA (CC) [7]; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-9; Badenhorst, van 
der Vyver and van Heerden 1994 JERL 289; Badenhorst 1991 TSAR 114.  See Badenhorst 1990 TSAR 239 251 
where the author explains this within the doctrine of rights.  
143As translated in Badenhorst et al Silberberg 92.  See Van Vuuren v Registrar of Deeds 1907 TS 289 294; Union 
Government (Minister v Railway and Harbours) v Marais and Others 1920 AD 240 246; Agri SA (CC) [7]; van 
der Merwe Sakereg 190; Mostert Principles and Policies 5; Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 77; 
Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-9 states that “the owner of the land is the 
dominus of the whole land…”  For a detailed exposition of this rule and the question whether it has its origin in 
Roman law see Dale (LLD thesis) 76 – 87.  Also see Pienaar 1989 De Jure 258 fn 15 for the origins of the maxim.  
The rule also applies in other jurisdictions.  See Barton in Zillman et al 22.  See González in Zillman et al 69 72 
73 for an explanation of how the rule has, at times, been limited in some Latin American Countries and Daintith 
in Zillman et al 39 for the position in the United States of America. 
144 50 of 1991. 
145 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 92; van der Merwe Sakereg 551; Viljoen and Bosman A Guide to Mining Rights 
in South Africa 7; Leon 2009 JERL 612. 
146Neebe v Registrar of Mining Rights 1902 TS 65 85; Rocher v Registrar of Deeds 1911 TPD 311 315; Erasmus 
and Lategan v Union Government 1954 3 SA 415 (O) 417; Viljoen (LLD thesis) 5; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg 
405; Mostert Principles and Policies 7; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 730. 





in the soil and can decide what to do with the minerals, i.e. to exploit the minerals or let them 
lie fallow.  The surface owner, by default, has the “first right” to the minerals.147  The cuius est 
solum principle further implies that it is impossible to layer property horizontally and that 
ownership of the land and ownership of minerals in the land cannot vest in different entities.148 
The need arose to acknowledge mineral rights as rights separate from ownership of land that 
could be transferred to another entity.149  One prominent reason for this was that, due to the 
high cost of mining, it became impossible for landowners to mine independently.150  It was 
thus necessary to acknowledge mineral rights as rights, separate from landownership, which 
could be transferred to an entity with the financial and technical ability to extract the minerals. 
The need to acknowledge separate mineral rights gave rise to the notion of severance.  
Severance makes it possible to separate the rights to minerals from ownership rights in the 
land.151  The notion of severance gave way to the development of mineral rights as rights that 
are distinct from ownership of land.  If the mineral rights were severed from ownership of the 
land, the landowner could be the holder of the mineral rights or could transfer the mineral rights 
to a third party.152  Mineral rights developed along the lines of property law and were 
                                                 
147 Cawood and Minnitt 1998 The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 372. The 
authors opine that the fact that the surface owner, by default, became owner of the mineral rights was due to “the 
imperfect administration of mineral rights over a long period of time...” 
148Rocher v Registrar of Deeds 315; Neebe v Registrar of Mining Rights 85; Mostert Principles and Policies 5; 
Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-11.  According to Barton in Zillman et al 
24, despite the cuis est solum rule also being applicable in other common-law jurisdictions, horizontal layering is 
possible “as a matter of conveyancing” and through statute.  According to de Alexander Xavier in McHarg et al 
222 – 223, Brazilian law distinguishes between ownership of the soil and ownership of the subsoil. 
149 Badenhorst 2004 JERL 219; Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 78; du Bois Wille’s Principles 618. 
150 Agri SA (CC) [8]; Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 78; Mostert November 2014 Recht In Africa 9; 
Mostert Principles and Policies 10; van der Merwe Sakereg 553. 
151 See Dale (LLD thesis) 89 -93 for an exposition of how this principle developed and 196 – 199 where the author 
shows that recognition was given to the separate holding of mineral rights for the first time by a Crown Land 
Disposal Ordinance in 1903 in the Transvaal Ordinance 57 of 1903 which was recognized in the Precious and 
Base Metals Act, 35 of 1908.  In 1943 the Appellate Division in Nolte v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment 
Company 1943 AD 295 315 accepted separate holding of mineral rights.  See Viljoen and Bosman A Guide to 
Mining Rights 9 for an overview of legislation as early as 1881 that provides evidence that mineral rights could 
be held separately from landownership.  Also see Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 9 – 11; Mostert and 
van den Berg in Zillman et al (eds) 78 – 79; Cawood and Minnitt 1998 The Journal for the South African Institute 
of Mining and Metallurgy 372; Badenhorst 1999 Stell LR 96 and 99; Joubert 1959 THRHR 27.  It is now well 
established that mineral rights could be held separately from ownership of land.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 
667; van der Merwe Sakereg 551 556 – 557; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 738.  Section 70(1) of 
the Deeds Registry Act 47 of 1937 also provided for severance.  Section 70 was repealed by section 53 of the 
Mining Titles Registration Act 24 of 2003.  As regards severance in common-law jurisdictions in general see 
Barton in Zillman et al 23. 
152 Agri SA (CC) [8] and [9]; Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al (eds) 78 – 79.  When minerals rights were 
severed from landownership and both titles vest in the landowner, merger did not take place.  See Beyers v Du 
Preez 1989 1 SA 328 (T) 336; Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 12; Badenhorst 1989 De Jure 385 – 386; 
Nel Jones Conveyancing in South Africa 415. 





“conceptualised with reference to acknowledged categories of property rights”.153  Although 
the judiciary experienced difficulty in finding the proper juristic niche for mineral rights within 
the acknowledged categories of limited real rights, mineral rights were classified as limited real 
rights.154  As opposed to ownership, which is the only real right that a person can have in 
relation to his own property,155 a limited real right is a right over the thing of another.156  
Limited real rights are more circumscribed than ownership and in actual fact derive from 
ownership.157  Furthermore, ownership is viewed as the “mother right” from which mineral 
rights (limited real rights) derive.158   
In Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy,159 the court, for the first time, parted 
from the traditional conception of mineral rights as limited real rights.160  The court referred to 
“mineral ownership” of which the entitlement not to mine (or the ability not to exploit) is an 
essential component.161  The decision creates the impression that “mineral ownership” is a type 
of ownership distinct from ownership of land.162  Mineral rights are thus, not limited real rights 
                                                 
153 Mostert Principles and Policies 1.  According to Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 12 the classification 
of mineral rights as limited real rights that derive from ownership of the land, is questionable.  
154 Trojan Exploration 509.  Mineral rights were initially classified as personal servitude or quasi-personal 
servitudes.  See for example Lazarus and Jackson v Wessels, Olivier and Coronation Freehold Estate, Town and 
Mines Ltd 1903 TS 499 510; Van Vuuren v Registrar of Deeds 294; Rocher v Registrar of Deeds 315 – 316; South 
African Railways and Harbours v Transvaal Consolidated Land and Exploration Co Ltd 1961 2 SA 467 481; 
Gluckman v Solomon 1921 TPD 335 338.  In Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates Pty (Ltd) 2007 2 SA 363 
(SCA) [16] the court held that it is a settled principles that mineral rights are quasi-servitudes.  This case was 
decided after the MPRDA came into operation and abolished mineral rights.  Mineral rights were also regarded 
as sui generis real rights.  See for example Ex Parte Pierce 1950 3 SA 628 (O) 634; Erasmus v Afrikaner 
Proprietary Mines Ltd 1967 1 SA 950 (W) 956E; Apex Mines Ltd v Administrator, Administrator 1986 4 SA 581 
(T) 590 - 591.  Regarding the proper juristic niche for mineral rights also see Mostert November 2014 Recht in 
Africa 12 – 15; Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 79 – 89; Badenhorst 1996 Stell LR 99 – 101; Badenhorst, 
van der Vyver and van Heerden 1994 JERL 290 – 291; Badenhorst Die Juridiese Bevoegdheid om Minerale te 
Ontgin 581 – 604; Badenhorst 1989 De Jure 386 – 389.  
155 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 47. 
156 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 47; van der Merwe Sakereg 69. 
157 Mostert Principles and Policies 9. 
158 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-8; Badenhorst Die Juridiese 
Bevoegdheid om Minerale te Ontgin 571. 
159 2013 4 SA 1 (CC). 
160 Agri SA (CC) [38] [39].  Also see Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 87.  It has been argued the court’s 
departure from the traditional conceptualization indicates that “the concept of ‘mineral right has been 
misunderstood for decades”. See Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 8. 
161 Agri SA (CC) [43]. 
162 Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 87 argue that “[t]he majority judgment treated the right to minerals 
as a separate form of ownership, unceremoniously breaking with traditional conceptions of the right to minerals 
as a limited real right”.  It seems that mineral rights are regarded as a separate type of ownership in other 
jurisdiction.  See, for example, Barton in Zillman et al 28 where the author argues that in English and Scottish 
law “severance caused ‘minerals’ to come into separate ownership” and Daintith in Zillman et al 43 - 44 as regards 
the “mineral estate” in the United States. 





that derive from ownership,163 but constitute a different form of ownership.  However, the court 
did not pursue this line of argument in any detail.  Furthermore, before the Agri SA decision, 
mineral rights, as limited real rights distinct from ownership of the land developed from, and 
were firmly rooted in, property law.164  
As part of the content of common-law mineral rights, holders thereof had the entitlements to 
go upon the land for purposes of exploitation, to prospect, and to mine and remove the minerals 
if any were found.165    The content of mineral rights by definition thus included the entitlements 
to prospect and mine.  In the absence of statutory regulation to exploit minerals, holders of 
mineral rights had the entitlement to exploit minerals freely.166    
Holders of mineral rights (the landowner or the entity to whom the mineral right was transferred 
if the mineral rights were severed from landownership), could grant lesser rights, i.e. 
prospecting rights or mining rights to third parties.167  Prospecting rights were granted by virtue 
of prospecting contracts168 and mining rights by virtue of mineral leases.169  Prospecting 
                                                 
163 Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 12 supports this view.  
164 See Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 88 where the authors argue that the judiciary has been unwilling 
for more than a century to conceptualize rights to minerals as a separate from of title.  Majoni August 2013 De 
Rebus 42 opines that it “appears” that the MPRDA “follow an English law approach where separate ownership of 
strata of the soil under the surface is possible”. 
165 Van Vuuren v Registrar of Deeds 294 – 295; Rocher v Registrar of Deeds 316.  See the definition of mineral 
rights proposed by Badenhorst 1991 TSAR 113 118; Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 384. 
166 Agri SA (CC) [38]. 
167 Van der Vyfer 2012 De Jure 125 127. 
168 Kaplan and Dale A Guide to the Minerals Act 47 – 48 and 53; Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 472.  The 
term prospecting contract had a wide and a narrow meaning.  In the narrow sense it meant only the entitlement to 
prospect for minerals.  In the broad sense it contained an option to purchase ownership of the land or minerals or 
the option to obtain a mineral lease.  Only prospecting contracts in the wide sense were registrable in the deeds 
office according to the repealed s 102 of the Deeds Registries Act.  See Badenhorst and Olivier 1997 TSAR 587; 
van der Merwe Sakereg 558; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 4-2. 
169 Kaplan and Dale A Guide to the Minerals Act 47 – 48, 75 – 78; Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 472.  
Although the term “mineral lease” can be problematic due to the unique nature of the contract.  See Wiseman v 
De Pinna and Others [1986] 1 All SA 341 (A) [10]; van der Merwe Sakereg 558; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral 
and Petroleum Law of South Africa 5-2. 





rights170 and mining rights171 were regarded as limited real rights provided that they were 
registered.172 
To summarize, ownership of land included ownership of mineral deposits under the surface.  
The entitlements of ownership included the entitlement of exploiting minerals, i.e. the 
entitlements to prospect and mine.  Mineral rights could be severed from ownership of the land, 
in which case either the landowner could be the holder thereof or could transfer the rights to 
another entity. Mineral right holders had the entitlements to prospect and mine, and could grant 
prospecting rights and mining rights to further parties.  However, the core concepts of mineral 
law, specifically prospecting rights and mining rights, have been subject to governmental 
regulation since the discovery of large deposits of gold and diamonds in South Africa. 173  The 
next section explores the impact of regulation on the core concepts of mineral law. 
3. Regulation 
Prospecting rights and mining rights in particular have been subject to considerable regulation 
by government.174  Indeed, prospecting rights and mining rights have been regulated to such 
an extent that “a distinction is typically drawn between the right to mine and/or prospect and 
the underlying mineral right”.175  The manner in which the government regulated the rights to 
mine and prospect since the discovery of mineral resources has been dealt with extensively.  
Mostert176 identifies four eras or generations of laws that regulated mineral law.177  Following 
                                                 
170 In terms of prospecting contrancts in the wide sense (see fn 66) was registrable.  In Vansa Vanadium SA Ltd v 
Registrar of Deeds 1996 1 ALL SA 433 (T) 442, the court held that registered prospecting contracts were not real.  
It is, however, generally accepted that this decision is wrong and that prospecting rights were real if registered.  
See Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 4-4; Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell 
LR 386; Badenhorst 1998 Obiter 146; Badenhorst and Olivier 1997 TSAR 593.  Before legislation enabling 
prospecting contracts to be registered, these contracts were personal in nature.  See Cullinan v Pistorius 1903 
ORC 33 37.  For a detailed examination of the nature of prospecting contracts, in the wide and the narrow sense 
see Badenhorst Die Bevoegdheid om Minerale te Ontgin 639 – 699.   
171 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 5-5; Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell 
LR 387; Badenhorst 1998 Obiter 146; Badenhorst Die Juridisie Bevoegdheid om Minerale te Ontgin 707 - 711 
172 Before registration the prospecting contracts and mineral leases gave rise to personal rights which were 
converted to real rights when registered.  See Bandenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 386; Badenhorst and Mostert 
Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 4-4 and 5-5; Badenhorst and van Heerden 1993 TSAR 166. 
173 Mostert Principles and Policies 1 and 15 – 16. 
174 Mostert Principles and Policies 1; Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 78; van der Vyfer 2012 De Jure 
127. 
175 Mostert Principles and Policies 1 and 163 for the right to mine in particular.  See Agri SA (CC) [38] for the 
necessity to distinguish between the underlying mineral right and the right to mine. 
176 Mostert Principles and Policies 16 – 17. 
177 The eras are the Colonial and Union eras from 1860 to 1964 (Mostert Principles and Policies chap 3), the era 
between 1964 and 1991 (Mostert Principles and Policies chap 4), the era between 1992 and 2004 (Mostert 





a detailed analysis of the extent of governmental regulation in the eras before 1991, the author 
concludes that governmental regulation was common in all eras.178  Regulation was specifically 
aimed at controlling the ability to prospect and mine or, in other words, to exploit minerals.179  
It is thus prospecting rights and mining rights that were subject to governmental regulation.180 
These rights had a strong public-law character due to the extent of governmental regulation.181 
The desired impact of the MPRDA in general, and specifically on the theoretical basis of 
mineral law, is best understood when compared to the system of mineral law immediately 
preceding it.  This regime consisted of the Minerals Act182 and the common law.  Before the 
Minerals Act came into operation, regulatory legislation had the effect that prospecting rights 
and mining rights vested in different entities at times.  For example, the rights to mine for and 
dispose of precious metals and precious stones vested in the state.183  The rights to prospect 
and mine for base minerals vested in the mineral right holder or the person with whom the 
mineral right holder concluded a prospecting contract or mineral lease.184  These regulatory 
provisions thus altered the common-law position of mineral right holders because the 
entitlements to prospect and mine vested in entities other than the holders of mineral rights.   
The pre-democratic government enacted the Minerals Act in pre-emption of a new political 
dispensation.  Thus, while the Minerals Act attempted to deregulate the mining industry, the 
MPRDA seeks to regulate the same quite heavily. 
                                                 
Principles and Policies chap 5) and the current system from 2004 onwards (Mostert Principles and Policies chap 
6). 
178 Mostert Principles and Policies 159.  See 37 where the author remarks that in the Colonial and Union eras the 
laws “acknowledged the capacity of the state to control and regulate the various kinds of minerals…”  See 45 – 
46 for the extent of regulation in the era between 1964 and 1991. 
179 Commenting on the regime immediately preceding the MPRDA in terms of the Minerals Act and the common 
law, Badenhorst 2001 THRHR 645 says that the role of the state was to give the green light to exercise rights. 
180 Mostert Principles and Policies 159.  See Viljoen and Bosman A Guide to Mining Rights 7 where the authors 
suggested in 1979 that mineral and mining law might fit better into administrative law due to state control of 
mining. 
181 Mostert Principles and Policies 159.    
182 Act 50 of 1991. 
183 S 2(1)(a) of the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967 and s 2 of the Precious Stones Act 73 of 1964. 
184 S 2(1)(b) of the Mining Rights Act. 





3.1. Regulation immediately prior to the MPRDA 
The enactment of the Minerals Act was perceived to be a re-enactment of the common-law 
position regarding holders of mineral rights.185  The Act further was an attempt (though not 
successful)186 to deregulate the mining industry as part of the general policy of privatisation 
and deregulation of the National Party government at the time.187  The Minerals Act pursued 
three objectives, namely, optimal utilisation of minerals, mine health and safety, and 
rehabilitation of the surface during and after prospecting and mining operations.188   
The Minerals Act re-vested the entitlements to enter upon the land that was subject to the 
mineral right and to prospect and mine for minerals in the holder of the mineral right.189  The 
content of mineral rights were thus by definition restored so that the entitlements to prospect 
and mine vested in holders of mineral rights (or an entity to whom the holders of mineral rights 
granted the right to prospect or mine through a prospecting contract or mineral lease).  
Nevertheless, these entitlements could not be exercised freely.  According to section 5(2), read 
with sections 6(1) and 9(1) of the Minerals Act, an entity had to obtain a prospecting permit190 
or mining authorisation191 to prospect or mine, respectively.  The entitlements to prospect and 
mine were subject to strict regulation under the Minerals Act.  In Minister of Minerals and 
Energy v Agri South Africa,192 the Supreme Court of Appeal (Agri SA (SCA)) said that mining 
authorisations conferred “practical value” on mineral rights.193 Commenting on the Minerals 
Bill that preceded the Minerals Act, Badenhorst said that regulation of the entitlements to 
                                                 
185 Kaplan and Dale A Guide to the Minerals Act 5 - 6; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg 406; Badenhorst 1991 TSAR 
125.  The definition of the word “mineral” in the Minerals Act was also perceived to be a re-enactment of the 
common law.  See Klein and Boraine Silberberg 410.   
186 See the White Paper on the Mineral Policy of the Republic of South Africa (1986) 5 – 6.  
187 See the White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation in the Republic of South Africa (1987) in general; Dale 
1997 Resources Policy 15 16; Waelde 2002 Minerals and Energy 13.  See Mostert Principles and Policies 57 – 
58 for the reasons for the enactment of the Minerals Act.  
188 Minerals Act, long title.  Also see Kaplan and Dale A Guide to the Minerals Act 3 – 4; Mostert Principles and 
Policies 59; Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy “Minerals and Petroleum” in LAWSA par 1.   
189 This is true concerning the rights to mine and dispose of precious stones and precious metals according to s 
5(1) of the Minerals Act.  Also see Badenhorst 1991 TSAR 122 – 123, 124 and 125 and for the entities in whom 
some of the entitlements vested before the Minerals Act; Badenhorst and van Heerden 1993 TSAR 164; 
Badenhorst, van der Vyver and van Heerden 1994 JERL 289. 
190 See Kaplan and Dale A Guide to the Minerals Act 55 – 56.  See Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum 
Law of South Africa chap 8 for a general discussion of prospecting permits. 
191 See Kaplan and Dale A Guide to the Minerals Act 78 – 79.  See Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum 
Law of South Africa chap 9 for a general discussion of mining authorisations.  
192 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA). 
193 Agri SA (SCA) [70]. 





prospect and mine were so extensive that “the Minerals Bill is characterised by a cradle to the 
grave form of regulation”.194   
Regulation of the ability to prospect and mine resulted in two layers of rights.195  The first layer 
consisted of the common-law mineral right196 as well as the prospecting rights (granted by 
virtue of prospecting contracts) and mining rights (granted by virtue of mineral leases) that 
derived from the mineral right.  The first layer provided access into the mining industry.197  
The second layer of rights consisted of the authorisations and permissions that were necessary 
to exercise198 prospecting rights and mining rights.  In pursuit of its objectives, the state 
effectively established control over the mining industry through the second layer of rights in 
the following manner: The state granted prospecting permits199 and mining authorisations200 
and determined the length of time for which they were valid.201  These permissions and 
authorisations could further be abandoned,202 suspended or cancelled203 in prescribed 
circumstances.  Cancellation had no effect on the underlying mineral right, prospecting right 
or mining right.204  These rights would still exist.  The holder thereof would, however, be unable 
to exercise them legally without the necessary permissions or authorisation.  Prospecting 
permits and mining authorisations were not transferable in any way and could not be 
                                                 
194 Badenhorst 1991 TSAR 130.  At 129 – 130 the author advances reasons for the statement.  The reasons include 
that exploitation of base minerals was also subject to the necessary state authorisation under the Minerals Bill 
while base minerals could be exploited freely in the regime before the Minerals Act.  Another reason is that the 
Minerals Bill gave government officials broad discretionary powers in administration of the Bill. 
195 Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 23; Mostert Principles and Policies 15; Mostert and van den Berg in 
Zillman et al 89.  Dale 1996 JERL 308 refers to a two-tiered system. The common-law mineral rights, prospecting 
rights and mining rights presented one tier and the authorisations represented a second tier. 
196 Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 23. 
197 Mostert Principles and Policies 94; Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 23; Mostert and van den Berg in 
Zillman et al 89. 
198 Mostert Principles and Policies 94 refers to “activation” of rights.  Also see Mostert November 2014 Recht in 
Africa 23; Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 89. See Badenhorst and Roodt 1995 THRHR 2 where the 
authors say “die Mineraalwet [reguleer] dus by uitstek die uitoefening van ontginingsbevoegdhede.”  Also see 
Badenhorst 1996 Obiter 168.  
199 Minerals Act, s 6(1). 
200 Minerals Act s 9(1). 
201 According to s 6(4) of the Minerals Act, prospecting permits were valid for 12 months or a longer period 
determined the Director of Mineral Development and were renewable in specified circumstances.  The Minerals 
Act did not provide specific time periods for which mining authorisations were valid but according to s 11(1) the 
authorisation remained valid for the “period determined therein”.  
202 Minerals Act, ss 11(1), 11(2) and (3). 
203 Minerals Act, ss 11(1) and 14. 
204 See Leon 2009 JERL 613 where following a brief discussion of mining authorisations and prospecting permits, 
the author says that “…common-law rights to minerals were not subject to termination by a public authority for 
non-compliance with the Minerals Act or on any other grounds”. 





encumbered by mortgage bonds.205  The underlying mineral rights were transferable freely and 
could be encumbered by mortgage.206 
To summarise, the regime before the MPRDA thus regulated the ability to prospect and mine 
by requiring a prospecting permit or mining authorisation.  Minerals rights were however 
recognised. Only the mineral right holder (the landowner or another if mineral rights were 
severed from ownership and transferred to another entity) or an entity that had consent to 
prospect or mine from the mineral right holder could apply for a prospecting authorisation207 
or mining permit.208  Thus, any person, who wanted to prospect or mine, had to obtain the 
common-law mineral right from the original holder, or had to obtain a prospecting right (in the 
form of a prospecting contract) or mining right (in the form of a mineral lease) from the mineral 
right holder.209  Mineral rights thus provided access into the mining industry.210  The right to 
prospect and mine, although derived from the mineral right, was extensively regulated by the 
government through a second layer of rights.  The second layer of rights was purely 
administrative and had a public law character.211  The combination of mineral rights, based in 
private law, and regulation of prospecting rights and mining rights, an administrative function 
of the state based in public law, becomes apparent.  It is evident that mineral law did indeed 
have a dual nature in the regime preceding the MPRDA, namely proprietary and administrative.  
This system of first and second layer of rights is utilised in the next section to illustrate the 
impact of the MPRDA on the theoretical foundations of mineral law.   
3.2. Regulation under the MPRDA 
The MPRDA effectively terminated the framework of mineral law that was operational before 
its enactment. Most significantly, it repealed the Minerals Act212 and the common law, to the 
extent that the common law was not consistent with the MPRDA.213  According to the MPRDA, 
mineral and petroleum resources are the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and 
                                                 
205 Minerals Act, s 13. 
206 See sec 3.2.2 fn 256 and fn 257 below. 
207 Minerals Act, s 6(1). 
208 Minerals Act, s 9(1). 
209 Kaplan and Dale A Guide to the Minerals Act 47. 
210 Mostert Principles and Policies 94 and 161. 
211 See Badenhorst 2011 4 SALJ 769 where the author says “[a] prospecting permit or mining authorisation was 
merely a licence and does not exhibit typical features of a real right”.  See Badenhorst and van Heerden 1993 
TSAR 168 regarding prospecting permits. 
212 S 110 and sch 1 MPRDA. 
213 MPRDA, s 4(2). 





the state is the custodian214 thereof for the benefit of all South Africans.215  According to section 
3(2)(a) of the Act, the state can grant, issue, refuse, control, administer and manage any right 
to minerals.216  The only way to obtain any right to minerals, including prospecting rights, 
mining rights and mining permits,217 in the regime established by the MPRDA is thus to apply 
for such rights to government through an administrative process.  
3.2.1. Extent of regulation 
The MPRDA regulates prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits extensively.218 
Although the extent of regulation is meticulously surveyed in later chapters, a simple reading 
of the Act demonstrates that current regulation is rigorous:  The only way to obtain prospecting 
rights, mining rights and mining permits is to apply to government.  The MPRDA determines 
the length of time for which the rights are granted219 as well as the circumstances in which 
rights can be suspended and cancelled220 and the circumstances in which a right lapses.221  The 
MPRDA further regulates the entitlements of holders of rights to enter the land under which 
the minerals subject to rights occur and to prospect and mine for minerals.222 The state even 
determines when holders of rights may exercise their entitlement not to exploit the mineral by 
requiring holders to mine or prospect within a certain period from which the right is granted.223  
                                                 
214 See chap 3, sec 2.2. 
215 MPRDA, s 3(1).  
216 MPRDA, s 3(2)(a). 
217 These are the rights to minerals relevant for this thesis.  See chap 1, sec 2. 
218 There are some aspects of prospecting and mining that the MPRDA do not regulate, for instance, the ability of 
holders of mining permits to dispose of minerals found.  See chap 4, s 2.2.  Dale in Bastida et al 849 has described 
the system as one of “administrative decision-making” and Mostert Principles and Policies 82 opines that the 
system is “administratively driven”.  According to Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 80, the MPRDA 
“represents the zenith of the state’s right to intervene in subsurface matters”.   
219 According to s 17(6), prospecting rights are valid for a maximum period of 5 years and according to s 18(4) 
can be renewed once for a maximum period of 3 years.  S 23(6) determines that a mining right can be granted for 
a maximum period of 30 years and according to s 24(4) can be renewed for “further periods” each of which may 
not exceed 30 years.  According to ss 27(8)(a) and (b) mining permits can be granted for a maximum period of 2 
years and can be renewed for 3 periods each not exceeding 1 year.  
220 MPRDA, s 47 
221 MPRDA, s 56.  
222 MPRDA, ss 5(2)(a) and (b) for prospecting rights and mining rights and 27(7)(a) and (d) for mining permits.  
223 For example, mining must commence within one year from the date on which the mining right becomes 
effective in terms of s 25(b) of the MPRDA and prospecting must commence within 120 days from the date on 
which the prospecting right becomes effective in terms of s 19(2)(b) of the MPRDA.  See in this regard Agri South 
Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy; Van Rooyen v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2010 1 SA 104 (GNP) 
[9] (Agri SA High Court).  See chap 4, sec 2.4.1 for a discussion of the obligation to commence prospecting and 
mining within certain periods. 





The MPRDA determines if and how prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits can 
be transferred and encumbered.224   
Furthermore, except for the transitional arrangements that provided for the transition from the 
previous regime to the current regime, which have already come to an end,225 the Act does not 
recognise the existence of common-law mineral rights.226  Holders of common-law mineral 
rights, prospecting rights and mining rights had an opportunity to convert their rights under the 
previous regime to new rights under the MPRDA.227  Common-law mineral rights, prospecting 
rights and mining rights ceased to exist irrespective of whether conversion was successful, 
unsuccessful or whether holders of rights in the previous regime did not lodge their rights for 
conversion.228  It is uncertain whether these rights were simply terminated or whether they were 
transferred to the state.  Two interpretations are possible in this regard. 
                                                 
224 Section 11 MPRDA. 
225 MPRDA, sch II.  The transitional provisions gave holders of rights in the regime preceding the MPRDA an 
opportunity to convert their rights into rights under the MPRDA.  The transitional arrangements made provision 
for “old order rights” to be converted into “new order rights”.  Old order rights consisted of bundles of rights that 
existed in the previous regime.  These bundles included common-law mineral rights.    As an example, Category 
1 Table 1 made provision for conversion of the common-law mineral right, together with a prospecting permits 
obtained in terms of s 6(1) of the Minerals Act.  The last of the transitional provisions ended in 2009.  See 
Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 381 for a list of “old order rights” and 392 for the “bundling of rights 
approach”.  See in general regarding the transitional provisions Badenhorst “Mineral Rights: “Year Zero” 
Cometh” 2001 Obiter 133 – 139; Mostert Principles and Policies 92 – 101; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and 
Petroleum Law of South Africa chap 25; Badenhorst 2011 4 SALJ 764 – 766; Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell 
LR 380 – 384.     
226 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Regional Manager, Mineral Regulation Free State Region: Department of 
Minerals and Energy Case 1590/2007 (OPD) Unreported (15-05-2008) par 2.5; Badenhorst 2004 JERL 235; 
Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13-6; Badenhorst “Mineral Rights: “Year 
Zero” Cometh ?” 2001 Obiter 130; Badenhorst 2011 4 SALJ 764; du Bois Wille’s Principles 618.  Mostert 
Principles and Policies 161 acknowledges that common-law mineral rights have “limited significance” in the 
current regulatory system as it only forms the basis upon which rights from the previous regime could be lodged 
for conversion. 
227 See fn 225 above.  
228 See Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 397 – 399.  Conversion of old order rights into new order rights 
came before the judiciary in the context of expropriation. The question was whether termination of unused rights 
in the previous regime amounted to expropriation of property.  In an interlocutory decision in Agri South Africa 
v Minister of Minerals and Energy; Van Rooyen v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2010 1 SA 104 (GNP) [11] 
and [12] the court held that in the absence of the transitional provisions all pre-existing mineral rights would have 
been extinguished and the MPRDA would have been unconstitutional.  Following the interlocutory decision, the 
court held in Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2012 1 SA 171 (GNP) [88] that there was an 
expropriation.   In Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) [101] the Supreme 
Court of Appeal set the High Court decision aside and held that there was no expropriation.  For reasons different 
than the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Constitutional Court in Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and 
Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) [72] also held that the coming into force of the MPRDA did not bring about 
expropriation of unused old order rights.  The constitutionality of the MPRDA and the effect of the transitional 
arrangements have been extensively written about.  See Dale in Bastida et al 844 – 845; Badenhorst and Mostert 
2004 Stell LR 22; Mostert Principles and Policies 101 – 111; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum 
Law of South Africa 25-19 – 25-34B; Badenhorst 2002 Obiter 250; Badenhorst “Expropriations by virtue of the 





The first interpretation is that the MPRDA extinguished the entitlements of holders of mineral 
rights and that the state acquired similar powers in terms of the MPRDA.229  The common-law 
powers and competencies of holders of mineral rights and the powers of the state in terms of 
the MPRDA are mutually exclusive.230  This interpretation thus includes destruction of the 
common-law entitlements of mineral right holders to prospect and mine.  If the mineral right 
holder concluded a prospecting contract or mining lease with another, who subsequently had 
the right to prospect or mine, the impact would be the same, i.e. the prospecting rights and 
mining rights would be destroyed.  In such a case, the holder of the prospecting right or mining 
right, and not the mineral right holder, would experience the effects of the destruction of the 
rights.  
Another interpretation is that there was an ex lege transfer of mineral right holders to the state 
upon enactment of the MPRDA.231  Before the MPRDA came into operation, the rights to 
prospect and mine vested in holders of mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights.232 
According to the interpretation that there was an ex lege transfer of mineral rights to the 
government, the government can only grant rights if the rights vest in it.233 Thus, there must 
have been an automatic transfer of the rights to the government when the MPRDA came into 
operatio.234  This interpretation relies on the Roman maxim nemo plus iuris ad alium tranferrre 
potest quam ipse habet according to which no one can transfer more rights than they hold.235  
Thus, to be grantor of prospecting rights and mining rights, the rights must first vest in the 
state.236  If the mineral right holder concluded a prospecting contract or mining lease with 
another, again the impact would be the same. The prospecting right or mining right would still 
be transferred to the state, but from the holder of the prospecting right or mining right and not 
the mineral right holder. 
                                                 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act” 2009 TSAR 600; van Niekerk and Mostert 2010 Stell LR 
158; van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 383 – 398.   
229 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-127 and MPRDA-129.    
230 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-127. 
231 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13 – 6; Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 
Stell LR 383; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 674; Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 481. 
232 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 674. 
233 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 674. 
234 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 674. 
235 Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 383; Badenhorst 1998 Obiter 152.  Regarding the nemo plus iuris maxim 
see Badenhorst et al Silberberg 73; van der Merwe Sakereg 301 and especially fn18; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel 391. 
236 Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 383.  In the context of expropriation the court held in Agri SA (CC) [68] 
that the state did not acquire any mineral rights when the MPRDA came into operation.   





Whichever interpretation is preferred, the practical effects remain the same: The MPRDA 
effectively regulated common-law mineral rights out of existence.237  In other words, mineral 
rights became extinct, and from the practical viewpoint of the landowner and mineral right 
holder, so did the accompanying entitlements that were part of the right.238  The mineral right 
holder is prohibited from exercising any entitlements that formed part of the right freely.239 The 
entitlments that the mineral right holder had are now incorporated in the public power of the 
Minister as set out in section 3(2)(a) of the MPRDA.240 The exercise of this power has the 
effect that the Minister grants rights with entitlements similar to those of common-law mineral 
right holders.  
The above discussion indicates that the MPRDA extensively regulates rights to minerals and 
has a significant impact on common-law mineral rights.241  The regulatory effect of the 
MPRDA on the theoretical basis of mineral law becomes more apparent when compared to the 
regime immediately preceding the Act. 
3.2.2. Comparison with previous regime 
In comparison to the regime immediately preceding the MPRDA, the first layer of rights no 
longer exist.  Only the second layer of rights remains.242  Current prospecting rights, mining 
rights and mining permits are indeed comparable to the second layer of rights in the previous 
regime in the following manner:243 The MPRDA provides for the procedures which must be 
                                                 
237 See Agri SA (High Court) [57]; Sishen Iron Ore CC [10] and [11]; De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Regional 
Manager par 2.5; van der Vyfer 2012 De Jure 128; Badenhorst 2004 JERL 235 
238 In Sechaba v Kotze and Others 2007 4 All SA 811 (NC) [8] where commenting on the power of the government 
to control mineral resources in terms of the MPRDA, the court referred to “ousting of the mining rights of the 
landowner and /or the holder of mining rights”.  
239 Dale et al South Africa Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-128; Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 
91. Leon 2009 JERL 614 opines that when the MPRDA, and the custodianship-model came into operation, 
“resource owners” were deprived of their “right of control”. 
240 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-128 
241 Contra Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa where the author argues that the impact is not so significant 
because the state has always controlled and regulated rights to minerals and the conceptualization of common-
law mineral rights as limited real rights were erroneous.  
242 Or the two-tier system is now a single tier system according to Dale 1996 JERL 308.  Also see Mostert 
Principles and Policies 113 where the author refers to the “two-tiered” system that existed before the MPRDA. 
243 See Cawood 2004 JERL 132 and 133; Mostert Principles and Policies 61 where both authors compare 
prospecting permits and mining licenses in the regime under the Minerals Act respectively with prospecting rights 
and mining rights under the MPRDA in table form; Badenhorst 2011 SALJ 776 and 778 says that some of the 
features of new prospecting rights and mining rights remind one of prospecting permits or mining authorisations 
in terms of the Minerals Act. 





followed to apply for rights as well as the criteria that applicants must meet.244 The rights to 
minerals are granted for specific periods245 and in the case of prospecting rights and mining 
rights provision is made for the renewal of rights.246  The rights are terminated and cancelled 
in prescribed circumstances.  If these rights lapse or are cancelled, there are no underlying 
common-law rights that remain as was the case in the regime under the Minerals Act.    
This does not mean that the second layer of rights in the previous regime and current 
prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits are exactly the same.  Two pertinent 
differences are that the MPRDA classifies current prospecting rights and mining rights as 
registrable real rights247 in land (the Act is silent with regards to the classification of mining 
permits) and that these rights can, in principle, be encumbered by mortgage.248  The 
classification of prospecting rights and mining rights as limited real rights raises the question 
whether these rights may be comparable to common-law mineral rights which were classified 
as limited real rights. 
Commenting on the Minerals Development Draft Bill,249 that preceded the MPRDA, 
Badenhorst opined that new prospecting rights and mining rights were “inferior and insecure 
compared to mineral rights…”250  One of the reasons advanced was that prospecting rights and 
mining rights were not registrable limited real rights in terms of the Bill.251  Other reasons are 
that rights were not transferable freely and that exercise of the rights as well as “secondary 
entitlements” such as encumbrance, depended on compliance with the Bill and were subject to 
                                                 
244 S 13 for reconnaissance permissions, s 16 for prospecting rights and s 22 for mining rights.  See Badenhorst 
and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13 – 26 – 13 – 27 for a summary, in table form, of the 
facets of the new rights under the MPRDA.  These rights have also been compared to prospecting leases and 
mining leases under the Mining Rights Act of 1967 and Precious Stones Act of 1964.  See Dale et al South African 
Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-137; Badenhorst 2008 1 TSAR 164.  
245 In terms of s 14(4), reconnaissance permissions are valid for two years.  In terms of s 17(6), prospecting rights 
are valid for a period specified but cannot exceed five years.  In terms of s 23(6) mining rights are valid for the 
period specified but cannot exceed 30 years. 
246 S 18 applies to renewals of prospecting rights and s 24 renewals of a mining rights. 
247 MPRDA, s 5(1). 
248 MPRDA, s 11.  See chap 5, sec 4 for a detailed discussion of the ability to encumber rights with mortgage 
bonds. 
249 (GN 4577) in GG 21840 of 18 December 2000. 
250 Badenhorst “Mineral Rights: “Year Zero” Cometh?” 2001 Obiter 132.  For a comparison of “old order rights” 
and “new order rights” in the context of expropriation see Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 397 – 399 and 
2004 Stell LR 42 – 50.  
251 Badenhorst “Mineral Rights: “Year Zero” Cometh?” 2001 Obiter 132.  See also the criticism of the Chamber 
of Mines of South Africa Memorandum to the Director-General: Minerals and Energy on the Draft Minerals 
Development Bill par 61.7 where the chamber strongly argued that prospecting rights and mining rights should be 
registrable real rights. 





the discretion of the Minister.252  The Bill was changed253 and the MPRDA now classifies 
mining rights and prospecting rights as registrable limited real rights. Semantic classification 
of prospecting rights and mining rights as real is, however, far removed from the question 
whether the rights have the common-law characteristics and advantages of real rights in 
property.254  The other objections raised by Badenhorst still remain and prospecting rights and 
mining rights do not exhibit those characteristics that were highlighted as justification for 
classifying mineral rights as limited real rights.  Prospecting rights and mining rights cannot be 
transferred255 or encumbered freely256 and do not exist in perpetuity257 in the same manner as 
common-law mineral rights.  Continued existence of prospecting rights and mining rights 
depend on compliance with provisions of the Act and if they lapse, are cancelled or terminated, 
nothing remains.  In other words, following the Bill, the MPRDA classified prospecting rights 
and mining rights as limited real rights without making any changes that one would expect for 
the rights to resemble common-law limited real rights.  
                                                 
252 Badenhorst “Mineral Rights: “Year Zero” Cometh?” 2001 Obiter 132. 
253 The transitional measures were also largely rewritten due to criticism.  See Mostert Principles and Policies 77. 
254 See Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 522 where the author says that “the mere labelling of a right as a “limited real 
right” smacks of property theory based upon the common law”.   
255 Current prospecting rights and mining rights can be transferred with ministerial consent.  See chap 5, sec 3.2 
for a detailed discussion of the ability to transfer prospecting rights and mining rights.  Regarding the 
transferability of common-law mineral rights see Agri SA [10]; Trojan Exploration 510; Lazarus and Jackson v 
Wessels, Olivier and Coronation Freehold Estate, Town and Mines Ltd 510; Du Preez v Beyers 1989 1 SA (T) 
320 324; Van Vuuren v Registrar of Deeds 294; Webb v Beaver Investments (Pty) Ltd 1954 1 SA 13 (T) 25A;  
Dale 1996 JERL 302; Badenhorst 1994 THRHR 46; Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 651; van der Merwe Sakereg 561; 
Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 738; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South 
Africa 3-20; Badenhorst 2004 JERL 222.  See Badenhorst 1998 Obiter 144 where the author states that mineral 
had “secondary rights” as part of its content, including the right of alienation; Badenhorst 2011 SALJ 773; 
Badenhorst Die Juridiese Bevoegdheid om Minerale te Ontgin 609; Badenhorst 1989 De Jure 389.  The fact that 
mineral rights were transferable freely was used as justification for their classification as limited real rights.  See 
Badenhorst 1990 TSAR 250.  Not all limited real right, for example personal servitudes, are transferable freely.  
In fact, the transferability of mineral rights are used to distinguish them from personal servitudes.  See van der 
Merwe Sakereg 560; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 3-10; Badenhorst 1990 
TSAR 239 252.  Sonnekus 2008 TSAR 133 regards the non-transferability of personal servitudes as an exception 
to the general rule that real rights are transferable. Also see Sonnekus 1987 TSAR 372 – 374. 
256 Current prospecting rights and mining rights can be mortgaged with ministerial consent.  See chap 5, sec 4.3 
for a detailed discussion of the ability to mortgage prospecting rights and mining rights.  Regarding encumbrance 
of mineral rights see Agri SA (CC)[10]; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 3-
12; Badenhorst 1998 Obiter 143 144 where the author states that mineral rights had “secondary rights” as part of 
its content, including the right of encumbrance; Badenhorst 2004 JERL 222; Badenhorst 2011 SALJ 773.  Mineral 
rights could also be the object of other limited real rights such as a usufruct.  See Ex parte Eloff 1953 1 SA 617 
(T); Badenhorst 1993 Stell LR 395, Badenhorst 1994 TSAR 107; Badenhorst 1994 THRHR 46.  
257 One of the characteristics of mineral rights, as limited real rights, were that they existed in perpetuity.  See 
Badenhorst “Mineral Rights: “Year Zero” Cometh?” 2001 Obiter 125; Badenhorst 1994 THRHR 46; Leon 2009 
JERL 613.  Also see Aussenkjer Diamante (Pty) Ltd v Namex (Pty) Ltd 1983 1 SA 263 (A) 274 where the court 
indicated that an important difference between statutory prospecting rights (granted under Ord 20 of 1968 (SWA)) 
and common-law mineral rights is that the statutory rights were limited to the duration of the grant.  





Prospecting rights and mining rights may be statutory conferred limited real rights258 with their 
own characteristics and advantages.  However, current prospecting rights and mining rights 
can best be compared to the second layer of rights in the regime immediately preceding it. 
Common-law mineral rights that developed under strong influence of property law, as well as 
its by-products, i.e. prospecting rights and mining rights no longer exist. 259  These rights were 
replaced by rights to minerals that are granted administratively.  It therefore seems as if the 
theoretical underpinnings of mineral law in the current regulatory regime are based in 
administrative law and no longer in property law.260  This shift in the theoretical underpinnings 
of mineral law requires reconsidering the role of property law in the current regulatory regime 
that is predominantly based in administrative law.   
3.2.3. Continued relevance of property law 
The shift in theoretical underpinnings does not mean that property law has no role to play in 
the current regulatory regime.261  There are instances where the MPRDA fails to regulate 
prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits.262  The MPRDA, for example, does not 
regulate the entitlement of holders of mining permits to dispose of minerals found during 
mining.263  The Act also does not regulate situations where minerals are mined and carried 
away by an unauthorized entity, or are stolen.264  In such instances, the rules of property law 
can no doubt supplement the MPRDA to provide answers to legal questions.  One has to accept 
                                                 
258 Leon 2009 JERL 628; du Bois Wille’s Principles 621.  See Palala Resources 2014 6 SA 403 (GP) [63] where 
the court said that prospecting rights and mining rights are “born out of, and their nature and ambit are determined 
by, the provisions of the MPRDA, rather than the common law”; Mostert Principles and Policies 165 says that 
“even the proprietary aspect of the rights to minerals is created and supported by the MPRDA”.  According to 
Barton in McHarg et al 81 “there is no generally accepted body of law for ascertaining whether the attributes of 
property ownership attach to permits granted by statute”.  
259 See Agri SA (High Court) [57]; In Holcim (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Prudent Investors (Pty) Ltd 2011 All SA 
364 (SCA) [24] the court said that common-law minerals rights were destructed.  See, however, SFF Association 
v Xstrata 2011 JDR 0407 (GSJ) 23 where, in the context of royalties payable under an “old order right”, the court 
held that the benefits of the rights were retained.  For criticism on the judgement see Badenhorst 2012 Obiter 441 
– 446.   
260 Leon 2009 JERL 614 opines that the MPRDA “essentially replaced the principles of private law, based on 
rights of ownership, with principles of administrative law based on conditional state licences”.  Contra Mostert 
Principles and Policies 113-114 where the author opines that the characterisation of rights in the MPRDA as 
limited real rights as well as compulsory registration thereof suggests that the current regulatory system goes 
beyond the “mere regulatory” and that the rights are not only based in administrative law.  
261 See Daintith in Zillman et al 49 where the author argues that despite legislative interventions in the United 
Sates, the common law remains relevant.  It must, however, be kept in mind that a great part of mineral law in the 
United Sates are left in the sphere of common law.  Also see McHarg et al in McHarg et al Property 7 – 8. 
262 In instances where statute law fails to regulate a specific activity, Barton in Zillman et al 22 refers to “default 
rules”.  Default rules, according to Barton, are often “tort and property law”. 
263 See chap 4, sec 2.2. 
264 See chap 3, s 3.2.  





the possibility that the failure of the MPRDA to regulate in the circumstances mentioned can 
quite simply be the result of careless drafting.265  The fact that rules of property law can fill the 
voids left by the legislator does not have to mean that mineral law is proprietary in nature.  It 
means that established legal rules of property law can be utilised to supplement a partially 
flawed regulatory regime based in public law. 
Traditionally, the relationship between the landowner and holder of the mineral right was 
governed by the rules of property law.266  The MPRDA acknowledges this relationship and 
governs it to a degree.267  If, for example, the Regional Manager accepts applications for 
prospecting rights,268 mining rights269 and mining permits,270 applicants must be notified to 
consult, inter alia,271 with the landowner.272  The MPRDA further provides that holders of 
rights to minerals must notify the relevant Regional Manager if landowners (or lawful 
occupiers) prevent them from conducting prospecting and mining activities.273 Similarly, 
landowners (or lawful occupiers) must notify the Regional Manager if they suffered or are 
likely to suffer any loss or damage as a result of prospecting and mining.274  The Act provides 
for a procedure aimed at settling the parties grievances if any such notifications occurred.275   
A detailed analysis of the relationship between the landowner and mineral rights holder is 
beyond the scope of this work.276  Anglo Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd,277 
however, indicates that the rules of property law can in future play a role in governing the 
                                                 
265 For criticism on drafting and interpretational difficulties due to poor drafting of the MPRDA in general see for 
example Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 486 and 492 – 493; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum 
Law of South Africa 13-19 – 13-24, 30-2 – 30-5; Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-
203 – MPRDA-204; Mostert Principles and Policies 77 and 88 – 90.  In Doe Run Exploration SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Minerals and Energy & others (499/07) [2008] ZANCHC 3 (8 February 2008) [43] the court said that 
s 105 of the MPRDA “can hardly be described as an epitome of exemplary draftmanship”. 
266 See sec 1 above. 
267 Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 96 - 97 indicates the MPRDA provides for compensation if the 
landowner suffered damages.  However, owners of neighbouring properties who suffer damages as a result of 
mining activities will have to rely on common-law remedies. 
268 MPRDA, s 16(4)(b). 
269 MPRDA, s 22(4)(b).  This section requires consultation with “interested and affected parties”.  Landowners 
will, however, certainly be an interested and affected party. 
270 MPRDA, s 27(5). 
271 Not only the landowner, but also lawful occupiers, interested and affected parties must be consulted according 
to ss 16(4)(b), 22(4)(b) and 27(5) of the MPRDA. 
272 See Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2001 4 SA 113 (CC) [65] – [67] where 
the court gave content to the consultation procedure. 
273 MPRDA, 54(1). 
274 MPRDA, s 54(7). 
275 MPRDA, ss 54(2) – (6).  
276 See Mostert Principles and Policies 11. 
277 2007 (2) SA (SCA).  





relationship between landowners and holders of mineral rights.278  The case involved an 
irreconcilable conflict between the landowner and mineral rights holder.  The case was decided 
after the MPRDA came into operation but before the transitional arrangements came to an end.  
The court utilised the rules of property law (although it was aware of the MPRDA)279 in 
deciding that the interests of the mineral right holder took precedence over the interests of the 
landowner.280  The reasoning of the court may have been different if the transitional 
arrangements were not operational anymore.281  Still, the case points towards the possible 
relevance of property law in governing the relationship between the landowner and holder of 
rights to minerals in future.282   
The argument here is that the MPRDA in principle regulates the nature, content, acquisition, 
transfer and loss of rights to minerals.  This function is an administrative one and is firmly 
based in public law even though there are instances in which the MPRDA fails to entirely 
regulate every aspect of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits.  Where the 
MPRDA fails to regulate, the rules of property law can still play a role.   
4. Summative remarks 
This chapter demonstrates that the MPRDA brought about significant changes to the theoretical 
landscape of mineral law in South Africa.  The MPRDA changed the mineral-law system from 
a combination of privately-held, state-held and administratively-regulated rights to one that is 
predominantly based in public law.  In the current regulatory regime, the state controls the 
acquisition, transfer and loss of rights to minerals.283  Mineral-law has, to a great extent, lost 
its private-law character with the enactment of the MPRDA.  
These changes to the theoretical underpinnings of mineral law raise questions regarding the 
continued role of private-law rules to strengthen mineral tenure security.  The next chapter 
examines the continued role of ownership of minerals and mineral resources, as a private-law 
concept in strengthening mineral tenure security.  
                                                 
278 Badenhorst 2008 TSAR 164. 
279 Anglo Operations [25]. 
280 Anglo Operations [20]. 
281 Because then mineral rights would not exist anymore.  See sec 3.2.1 above. 
282 See Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 418 where the authors list the entitlements that constitute the content 
of mineral rights and then recognises that the MPRDA are not subject to provisions of the MPRDA. 
283 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 670.   





OWNERSHIP AND MINERAL TENURE SECURITY:  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
Prior to the MPRDA, the consequences of private ownership of minerals and mineral resources 
assisted in ensuring that holders of rights to minerals could develop mines profitably.  This is 
evident from the fact that, in common law, landowners in some respects284 were owners of 
minerals that were not separated from the earth (unmined minerals)285 which afforded them the 
entitlements to prospect and mine.286  Landowners could also transfer the entitlements to 
prospect and mine to third parties.287  Once minerals were separated from the earth (mined 
minerals),288 ownership of such minerals conferred the entitlement to dispose of minerals and 
to vindicate minerals which were not in the possession of owners, on holders of rights.289  The 
ability to vindicate property means that owners of mined minerals can successfully institute the 
rei vindicatio to reclaim their minerals from anyone who cannot prove that they are lawfully in 
possession thereof.290   
                                                 
284 This was the position immediately before the MPRDA came into operation in the regime espoused by the 
Minerals Act 50 of 1991 and the common law. However, the rights could only be exercised with authorisation 
from the government.  See sec 2.1 below.  Before the Minerals Act, the right to mine minerals on private land 
vested in the government at times.  For example, the right to mine for precious stones on private land vested in 
the Crown in terms of the Precious Stones Act, 44 of 1927.  The Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967 and the Precious 
Stones Act 73 of 1964 also vested the right to mine for and dispose of precious metals and precious stones in the 
state.  The rights to base minerals vested in the landowner or mineral right holder under the Mining Rights Act of 
1967.  Before the Mining Rights Act of 1967, rights to base minerals vested in landowners or mineral right holders 
according to the Base Minerals Amendment Act 39 of 1942 and Orange Free State Metals Mining Act 13 of 1936 
(provincial legislation).  In terms of some provincial legislation, for example the Precious and Base Metals Act 
35 of 1908 in the former province of Transvaal, the right to mine precious metals vested in the Crown. Provincial 
legislation that vested the rights to base metals in landowners or mineral right holders include the Precious and 
Base Metals Act 35 of 1908 (Transvaal), Orange Free State Metals Mining Act 13 of 1936 (Province of the Orange 
Free State) and Mineral Law Amendment Act 16 of 1907 (Cape Province).  See Mostert Principles and Policies 
19 – 56 for a detailed and complete exposition of the different entities that rights to different minerals vested in 
before the Minerals Act of 1991.  Also see Badenhorst 2002 Obiter 251 – 257. 
285 The term “unsevered minerals” is at times used to describe minerals that have not been separated from the 
earth.  The term “unmined minerals” is preferred here and the term “unsevered” is reserved for the juridical 
severance of mineral rights from ownership of land.  The term “unsevered minerals” is only used in verbatim 
quotations.  
286 See sec 2.1 below.   
287 See sec 2.1 below. 
288 The term “severed minerals” is at times used to describe minerals that have been separated from the earth.  The 
terms “mined minerals” or “extracted minerals” are preferred here and the term “severance” is reserved for the 
juridical severance of mineral rights from ownership of land.  The term “severed minerals” is only used in verbatim 
quotations.  
289 See sec 3.1 below. 
290 See sec 3.1 below. 




A private-law ownership 291 analysis can be applied to two categories of minerals, namely, 
minerals that have not been separated from the earth, or unmined minerals, as well as minerals 
that have been mined.  Traditionally, ownership of unmined minerals impacts on the ability of 
right holders to prospect and mine and to choose not to prospect and mine.  Ownership of mined 
minerals traditionally impacts on the abilities of holders of rights to minerals to dispose of 
minerals and to claim minerals from anyone who cannot prove a lawful entitlement to be in 
possession, i.e. to vindicate minerals.  
This chapter uses these two categories of minerals to investigate a narrow aspect of the 
foundations of mineral law: whether ownership of minerals and mineral resources continue to 
strengthen security of tenure of holders of new order rights292 granted in terms of the 
MPRDA.293  In this regard, the inquiry focuses on whether ownership plays a role in enabling 
holders of rights to prospect and mine, to remove and dispose of minerals and to choose not to 
prospect and mine.  The chapter does not aim to analyze the role of ownership in every aspect 
of the current regulatory regime.294   
Moreover, it is arguable that private-law ownership is no longer the appropriate lens through 
which to view and analyze rights to minerals.  The administrative nature of the current 
regulatory regime has the effect that continued sole reliance on the rules of private property 
law may be inefficient to find solutions for legal problems.  The limited analysis of the role of 
private-law ownership to strengthen mineral tenure security in this chapter opens the door to 
questions relating to the continued suitability of a private-law ownership conceptualization of 
                                                 
291 “Ownership” refers to the ownership of mineral resources and not “ownership” of rights to minerals (i.e. 
mineral title). Common-law mineral rights are classified as incorporeal property in South Africa inter alia because 
they can function as the object of a real right.  See Badenhorst et al Sliberberg 15 and 14 – 19 for a general 
discussion of incorporeal things.  “Ownership” over rights to minerals as “incorporeal property” is thus possible.  
The following sources are examples where ownership of rights terminology is used:  Dale 1996 JERL 301; Bastida 
2001 JERL 35; Cawood and Minnitt 1998 The Journal of the South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 
396.  It is unnecessary and confusing to refer to the “owner” of mineral rights or rights to minerals.  It is preferable 
to refer to the “holder” of rights to minerals.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 18 where this argument is made in 
relation to the “holder” of a servitude and not the “owner” thereof. 
292 Tenure security is, at times, also analysed according to the transition from the previous regime to the current 
regime.  See, for example, Badenhorst 2014 JERL 25 – 34.   
293 28 of 2002.     
294 For example, the question whether owners of unmined minerals were expropriated of their property when the 
Act came into operation is not investigated.  An interpretation of s 3(1) which means that the cuius est solum 
principle was abrogated will be relevant in the context of expropriation.  See Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 
484 - 491; Badenhorst and Mostert 2003 Stell LR 382.  Also see fn 228 above.  Ownership of tailings is also 
relevant for the question of expropriation in relation to the transition from the previous regime to the current 
regime.  See De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd and Others (3215/06) [2007] ZAFSHC 
74 (13 December 2007) [68]; Badenhorst and van Heerden 2010 Stell LR 126. 




rights to minerals granted in terms of the MPRDA in general.  Although the chapter does not 
aim to provide a detailed analysis of the role of private-law ownership in every aspect of the 
current regulatory regime, the last part thereof raises considerations regarding whether a 
private-law ownership paradigm of rights to minerals continues to be appropriate in the current 
regulatory regime. 
2. Ownership of unmined minerals  
Traditionally, ownership of unmined minerals impacts on the abilities of holders of rights to 
prospect and mine and to choose not to prospect and mine.  The abilities to prospect and mine 
are rudimentary requirements to ensure that holders of rights to minerals can develop mines 
profitably.295  If holders of rights to minerals cannot prospect and mine, they cannot develop 
mines profitably.  These abilities are essential for providing mineral tenure security to holders 
of rights to minerals.   
The ability to choose not to prospect and mine is important for mineral tenure security because 
it allows holders of rights to minerals the opportunity to postpone commencement of 
prospecting and mining, or to discontinue operations, during times when mining or prospecting 
will be uneconomical.296  The ability to choose not to prospect and mine thus increases the 
possibility of developing mines profitably and as a result mineral tenure security is 
strengthened.   
This section firstly provides an account of the manner in which ownership of unmined minerals 
traditionally protects mineral tenure security by allowing holders of rights to prospect and mine 
and to choose not to prospect and mine.  Secondly, it investigates whether private-law 
ownership of unmined minerals continues to protect and strengthen mineral tenure security in 
the current regulatory regime. 
2.1. Traditional protection of mineral tenure security 
The common-law maxim cuius est solum eius usque ad caelum et ad inferos expresses the rule 
that a landowner owns everything in the sky above and everything contained in the soil below 
the surface of the land.297  Accordingly, under common law, the landowner was automatically 
                                                 
295 See chap 4, sec 2.1 for a detailed discussion of the ability to prospect and mine in the MPRDA. 
296 See chap 4, sec 2.4 for a detailed discussion of the ability to choose not to prospect and mine in the MPRDA. 
297 See chap 2, sec 2. 




owner of the minerals below the soil.  One of the entitlements of landowners was to prospect 
and mine minerals in the ground.298  Landowners could grant prospecting rights, by virtue of 
prospecting contracts, or mining rights, by virtue of mineral leases, to other entities.299  In the 
first instance, landowners as owners of unmined minerals thus controlled the abilities to 
prospect and mine.300  Under common law, it was possible to sever the mineral rights from the 
ownership of the land.301  Mineral rights that were severed from ownership existed as 
independent limited real rights separate from landownership, which could be transferred to 
other entities.302  Even if landowners did not transfer mineral rights to others, or if mineral 
rights vested in landowners again at a later stage, the two titles existed separately.303    
Upon transfer of mineral rights to other entities (the new mineral right holder), those entities 
obtained the entitlements to prospect and mine from the agreements between themselves and 
the landowner.304  Landowners no longer had the entitlements to prospect and mine, although 
ownership of the unmined minerals still vested in them.305  Mineral right holders could grant 
prospecting rights (by virtue of prospecting contracts) or mining rights (through mineral leases) 
to other third parties.306  The entitlements to prospect and mine then vested in the third parties 
because of the agreement between themselves and the holder of the mineral rights.307  This 
means that when the mineral rights were severed from ownership and transferred to a mineral 
right holder, the entitlements to prospect and mine attached to the mineral right and vested in 
the mineral right holder who could transfer them independent of the landowner.  The mineral 
right holder thus controlled the ability to prospect and mine. 
                                                 
298 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy and Others (CC) [7]; Van Vuuren and Others v Registrar 
of Deeds 294; Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 78; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law 
of South Africa 1-9; Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 649.  
299  Badenhorst 1998 Obiter 145 for prospecting contracts and 146 for mineral leases. 
300 According to Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 11, ownership of the surface “was indicative of control 
over the unextracted resources 
301 See chap 2, sec 2. 
302 See chap 2, sec 2. 
303 Beyers en ‘n Ander v Du Preez en Andere 1989 1 SA 328 (T) 336.  Contra Joubert 1959 THRHR 27. 
304 See Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 78 where the authors say that “[i]n property law parlance, the 
‘right to mine’ was one of the ‘entitlements’ comprised by the ‘mineral right’”.  
305 Nolte v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company 315; Le Roux v Loewenthal 1905 TS 742 745.  
Compare Barton in Zillman et al 28-30 where the author explains that in Scottish and English law “an instrument 
of severance caused ‘minerals’ to come into separate ownership”. 
306 Badenhorst 1998 Obiter 145 for prospecting contracts and 146 for mineral leases; Agri SA (CC) [10]. 
307 See Chap 2, sec 2. 




In common law, landowners, in the first instance, controlled the ability not to prospect and 
mine in the same manner that they controlled the ability to prospect and mine.308  Briefly, as 
owners of unmined minerals, landowners had the entitlement not to exploit the minerals under 
the surface.309  If landowners transferred the mineral rights to a mineral right holder, the mineral 
right holder had the entitlement to choose not to prospect and mine.  If landowners or mineral 
right holders granted prospecting rights, by virtue of prospecting contracts or mining rights, by 
virtue of mineral leases, to another entity, that entity had the entitlement not to prospect and 
mine.  The mineral right holder, prospector or miner then controlled the ability not to prospect 
and mine.  
Thus, when ownership of unmined minerals vests in landowners, their ownership rights play a 
role in providing security of tenure to holders of rights to minerals as far as the abilities to 
prospect and mine, and to choose not to prospect and mine are concerned.  Landowners are 
certain that they can prospect and mine, or choose not to prospect and mine, as a result of their 
ownership rights.  Furthermore, entities to whom landowners transfer mineral rights, 
prospecting rights or mining rights are certain that they can prospect and mine, or choose not 
to prospect and mine, as a result of the agreements between themselves and landowners.  When 
mineral right holders grant prospecting rights or mining rights to others, the certainty of holders 
of prospecting rights and mining rights to prospect and mine flow from the agreements between 
themselves and mineral right holders. 
Immediately prior to the MPRDA, in the regime espoused by the common law and the Minerals 
Act, statutory authorisation was necessary to prospect and mine.310  This meant that landowners 
and holders of mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights could not exercise their 
entitlements to prospect and mine freely.  Although these statutory authorisations limited the 
ownership rights of landowners,311 landownership was still relevant regarding the abilities to 
prospect and mine and to choose not to prospect and mine.  Entities could only apply for state 
authorisation to prospect or mine if they were the common law holder of mineral rights (the 
                                                 
308 See chap 2, sec 2.  In Agri SA [CC] [43] the court said that the ability not to exploit mineral was an “essential 
component of mineral ownership”.  According to the court [66], the MPRDA brought an end to the ability not to 
exploit minerals.  Also see Mostert Principles and Policies 138 – 140. 
309 Agri SA (CC) [43], [44] and [46].  
310 Chap 2. 
311 See chap 2, s 2 where it is explained that ownership is not absolute. 




landowner as owner of unmined minerals in the first instance312) or if they obtained a 
prospecting right or mining right from the mineral rights holder.313   
Whereas holders of rights to minerals may have valid reasons not to exploit mineral 
resources,314 the government has an interest to ensure optimal exploitation of minerals.315  In 
other words, the government has an interest to limit the ability of holders of rights to choose 
not to prospect and mine.  In this regard, the Minerals Act gave the Minister the power to 
intervene if he was of the opinion that holders of mining authorisations conducted mining in a 
manner, and on a scale, that were detrimental to optimal exploitation of minerals.316  The 
Minister had the power to cause an investigation317 and issue a directive318 to holders of 
authorisations to take rectifying steps.319  The ability of holders of mining authorisations to 
choose not to prospect and mine was thus limited to an extent in the regime under the common 
law and Minerals Act.  In that regime, there were no limitations on holders of prospecting 
authorisations regarding the ability to choose not to prospect and mine.  In the regime under 
the Minerals Act and the common law, the ability to choose not to prospect and mine were thus 
influenced by ownership of unmined minerals to the extent described above but was also 
influenced by the regulatory regime. This is consistent with the dual nature of the regime under 
the Minerals Act.  
In summary, under the Minerals Act, the abilities to prospect and mine were influenced firstly 
by landownership, as a private-law concept, to the degree explained above.  However, the 
exercise of these abilities was also influenced by governmental regulation (as part of 
administrative law).  It is beyond the scope of this work to do a detailed analysis of prospecting 
and mining authorisations under the Minerals Act.  It is, however, understandable that the 
manner in which these authorisations were regulated impacted on the certainty of holders 
thereof to prospect and mine.  Under the Minerals Act, mineral tenure security was thus 
                                                 
312 S 1(ix)(a)(i) of the Minerals Act of 1991 defined “holder” as follows: “the owner of the land: [p]rovided that 
(i) if the right to such mineral or an undivided share therein has been severed from the ownership of the land 
concerned, the person in whose name such right or an undivided share therein is registered in the deeds office…” 
313 Minerals Act of 1991, ss 6(1) and 9(1) read with the def of “holder”. In Agri SA [CC] [36] the court said that 
“[p]rior to the commencement of the MPRDA the state could, in respect of private land, allocate these rights to 
exploit only to those who owned them”. 
314 See Mostert Principles and Policies 138. 
315 Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 85; Mostert Principles and Policies 133. 
316 Minerals Act of 1991, s 22. 
317 Minerals Act of 1991, s 22(1)(a). 
318 Minerals Act of 1991, s 22(1)(b). 
319 Minerals Act of 1991, s 22(2) determined that the holder of the authorisation had to be notified of the 
contemplated intervention and had to have an opportunity to comment on the Minister’s intention. 




influenced by ownership and the regulatory regime.  This seems logical since the regulatory 
regime under the Minerals Act had a proprietary and an administrative nature.320   
2.2. Protection of mineral tenure security in the MPRDA 
According to section 3(1) of the MPRDA, mineral and petroleum resources are the common 
heritage of the people of South Africa and the state is the custodian thereof for the benefit of 
the people of South Africa.321  The MPRDA does not specifically state in whom ownership of 
unmined minerals vests.  Furthermore, the meaning of the word “custodian” is unclear and 
gives little guidance regarding the question of ownership of unmined minerals.  The meaning 
of section 3(1) has not received significant attention from the courts.322   
Different academic opinions exist regarding the meaning of section 3(1) and its effect on 
ownership of unmined minerals.  The first distinction that is made concerns the question 
whether section 3(1) abrogates the common-law maxim cuius est solum eius usque ad caelum 
et ad inferos.  If section 3(1) does not abrogate the cuius est solum maxim, the landowner is 
still the owner of unmined minerals under the MPRDA.323  This interpretation is supported by 
an argument that section 3(1) refers to the “minerals and petroleum occurrences collectively 
countrywide”.324  In other words, the collective mineral wealth of the country belongs to the 
nation or people of South Africa while ownership of specific unmined minerals vests in the 
landowner.  This argument is, however, rejected based on the fact that the “nation” or “people 
of South Africa” is not a legal subject either in public law or private law.325  If section 3(1) 
                                                 
320 See chap 2, sec 3.1. 
321 MPRDA, s 3(1).  S 3(1) gives effect to the objective in s 2(a) of the MPRDA namely to give effect to the 
universally accepted right of the state to exercise sovereignty over all mineral and petroleum resources.  See 
Badenhorst et al Silberberg 673; Dale in Bastida et al 826.    
322 S 3(1) is at times mentioned but the meaning not discussed.  Cases where the meaning of s 3(1) was relevant 
but not discussed include Agri SA (CC) [25]; Agri SA (SCA) [?]; De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua 
Mining [67]; Joubert and Others v Maranda Mining Company (Pty) [2].  See Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman 
et al 87 and 88 where the authors criticise Agri SA (SCA) and Agri SA (CC) for not giving content to the concept. 
323 This is the position that Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA 123 take.  See Watson 
(LLB thesis) 13 – 14 and van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 148 and 149 for a more detailed discussion of the argument.  
Dale in Bastida et al 827 argues that the cuius ets solum rule was not abrogated and that the granting of rights 
confer suspensive ownership on holders of rights.  According to the argument, ownership will pass to the holder 
when minerals are separated from the earth.  
324 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-122; Marumo 2013 Without Prejudice 50.  
325 Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 86; Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 477 and 478; van den Berg 
2009 Stell LR 148; Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 657; Marumo July 2013 Without Prejudice 51.  Dale et al South African 
Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-4, MPRDA-5 and MPRDA-123 also accept that mineral resources cannot 
vest in the “nation”.  It is therefore strange that Dale et al MPRDA-121 argues that the collective mineral and 
petroleum resources vest in the “nation” while specific mineral resources cannot.  See Badenhorst and Mostert 
2007 TSAR 478 regarding the contradictory views of Dale et al.  In Minister of Mineral Resources and Others v 




does not abrogate the cuius est solum principle, the section can be seen as social rhetoric which 
is found in transformative legislation.326   
If section 3(1) abrogates the cuius est solum maxim, ownership of unmined minerals does not 
vest in the landowner.327  The question that arises then is in whom the ownership of unmined 
minerals vests.  One interpretation is that section 3(1) establishes a new type of res publicae.328  
In terms of this interpretation, ownership of unmined minerals vests in the state, but for the 
benefit and use of the public.329  Unmined minerals do not belong to the state in private 
ownership, but for the benefit of the public. 
Another possible interpretation is that mineral and petroleum resources are subject to the public 
trust doctrine.330  The public trust doctrine forms part of Anglo-American law and “seeks to 
develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management problems”.331  However, 
most authors accept that the public trust doctrine is foreign to South African law and should 
not be incorporated to address problems surrounding mineral and petroleum management.332 
                                                 
Sishen Iron Ore Company [10] the court held that the MPRDA dispensed with mineral rights and rights to minerals 
which existed before the MPRDA by “vesting all petroleum and mineral resources in the nation”. 
326 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13-3 raises this possibility regarding the 
meaning of s 3(1) in general and not specifically in the context of mineral tenure security.  See also Badenhorst et 
al Silberberg 673; Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 476 and 478.  Van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 148 disagrees 
with this and argues that “meaningful consequences must be attached to the provision …”  
327 The following sources argue that s 3(1) abrogated the cuius est solum principle: Badenhorst and Mostert 
Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13-4; Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 476; Badenhorst and 
Mostert 2003 Stell LR 382; van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 147; du Bois Wille’s Principles 618.  Vesting of ownership 
of unmined minerals in an entity other than the landowner (the state, for example) is at times viewed as an 
exception to the cuius est solum principle in other jurisdictions.  See Rønne in McHarg et al 65.  An extreme 
alternative is the model of “absolute governmental or state property” where ownership of unmined minerals vest 
in the government and private parties are not allowed even to participate in exploitation.  See González in McHarg 
et al 211. 
328 In De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining [38] the court expressly held that mineral resources are 
not res publicae. Van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 150 – 154 argues in favour of the res publicae construction.  The 
author argues that the “collective mineral and petroleum resources” are res publicae of which the state acquires 
public ownership in order to protect and regulate the resources.  Marumo “Getting to Legal Grips with Illegal 
Mining 2013 Without Prejudice 51 accepts the res publicae construction.  Watson (LLB thesis) 19 – 22 argues 
against van den Berg’s acceptance of the res publicae interpretation.  Also see Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 
476 – 478 where the authors mention the res publicae interpretation in the light of the mineral and petroleum 
resources as such and not in relation to every piece of land in which minerals are found without expressly rejecting 
or accepting the interpretation.  According to Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 661 “the res publicae argument seems to be 
an acceptable explanation of the ownership regime created by the MPRDA”.  Dale et al South African Mineral 
and Petroleum Law MPRDA-121 – 122 expressly rejects the res publicae interpretation. 
329 Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 477; van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 149. 
330 This is the view of Van der Schyff (PhD thesis); Van der Schyff 2008 4 TSAR 760 – 766.  Also see Badenhorst 
2010 SALJ 658. 
331 Van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 144. 
332 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-125 - MPRDA-126; Badenhorst and Mostert 
2007 TSAR 478 (although the authors mention that the doctrine is incorporated expressly in some legislation and 
that there seems to be a tendency to draw from it); van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 147; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 




None of the interpretations advanced above provide a satisfactory explanation regarding 
ownership of unmined minerals.333  All positions can be defended and criticized on some 
level.334  The question here is whether security of tenure is strengthened if one accepts the 
strongest possible private-law position, namely, that section 3(1) does not abrogate the cuius 
est solum principle and that ownership of unmined minerals thus vests in landowners.   
Landowners, as owners of unmined minerals, no longer have the entitlements to prospect and 
mine.  In fact, the entitlements of landowners “[have] been destroyed by the Act in the sense 
that it has been removed in toto from South African Law”.335  Even if ownership of unmined 
minerals vests in landowners, their ownership rights are limited to such an extent that it 
becomes “an empty shell”.336  Furthermore, common-law mineral rights, with the 
accompanying entitlements to prospect and mine, no longer exist.337  This means that 
landowners cannot transfer mineral rights to mineral right holders who can in their turn transfer 
the entitlements to prospect and mine to prospectors and miners.   
As with the abilities to prospect and mine, ownership of unmined minerals has no bearing on 
the ability to choose not to prospect and mine under the MPRDA.  This is simply because 
mineral rights and the accompanying entitlement to choose not to prospect and mine no longer 
exist.338  Even if section 3(1) of the MPRDA does not abrogate the cuius est solum principle 
and landowners remain owners of unmined minerals, landowners cannot transfer the 
entitlement to choose not to prospect and mine to others because they no longer have this 
entitlement.  The MPRDA determines when and why holders of prospecting rights, mining 
rights and mining permits do not have to prospect and mine.339  Thus, ownership of unmined 
                                                 
673; Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 658.  Also see Watson (LLB thesis) 23 – 27.  There are, however, scholars who are 
in favour of the doctrine.  See van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 146 fn 87 and fn 88 for references to environmental 
law scholars who are in favour and opposed to the public trust doctrine.  According to Marumo July 2013 Without 
Prejudice 51, the public trust doctrine fulfils the same purpose than res publicae.   
333 Van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 143. 
334 Watson (LLB thesis) raises compelling criticism against all of the positions; van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 143 
– 155 advances the res publicae position but raises criticism against the other positions; see Dale et al South 
African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-121 – MPRDA-122 for criticism on the res publicae interpretation 
and MPRDA-125 – MPRDA-126 for criticism on the public trust doctrine; Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 656 criticises 
the view in terms of which the cuius est solum principle is abrogated.  
335 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-123. Also see Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 
TSAR 491; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13-5.  Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 
657 states that “…the MPRDA excludes the ability of the owner to exploit the minerals beyond the legislative 
parameters”.   
336 van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 153. 
337 See chap 2, sec 3.2.1. 
338 See chap 2, sec 3.2.1. 
339 See chap 4, sec 2.4 for a detailed discussion. 




minerals no longer contributes towards strengthening mineral tenure security as far as the 
ability to choose not to prospect and mine is concerned. 
In summary, in contrast to the regime preceding it, the abilities to prospect and mine as aspects 
of mineral tenure security, are now influenced by the regulatory regime only.  This seems 
logical based on the fact that the MPRDA created a regime that is predominantly administrative 
in nature.340  In this regime, the only way to obtain rights to minerals, including rights to 
prospect and mine, is to apply to the state through an administrative process.341  Private-law 
ownership does not increase certainty, or reduce risks, concerning the ability to prospect and 
mine to ensure profitable development of mines.  Even if one accepts the strongest possible 
private-law position, namely that ownership of unmined minerals vests in landowners, private-
law ownership does not strengthen mineral tenure security. 
3. Ownership of mined minerals 
Traditionally, ownership of mined minerals impacts on the abilities of right holders to dispose 
of minerals and to vindicate minerals from anyone who is in unlawful possession thereof.  
These abilities are rudimentary requirements for mineral tenure security. Profitable 
development of mines will not be possible if holders of rights cannot dispose of mined 
minerals.  Furthermore, right holders cannot dispose of minerals if, for example, minerals are 
separated from the earth and taken away by someone not authorised to do so,342 or if the 
minerals are stolen after right holders extract them.  Thus, mineral tenure security requires that 
holders of rights have a remedy to claim minerals from anyone in possession thereof who 
cannot prove a lawful entitlement to possess the minerals.    
                                                 
340 See chap 2, sec 3.2. 
341 See chap 2 sec 3.2.1. 
342 Additionally, illegal mining (in working mines and mines for which no closure certificate has been issued) 
presents safety risks and significant loss of income and opportunities to the government and to mines.  See Author 
unknown “Running Riot Underground” 18 August 2015 Miningmx available at 
http://www.miningmx.com/special_reports/green-book/Running-riot-underground.htm5; Author unknown 
“Clamping Down on Illegal Mining” 2014 11/12 Inside Mining 29 available at 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/sh_mining/sh_mining_v7_n11_
a14.pdf; Coetzee and Horn “The Theft of Precious Metals from South African Mines and Refineries” May 2007 
ISS Monograph Series vi  available at 
http://reference.sabinet.co.za.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/webx/access/electronic_journals/ismono/ismono_n133a.pdf; 
Chamber of Mines 2015 Fact Sheet on Illegal Mining in South Africa available at 
http://www.chamberofmines.org.za/media-room/mining-factsheets. 




This section firstly provides an account of the manner in which ownership of mined minerals 
traditionally protects mineral tenure security by allowing right holders to dispose of minerals 
and to claim minerals from anyone who is in possession thereof.  Secondly, it investigates 
whether private-law ownership of mined minerals continues to protect and strengthen mineral 
tenure security in the current regulatory regime. 
3.1. Traditional protection of mineral tenure security 
Under common law, minerals became separate movable things upon separation from the earth 
and were susceptible to ownership as a result of the separation.343  The entity that was entitled 
to separate the minerals from the earth, namely holders of mineral rights, prospecting right, 344 
and mining rights became owners of mined minerals.345 346  Owners of minerals have the 
                                                 
343 Agri SA (CC) [8]; Trojan Exploration 525; Dale (LLD thesis) 79 – 83; De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v 
Ataqua Mining [27]; Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 473. 
344 See, however, Badenhorst 1998 Stell LR 148 where the author states that holders of prospecting rights by virtue 
of prospecting contracts did not become owners of extracted minerals unless the prospecting contract stipulated 
that the prospector became owner.    
345Agri SA (CC) [8]; Trojan Exploration 509 – 510.  A perusal of earlier cases concludes that Badenhorst 1995 
TSAR 573 – 574 is correct that the following cases are only implied authority for the statement that ownership of 
mined minerals vests in holders of the mineral rights: Le Roux v Loewenthal; Van Vuuren v Registrar of Deeds; 
Gluckman v Solomon; Nolte v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment; Ex Parte Pierce; South African Railways 
and Harbours v Transvaal Consolidated Land and Exploration Co Ltd.  The following cases are direct authority: 
Buitendach v West Rand Proprietary Mines Ltd 1925 TPD 895 897; Roets v Secundior Sand Bk 1989 1 SA 902 
905.  In Erasmus v Afrikander Proprietary Mines Ltd 961, after stating that holders of mineral rights have the 
entitlements to mine and take minerals away, the court said there can be no question of (joint)-ownership until 
minerals are separated from the earth.  Also see Badenhorst et al Silberberg 694; van der Merwe Sakereg 562; 
Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 730; Wille’s Principles of South African Law 623; Joubert 1959 
THRHR 27 28; Kaplan 1987 SALJ 283; Badenhorst and van Heerden 1989 TSAR 460; Badenhorst 1990 TSAR 
465; Badenhorst 2001 THRHR 645; Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 472; Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 658; 
Badenhorst 1999 Stell LR 147 – 148.  Contra Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 80 where the authors 
opine that the landowner became owner of mined minerals. 
346 Although the method of acquiring ownership is uncertain. As far as can be ascertained the common law mode 
of acquisition of ownership of mined minerals has not received explicit attention from the courts.  In Trojan 
Exploration 528 – 529 the court said that there were “contingent intentions” between landowners and mineral 
right holders to transfer and receive ownership of the separated ore.  The contingency was that minerals had to be 
separated from the earth.  According to Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 730, holders of mineral rights 
acquired ownership through appropriation (occupatio).  According to van der Merwe Sakereg 562, holders of 
mineral rights had, inter alia, the entitlement to appropriate extracted minerals.  It is, however, not clear whether 
these authors refer to appropriation (toe-eining) in the technical property law sense or in the ordinary dictionary 
meaning.  Perhaps it is better to refer to the ability of mineral right holders to “carry [minerals] away” as the court 
did in Van Vuuren v Registrar of Deeds 294.  According to Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 473, holders of 
mineral rights, mining rights and prospecting rights became owners through the real agreement with the 
landowner.  Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-124 argues that the real agreement 
gave rise to a conditional transfer of ownership of mined minerals from landowners to mineral right holders.  Dale 
in Bastida et al 828 argues that the granting of rights confer suspensive ownership on the holder and that ownership 
will pass to the holder upon severance of the mineral. 




entitlement to dispose of the minerals for their own account.347  The entitlement to sell minerals 
means that ownership of mined minerals strengthened the security of tenure of holders of 
mineral rights, mining rights and prospecting rights. 
Furthermore, when minerals are mined and carried away by an unauthorized entity, right 
holders are deprived of the ability to dispose of the minerals and the risk that the mine cannot 
be developed profitably will thus increase.  Also, holders of rights cannot dispose of mined 
minerals that are stolen.  In such cases, holders of rights, as owners348 of the unmined minerals, 
have the rei vindicatio at their disposal to get the minerals back.349  Owners of minerals have 
this remedy as one of the incidences of their ownership rights.350  The rei vindicatio is a real 
remedy which can be instituted against anyone who unlawfully withholds the thing (the mined 
minerals) from the owner.351  It is regarded as the strongest real remedy352 and it is the most 
important remedy for the protection of ownership.353  Traditionally, ownership of mined 
minerals thus enabled holders of mineral rights, mining rights and prospecting rights to 
vindicate minerals that were mined by an unauthorized entity or that were stolen after right 
holders mined them.  Successful institution of the rei vindicatio means that minerals are 
returned to holders of rights who can dispose thereof to pursue profitable development of 
mines.  Thus, before the MPRDA, ownership of mined minerals strengthened the security of 
tenure of holders of rights to minerals. 
                                                 
347 Badenhorst 1990 TSAR 465.  A description of ownership includes the entitlement to dispose of the thing (the 
ius disponendi).  As regards ownership of land see Badenhorst and Mostert Silberberg 93; van der Merwe Sakereg 
173; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 1-9.     
348 The rei vindication is available to owners.  See Goudini Chrome (Pty) Ltd v MCC Contracts (Pty) 1993 1 SA 
77 (A) 77 81-82; van der Merwe and Another v Taylor NO and Others 2008 1 SA 1 (CC) [114]. 
349 On the rei vindicatio in general, see Bandenhorst et al  Silberberg 242 – 262; van der Merwe Sakereg 347 – 
353, 361 – 373.  See Kaplan 1987 SALJ 285 regarding the position under the Mining Rights Act of 1967.  
350 See Chetty v Naido 1974 3 SA 13 (A) 20B regarding the rei vindicatio as an incidence of ownership.  In Absa 
Bank Limited v Keet (817/2013) [2015] ZASCA 81 (28 May 2015) [20], the court referred to the rei vindicatio as 
“the right of ownership”. 
351 The plaintiff has to prove that he is owner, that the respondent is in possession of the thing at the beggining of 
the proceedings and that the thing exists and is clearly identifiable.  See van Der Merwe and Another v Taylor NO 
and Others [114];  Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd [1998] JOL 4003 (T) 9 -10.  
The rei vindiactio will not succeed if the respondent can prove that he was lawfully in possession of the thing.  
See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 242 – 243; du Bois Wille’s Principles 540; van der Merwe Sakereg 347; Sonnekus 
and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 467. 
352 Sonnekus 2007 TSAR 162; Sonnekus 2014 TSAR 201. 
353 Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 467; van der Merwe Sakereg 347. du Bois Wille’s Principles 538 
lists the rei vindicatio as one of the most important remedies for the protection of ownership.  Other real and 
personal remedies  that are avalilable in specific circumstances are the actio negatoria, actio ad exhibendum, 
condictio furtiva, actio legis aquilia and enrichment actions.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 262 – 270; du Bois 
Wille’s Principles 541 – 546.   




The Minerals Act was silent regarding ownership of extracted minerals.  It is accepted that, 
under the Minerals Act, ownership of mined minerals was governed by common-law rules of 
ownership.354  Although the entitlement to dispose of minerals was an incidence of ownership, 
the Minerals Act expressly conferred the ability to dispose of minerals on holders of mineral 
rights, prospecting rights and mining rights.355  It therefore seems that it was not necessary to 
rely on rules of ownership regarding the ability to dispose of minerals.  However, the Minerals 
Act did not grant a remedy to right holders to vindicate minerals from persons who were in 
unlawful possession thereof.  The ability to vindicate minerals stemmed from the ownership 
rights of right holders in the form of the rei vindicatio.  Thus, before the MPRDA came into 
operation, ownership of mined minerals strengthened mineral tenure security of holders of 
mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights.    
3.2. Protection of mineral tenure security in the MPRDA 
Similar to the Minerals Act, the MPRDA does not state in whom ownership of mined minerals 
vests.356  It is generally accepted that the common-law position prevails and that ownership of 
mined minerals vests in the holder of the right enabling separation of the minerals from the 
earth.357  The question here is whether mineral tenure security is strengthened if one accepts 
that ownership of mined minerals vests in holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and 
mining permits. 
The MPRDA confers the ability to dispose of minerals on holders of prospecting rights and 
mining rights.358  The Act thus provides security of tenure in relation to the ability to dispose 
of minerals on holders of prospecting rights and mining rights and it is not necessary to rely on 
private-law rules of ownership.  The Act does not confer the ability to dispose of minerals on 
holders of mining permits.  Since the MPRDA confers the ability to mine for their own account 
on holders of mining permits,359 it is questionable whether the legislator did not intend to confer 
                                                 
354 Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 473. 
355 Minerals Act, s 5(1). 
356 For criticism on this see Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 658 in comparison with the position in Australia; Mostert and 
Pope The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa 273.    
357 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-124; Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 658; Badenhorst 
and Mostert 2007 TSAR 479, 491, 492; van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 154 – 155; du Bois Wille’s Principles 623.   
Dale in Bastida et al 828 argues that “ownership will pass…on the mining actually occurring”.  According to sec 
4(2) of the MPRDA, if the common law is inconsistent with the Act, the Act prevails.  It can perhaps be argued 
that it is not inconsistent with the MPRDA if ownership of extracted minerals vests in holders of rights and 
therefore the common law prevails.  
358 MPRDA, s 5(1)(c). 
359 MPRDA, s 27(7)(d). 




the ability to dispose of minerals on holders of mining permits.360  The failure of the Act to 
confer the ability to dispose of minerals on holders of mining permits perhaps can be viewed 
as a legislative oversight.   
It is thus arguable that certainty will be increased if one accepts the common-law position in 
terms of which holders of mining permits, who are entitled to extract the minerals, become 
owners thereof upon separation from the earth.  As part of their ownership rights, holders of 
mining permits will have the entitlement to dispose of the mined minerals.  Holders will then 
have certainty regarding the ability to dispose of minerals to ensure profitable development of 
mines.  However, as explained, the MPRDA confers the ability to mine for their own account 
on holders of mining permits and the failure of the MPRDA to confer the ability to dispose of 
minerals on holders of mining permits probably is a legislative oversight.  The argument that 
ownership of mined minerals can continue to strengthen mineral tenure security in the current 
regulatory regime is therefore not pursued here. 
The MPRDA does not provide a remedy to holders of rights to vindicate minerals from entities 
who are in unlawful possession thereof. 361  In other words, the Act does not confer on holders 
of rights the ability to get their minerals back, and subsequently dispose thereof, to ensure 
profitable development of mines.  If one accepts that holders of rights acquire ownership when 
minerals are separated from the earth, holders will have the rei vindicatio at their disposal as 
one of the incidences of their ownership rights.  Certainty will be bolstered if one accepts that 
holders of rights who were entitled to separate minerals from the land, acquire ownership at 
the moment of separation irrespective of who or what caused the separation.362  This means 
that holders of rights can institute the rei vindicatio against anyone in unlawful possession of 
                                                 
360 Dale et al South African Mineral and petroleum Law MPRDA–124. 
361 See Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 647 and 658; Marumo July 2013 Without Prejudice 50.  Holders of rights will, of 
course, have delictual remedies at their disposal if they suffered damages.  Holders of rights can also obtain an 
interdict against illegal miners to cease the mining activities.  See, for example, Macassar Land Claims Committee 
v Maccsand CC and Others [2011] JOL 27464 (LCC).   
362 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-124 where the authors state “[e]ven if the 
severance was effected by natural forces or by a third party or by a thief, ownership vested in the mineral right 
holder”.  However, the authors rely on the minority judgment Trojan Exploration 534 per Botha JA for this 
statement.  Although Botha JA 531 concurred with the conclusions of the majority as well as the reasoning in 
general, this statement is not the same as the majority judgment.  The majority per Schulze JA 525 specifically 
stated that the decision did not apply in case of illegal or unlawful mining.  In White v Adams 14 1897 Juta SC 
152 159 - 160 the court held that the right holder did not become owner of illegally mined minerals because he 
was not owner of minerals in situ.  




the minerals.  The availability of the rei vindicatio reduces risks and increases the certainty of 
right holders that they will be able to develop mines profitably. 
In summary, ownership of mined minerals can assist in strengthening mineral tenure security 
in the current regulatory regime in two circumstances.  Firstly, ownership of mined minerals 
confers the entitlement to dispose of minerals on holders of mining permits.  Secondly, 
ownership of mined minerals confers the entitlement to claim minerals from anyone in 
unlawful possession thereof on holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits.  
Regarding these two circumstances, the situation is similar to the position under common law 
and the Minerals Act.   
The MPRDA does not confer a vindicatory remedy on right holders and it is therefore necessary 
to rely on the private-law rules of ownership.  The reasons for the lack of regulation here is a 
matter of speculation.  It is possible that the legislator deliberately decided to be silent on all 
matters regarding ownership of minerals and mineral resources and to leave decisions in this 
regard to the judiciary.  It is also possible that the absence of a remedy to vindicate minerals is 
an oversight and a result of careless drafting.  Whatever the case may be, the current situation 
regarding a vindicatory action creates uncertainty.  On the face of it, the legislator has two 
options to clear up the uncertainty and to strengthen mineral tenure security.  Firstly, the 
legislator can opt to be explicit regarding ownership of minerals and mineral resources.363  If 
ownership of mined minerals vests in holders of rights who were entitled to extract minerals, 
right holders will automatically have the rei vindicatio at their disposal to claim their minerals 
back from anyone in unlawful possession.  If ownership does not vest in the holder of the 
enabling right, the MPRDA should contain a remedy that will allow right holders to claim 
minerals back from anyone in unlawful possession thereof.  Considering that the current 
regulatory regime is predominantly administrative in nature, following the latter approach will 
probably prove to be sounder.  Furthermore, as discussed below, the rules of ownership will 
not solve all problems regarding a vindicatory action.364 
                                                 
363 Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 658 and Mostert and Pope The Principles of the Law of Property in South Africa 273 
argue that the Act should state in whom ownership of severed minerals vest.   
364 Sec 4 below. 




4. Suitability of a private-law ownership analysis 
It has been argued that section 3(1) of the MPRDA, according to which the state is the custodian 
of the country’s mineral resources, must be interpreted from a “public law paradigm”. 365  
Section 3(1) thus points to the powers of the government to grant and control rights to minerals 
and does not relate to private ownership of mineral resources.  Furthermore, section 3(1) 
indicates that the government is responsible for regulating minerals and mineral resources for 
the benefit of the nation.366   Also, the MPRDA “presents a definite move away from the idea 
of private ownership of mineral resources”367 to a system of state-controlled rights to 
minerals.368   
From the discussion above, it is clear that private ownership of unmined minerals does not play 
a role in the abilities to prospect and mine.369  The one area where the relevance of private law 
must be considered is the relationship between landowners and holders of rights to minerals.370 
This aspect of mineral law was traditionally rooted in rules of property law.371  It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to do a detailed analyses of the relationship between landowners and holders 
of rights to minerals.  However, it was pointed out earlier that the MPRDA regulates this 
relationship to a degree and describes a procedure that must be followed if there is conflict 
between landowners and holders of rights to minerals.372   
In the case of unmined minerals, ownership based arguments will not be detrimental to the 
tenure security of holders of rights to minerals.373  Even if ownership of unmined minerals vests 
in landowners, holders of rights will still be able to prospect and mine.  Still, since ownership 
                                                 
365 Watson (LLB thesis) 30.  According to Watson, custodianship in a public law paradigm must “grapple with 
questions around polycentricity, separation of powers and Constitutional limitations on the state’s duty to reform 
mineral law”.  Also see De Beers Consolidated [31] where the court said “[w]e must look at prospecting law 
through the lens of public law, not private law”.  
366 Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al (eds) 86.  In Agri SA (CC), the court held that the custodianship-
model aims to facilitate broader and more equitable access to mineral resources. 
367 Mostert Principles and Policies in Perspective 114. 
368 Badenhorst et al Silberberg; van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 154.  See also De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v 
Ataqua Mining [62] where the court said that the MPRDA destroyed common-law rights and created rights granted 
by the government.    
369 Sec 2.2 above. 
370 See chap 2, sec 3.2.3. 
371 See chap 2, sec 1 and sec 3.2.3. 
372 See chap 2, sec 3.2.3. 
373 See Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 95 where the authors explain that the cuius est solum principle 
as a concept of private-law ownership will be detrimental to hydraulic fracking. 




of unmined minerals will have very little impact in practice,374 it becomes questionable whether 
a private-law ownership paradigm is at all necessary and suitable for analyses and solving of 
problems that arise in relation unmined minerals.375 
As regards mined minerals, it was shown above that, in the current regulatory regime, private-
law ownership plays a role in the ability to institute the rei vindicatio if minerals are mined and 
carried away by an unauthorized entity or are stolen.376  However, an option that must be 
contemplated, but which will not be pursued here, is that mined minerals are also subject to 
section 3(1) of the MPRDA and hence fall under the custodianship of the state.  Thus, holders 
of rights to minerals have the ability to remove, dispose of and vindicate minerals as far as the 
MPRDA allows them.  If that is the case, the MPRDA must be criticised for not conferring a 
remedy to claim unlawfully or illegally mined and stolen minerals back on holders of rights. 
Furthermore, accepting that ownership of mined minerals vests in holders of rights does not 
solve all problems.  For instance, what is the situation if minerals, which are not subject to a 
right granted in terms of the MPRDA, are mined unlawfully or illegally?377  From a policy 
perspective, it is clear that in these instances the government should be able to claim the 
minerals back.  The lack of regulation in this regard has contributed to an argument that 
minerals and minerals resources are res publicae.378  Consequently, when minerals are mined 
and carried away by an unauthorized entity, ownership thereof will vest in the state and the 
state will then be able to use remedies normally available to owners, including the rei 
vindicatio.379  However, the res publicae argument was rejected by the judiciary.380 
On the one hand, it seems that private ownership of mined minerals that vests in holders of 
rights with the effect that right holders have the rei vindication at their disposal is advantageous 
to holders of rights to minerals.  On the other hand, if minerals and mineral resources are res 
publicae, the government will have the remedies of private owners, including the rei vindicatio 
at their disposal.381  However, private ownership of mined minerals that vests in holders of 
                                                 
374 Watson (LLB thesis) 30.  Ownership of unmined also do not have bearing on ownership of mined minerals.  
See Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 
375 Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 86 opine that explaining the custodianship role of the state in terms 
of private law lead to results that “borders on the absurd”.   
376 Sec 3.2 above. 
377 See Badenhorst 2010 SALJ 657 – 658. 
378 See van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 150. 
379 See van den Berg 2009 Stell LR 150. 
380 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining [38]. 
381 Watson (LLB thesis) 22. 




rights and the res publicae construction are mutually exclusive.  It becomes questionable 
whether a private-law ownership paradigm, even in case of mined minerals, is appropriate for 
analysis and problem solving in the current regulatory regime. While the MPRDA does not 
contain a remedy for vindication, it remains to be seen whether the judiciary will solve 
problems of vindication from a solely private-law paradigm.382  However, in a best-case 
scenario, the legislator will amend the MPRDA to provide remedies to holders of rights where 
minerals are mined and carried away by an unauthorized entity or are stolen.  An amendment 
will also require remedies for the government in situations where minerals that are not subject 
to rights, are mined without the necessary right or permit. 
5. Summative findings and remarks 
Traditionally, private-law ownership of minerals and mineral resources protected and 
strengthened mineral tenure security.  Firstly, ownership of unmined minerals affected the 
abilities of holders of mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights to prospect and mine 
and to choose not to prospect and mine.  Secondly, ownership of mined minerals affected the 
abilities of holders of mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights to dispose of minerals 
and to claim minerals back from anyone who could not prove a legal entitlement to be in 
possession of the minerals.  Ownership of mined minerals was particularly important to 
vindicate minerals that were mined and carried away by an unauthorized entity if that were 
stolen.   
In the current regulatory regime, ownership of unmined minerals have no bearing on the 
abilities of holders of rights to minerals to prospect and mine and to choose not to prospect and 
mine.  In this regard, private-law ownership of unmined minerals does not continue to 
strengthen and protect mineral tenure security.  Private-law ownership of mined minerals 
continues to play a limited role in certain abilities of holders of rights to minerals that are 
necessary for mineral tenure security.  In this regard, the MPRDA does not provide a 
vindicatory remedy to holders of rights to minerals.  This is specifically problematic where 
minerals that are subject to rights are mined and carried away by an unauthorized entity or are 
stolen.  The lack of regulation regarding a vindicatory remedy necessitates relying on the rules 
of private law to protect and strengthen mineral tenure security.  Rules of private-law 
ownership automatically allow holders of rights to use the rei vindicatio to claim minerals back 
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from anyone who cannot prove a legal entitlement to be in possession of the minerals.  
However, reliance on private-law rules of ownership does not solve all problems regarding 
vindication of minerals.  This is especially apparent in situations where the state needs to 
vindicate minerals that were mined without the necessary right or permit.   
The analysis in the chapter casts doubt on whether it is apposite to investigate right to minerals 
granted in terms of the MPRDA from a private-law paradigm.  This is evident from the 
insignificance of private-law ownership of unmined minerals for the abilities to prospect and 
mine and to choose not to prospect and mine.  The unsuitability of a private-law approach to 
minerals is also apparent from the inability of rules of private-law adequately to solve 
vindicatory problems regarding mined minerals adequately.   
The next two chapters investigate how the MPRDA provides security of tenure to holders of 
rights to minerals regarding the abilities to prospect and mine, to remove and dispose of 
minerals, to choose not to prospect and mine and to transfer and mortgage rights.  The analyses 
in these two chapters use the text of the MPRDA, and not a private-law paradigm, as a starting 
point.    
 





RIGHT HOLDERS’ ABILITY TO PROSPECT AND MINE 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
For profitable development of mines, holders of rights to minerals must be able to prospect383 
and mine,384 and to dispose of minerals found, for their own account.  Profitable development 
of mines furthermore requires that holders of rights to minerals must, at least to an extent, be 
able to discontinue or interrupt operations and still retain their rights during times that mining 
would be uneconomical.385  
An evaluation of how the MPRDA provides mineral tenure security thus necessitates 
investigating the conditions under which holders of rights to minerals are allowed to, and 
prevented from, prospecting and mining.  It further requires scrutiny of the conditions under 
which holders of rights may dispose of minerals found.  An evaluation of mineral tenure 
security also requires examining the conditions under which holders of rights to minerals can 
suspend operations while retaining their rights.   
This chapter comments on the extent to which the MPRDA provides security of tenure to 
holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits concerning the abilities to 
prospect and mine, to dispose of minerals found for their own account and to choose not to 
prospect and mine.  The chapter also highlights the features of the current predominantly 
administrative regulatory regime386  that cause uncertainty and weaken mineral tenure security. 
The analysis in this chapter is relevant for the insight it brings into how certainty may be 
bolstered, and tenure security thus strengthened, by minimizing risks and uncertainties that 
may prevent profitable development of mines.387 
                                                 
383 According to s 1 of the MPRDA, prospecting means “intentionally searching for any mineral by means of any 
method – (a) which disturbs the surface or subsurface of the earth, including any portion of the earth that is under 
the sea or under other water; or (b) in or on any residue stockpiles or residue deposit, in order to establish the 
existence of any mineral and to determine the extent and economic value thereof; or (c) in the sea or other water 
on land”.  Prospecting operations “means any activity carried on in connection with prospecting”. 
384 According to s 1 of the MPRDA, mining operation “means any operation relating to the act of mining and 
matters directly incidental thereto”. Mine when used as a verb means “…the mining of any mineral, in or under 
the earth, water or any residue deposit, whether by underground or open working or otherwise and includes any 
operation or activity incidental thereto, in, on or under the relevant mining area”.  
385 Bastida 2001 JERL 38.   
386 See chap 2, sec 3.2.1 and sec 3.2.2. 
387 See chap 1, sec 1.1 regarding profitable development of mines as an aspect of mineral tenure security. 




Administrative regimes are, at times, criticised for allowing extensive governmental 
interference and discretionary decision-making power.388  According to one commentator, the 
question whether the custodianship model389 of the MPRDA will be perceived to be investor-
friendly390 depends largely on the degree to which governmental discretion in decision-making 
is circumscribed.391  Furthermore, the MPRDA is, at times, criticised for being drafted poorly 
and carelessly and in vague and unclear terms.392  The analysis in this chapter foresees the 
possibility that governmental interference, discretionary decision-making powers and drafting 
concerns can cause uncertainty that may weaken mineral tenure security.   
2. Optimal mineral tenure security 
Mineral tenure security will be served best if holders of rights are free to prospect and mine, to 
dispose of minerals and to choose not to prospect and mine.  Such freedom will ensure the best 
prospects for profitable development of mines and will simultaneously allow investors to 
maximise returns on their investments.  Holders of rights to prospect or mine need this freedom 
to make decisions regarding when and how to conduct their operations, based on objective 
market conditions and their own financial, technical and other abilities.   
The government also has legitimate interests in prospecting and mining.  For example, the 
government may pursue optimal exploitation of mineral resources in an attempt to create 
employment and alleviate poverty.393  It is possible that the government’s interest in optimal 
exploitation may, at times, not coincide with the freedom of right holders to choose not to 
                                                 
388 See regarding wide governmental discretion Bastida 2001 JERL 37; Dale 1996 JERL 300; Dale in Bastida et 
al 833.  Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-16 submit that the most important aspect 
of administrative decisions is the degree to which the discretion is circumscribed by reference to stipulated 
objective criteria.  Also see Williams in Bastida et al 50-51 where the author advances that “excessive 
discretionary authority” is an obstacle in “winning the respect and confidence of the mining industry”.  The World 
Bank A Mining Strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean 9 and 10 views limitation of discretion in the 
implementation of mining laws, to minimise corruption, as one of the main characteristics of a successful legal 
framework.  Badenhorst 1998 Obiter 157, 159 and 169 criticises various provision of the Green Paper on a 
Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa (1998) for allowing governmental discretion.   
389 See chap 3, sec 2.1 for a discussion of the custodianship-model. 
390 One of the requirements for the system to be investor-friendly is provision of tenure security.  See chap 1, sec 
1.  
391 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-15. 
392 For criticism on drafting of the MPRDA in general see Badenhorst and Mostert 2007 TSAR 486 and 492 – 493; 
Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13-19 – 13-24, 30-2 – 30-5; Dale et al South 
African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-203 – MPRDA-204; Mostert Principles and Policies 77 and 88 – 
90.  In Doe Run Exploration SA (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Minerals and Energy & others (499/07) [2008] ZANCHC 
3 (8 February 2008) [43] the court said that s 105 of the MPRDA “can hardly be described as an epitome of 
exemplary draftmanship”. 
393 Agri SA (CC) [2]; Mostert Principles and Policies 2 and 157 – 158.  According to Mostert and van den Berg 
in Zillman et al 91, the MPRDA indicates a policy choice by the government to ensure active mining.  




prospect and mine.  Furthermore, the MPRDA is transformative in nature and aims to ensure 
equitable access to the country’s mineral resources394 and to advance opportunities to 
previously disadvantaged persons to participate in the mining industry.395  Thus, the 
government may legitimately require holders of rights to meet certain requirements in relation 
to black economic empowerment396 and socio-economic development to maintain their rights 
and the ability to prospect and mine.  
An evaluation of mineral tenure security needs to take into account that the government has 
legitimate reasons and interests to limit the abilities of right holders to prospect and mine, to 
dispose of minerals and to choose not to prospect in mine.  In this regard, the interests of the 
government and of holders of rights may not always coincide.397  It is thus accepted here that 
an evaluation of mineral tenure security cannot follow an all-of-nothing approach.  It is not 
possible to argue that the MPRDA provides mineral tenure security if holders of rights have 
unfettered freedom to choose when they prospect and mine and when they do not.  Similarly, 
it cannot be concluded that any limitation of these freedoms by the government unjustifiably 
weaken mineral tenure security.  The approach followed here is that optimal mineral tenure 
security requires creating a state of certainty in relation to rights to minerals that is most 
attractive to investors, whilst supporting the legitimate and important objectives of the 
government.   
The following sections accordingly investigate the manner in which the MPRDA regulates the 
abilities of right holders to prospect and mine, to dispose of minerals found and to choose not 
to prospect and mine.  The analysis also identifies the situations in which, and the reasons why, 
right holders’ abilities are limited.  
2.1. The ability to prospect and mine  
The ability to prospect emanates from prospecting rights398 in terms of the MPRDA, while 
mining occurs by virtue of mining rights399 or mining permits.400  To prospect, an entity must 
                                                 
394 MPRDA, s 2(c). 
395 MPRDA, s 2(d). 
396 See fn 451 below for the most salient requirements of black economic empowerment.  
397 Erize in McHarg et al 282 opines that, in general, “when some combination of private effort and state activity 
exists, dispute arises”. 
398 MPRDA, s 5(3)(b) read with the def of “prospecting right” in s 1. 
399 MPRDA, s (5)3)(b) read with the def of “mining right” in s 1. 
400 MPRDA, s 27(7)(d) read with the def of mining permit in s 1. 




be the holder of a prospecting right; to conduct mining operations, such an entity must hold a 
mining right or mining permit.401  The difference between mining rights and mining permits is 
that mining permits are issued when the mineral can be mined optimally within two years and 
the mining area does not exceed 5.0 hectares,402 while no limitation is placed on the area and 
period related to mining rights.  Mining permits are thus issued for small-scale mining and 
mining rights for large-scale mining operations.  Holders of prospecting rights, mining rights 
and mining permits can prospect and mine by virtue of the rights that the government confers 
on them.403   
Apart from having the ability to prospect and mine, holders of prospecting rights, mining rights 
and mining permits must have sufficient time to develop mines profitably.404  The time that a 
particular rights allows for prospecting and mining depend on the initial time that the right is 
granted for as well as the possibility to renew rights.  The following sections investigate 
whether the MPRDA allows enough time for prospecting and mining and also investigates the 
requirements for renewals of rights. 
2.1.1 Time allowed for prospecting and mining 
It is difficult to generalize about the time that is required to develop mines profitable.405  
Various factors influence timelines for profitable development, for example, the “scale, type 
of targeted deposit and local conditions”.406  Based on a study of 50 mines worldwide, Otto 
concludes that medium and large mining projects require upwards of ten years to gestate.407  
The gestation period refers to “the length of time between the initiations of exploration…to the 
start of commercial production”.408  In the terminology of the MPRDA, this includes periods 
for reconnaissance permissions409 and prospecting rights.  The MPRDA allows a total period 
                                                 
401 According to s 5A(b) it is an illegal act to prospect without a prospecting right or to mine without a mining 
right or a mining permit. 
402 MPRDA, ss 27(1)(a) and (b). 
403 MPRDA, s 5(3)(b). 
404 Otto in Bastida et al 354; Dale 1996 JERL 299. 
405 Otto in Bastida et al 365. 
406 Otto in Bastida et al 357 and 365.  Regarding differences in orebodies see Benning May/June 2000 The Journal 
of The South African Institute of Mining and Metallurgy 148.  The author comments on the risks that uncertainties 
regarding orebodies have for the financing of mining projects. 
407 Otto in Bastida et al 355 and table 1 358 – 359 for specific periods for specific mines. 
408 Otto in Bastida et al 354. 
409 Reconnaissance permissions are not analysed in detail in this thesis because the MPRDA does not include 
tenure security with regard to reconnaissance permissions as an objective.  See chap 1, sec 2.  The time period for 
reconnaissance operations is, however, included here because it is relevant for the total time allowed for 
exploration. 




of nine years for development according to these two rights.  This consists of one year for 
reconnaissance operations,410 a maximum period of five years for the initial prospecting right411 
and three years for a renewed prospecting right.412  The administrative regime created by the 
MPRDA thus falls short of providing the necessary time for development in the gestation 
period according to Otto’s study.413   
The MPRDA does not place a limitation on the total time allowed for large-scale mining.  
Mining rights are granted for an initial maximum period of thirty years.414  The Act provides 
that mining rights can be renewed for further periods (without placing a limitation on the 
number of periods), each not exceeding 30 years.415  The fact that no limitation is placed on 
the number of times that mining rights can be renewed, in principle, strengthens mineral tenure 
security.  However, renewal of mining rights is not automatic and holders of rights will have 
to show that they meet certain criteria before rights are renewed. 416  The concern is that some 
of these criteria are not closely circumscribed and create uncertainty regarding whether 
renewals will be granted.417  A life-of-mine grant of mining rights will strengthen mineral 
tenure security and will find favor with investors.418   
The total time allowed for small-scale mining operations is five years.  Mining permits are 
initially granted for a maximum period of two years and may be renewed three times for a 
period of one year per renewal.419  Given that mining permits are only issued if the mineral can 
be mined optimally within two years or the mining area does not exceed 1.5 hectares, the five-
year period appears long enough to ensure profitable development of mines.  Furthermore, the 
Act does not preclude investors from applying for mining rights if they are uncertain whether 
the mine can be developed profitably within two years.420  Allowing sufficient time for 
prospecting and mining will only strengthen mineral tenure security if investors are certain that 
                                                 
410 MPRDA, s 14(4).  Reconnaissance permissions are not renewable.  
411 MPRDA, s 16(6). 
412 MPRDA, s 18(4). 
413 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-19 where the authors criticise the restriction 
on the Minister’s power to grant one renewal for prospecting rights only even when the facts dictate otherwise. 
414 MPRDA, s 23(6). 
415 MPRDA, s 24(4). 
416 See sec 2.1.2 below. 
417 See sec 2.1.2 below. 
418 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-19 and MPRDA-267; Badenhorst 2014 JERL 
18 says that the fact that mining rights are not granted in perpetuity or for the life of a mine detracts from security 
of tenure. 
419 MPRDA, s 27(8)(a). 
420 S 22 does not place any limitation on the area and size of the mine when mining rights are applied for. 




the time will be allocated to them.  In this regard, the requirements for renewal of rights to 
minerals are important aspects of mineral tenure security. 
2.1.2 Renewal of rights 
The MPRDA strengthens mineral tenure security of holders of prospecting rights421 and mining 
rights422 by providing for compulsory granting of renewals of rights if specified criteria are 
met.423 In case of mining permits, the Act provides only that permits can be renewed.  There is 
thus no obligation on the Minister to grant renewals of mining permits.  Furthermore, the 
MPRDA does not prescribe a procedure for lodging applications for renewals or any criteria 
on which decisions to grant renewals must be based.  
In contrast to prospecting rights and mining rights, the MPRDA is silent regarding obligatory 
granting of renewals of mining permits based on specified renewal criteria.  This creates 
uncertainty in relation to profitable development to holders of mining permits.  It is unlikely 
that the absence of criteria in the case of mining permits must be interpreted to imply that 
renewals will be automatic.  Such an interpretation will be contrary to the general character of 
the MPRDA in terms of which criteria are prescribed for applications and renewals of almost 
all rights to minerals.424  A reasonable inference is that the government has wide and 
                                                 
421 S 18(1) of the MPRDA requires that applications must be lodged in a prescribed manner. According to section 
18(2), applications must (a) state the reasons and period for which the renewal is required; (b) be accompanied by 
a report reflecting the prospecting result and prospecting expenditure incurred; (c) be accompanied by report 
showing the extent with which the prospector complies with the environmental management programme, the 
rehabilitation that is required and the cost thereof; (d) include a detailed prospecting work programme for the 
period of renewal; (e) must be accompanied by a certificate issued by the Council of Geoscience that all 
prospecting information as prescribed were submitted. According to 18(3), the Minister is under an obligation to 
grant renewals if the requirements for section 18(1) and (18(2) are met and if the holder of the prospecting right 
complies with (a) the terms and conditions of the right and is not in contravention of any relevant provisions of 
the MPRDA; (b) the prospecting work programme; and (c) the requirements of the approved environmental 
management plan. 
422 S 24(1 of the MPRDA requires that the applications must be lodged in a prescribed manner. According to s 
24(2) applications for renewals must (a) state the reasons and the period for which the renewal is required; (b) be 
accompanied by a report reflecting the prospecting result and prospecting expenditure incurred; and (c) include a 
detailed mining work programme for the renewal. S 24(3) places an obligation on the Minister to grant the renewal 
if the requirements of ss 24(1) and (2) are met and if the holder of the mining right has complied with (a) the terms 
and conditions of the mining right and any relevant provisions of the MPRDA; (b) the mining work programme; 
(c) the requirements of the prescribed social and labour plan; and (d) the requirements of the approved 
environmental management programme. 
423 Regarding obligatory granting of rights in general see See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum 
Law MPRDA-204; Dale 1996 JERL 300; Dale in Bastida et al 833.  
424 Ss 14(1), 17(1), 17(3), 23(1), 24(3), 32(1), and 34(2) respectively set criteria for granting of reconnaissance 
permissions, prospecting rights, renewals of prospecting rights, mining rights, renewals of mining rights, retention 
permits and renewals of retention permits.  S 20(1) of the MPRDA does not set specified criteria for the granting 
of permissions to remove and dispose of minerals although the section requires that minerals may be removed and 




uncircumscribed discretion to grant or refuse renewals of mining permits.  The extent of the 
uncertainty created does not seem to be in pursuit of any particular governmental objectives 
that justify it.  Where the government implements a regulatory regime, it cannot make 
continued mining dependent on renewals without informing holders of mining permits when 
and why renewals will be granted.  Although mining permits are issued for small-scale mining, 
holders of permits require certainty that they will have enough time to develop mines 
profitably.  Therefore, the MPRDA should be amended at least to provide for compulsory 
granting of renewals of mining permits and to inform holders of permits of the requirements 
that they must meet for renewals.  The requirements can include, for example, that permits 
holders must show that they actively and continuously mined for the duration of the initial 
period of the permit but need more time to develop the mine profitably. 
As stated, obligatory granting of renewals of prospecting rights and mining rights, in principle, 
strengthen mineral tenure security.  However, certainty is diminished by two factors.  Firstly, 
some criteria for renewals of prospecting rights and mining rights are drafted imprecisely and 
vaguely with the result that applicants for renewals are uncertain of the circumstances in which 
the Minister will be under an obligation to grant renewals. For example, the Minister is under 
an obligation to grant renewals of prospecting rights and mining rights if holders are not in 
contravention of any “relevant” provisions of the MPRDA.  Secondly, some of the criteria for 
renewals of mining rights have been criticized for not being closely circumscribed and for 
creating uncertainty. Such criteria can lead to wide governmental discretion when rights are 
renewed. An example of criteria that lead to wide governmental discretion is that applicants 
for renewals of mining rights must comply with the social and labor plan. The following 
paragraphs discusses the effect of the two examples on mineral tenure security. 
Regarding vague and imprecise drafting, one of the criteria425 that will place an obligation on 
the Minister to renew prospecting rights and mining rights is that right holders who apply for 
renewals are not in contravention of any relevant provision of “this Act”.426  In addition, 
applicants for renewals of mining rights must not be in contravention of relevant provisions of 
                                                 
disposed to conduct tests or to identify and analyse the minerals.  See sec 2.2 below for a discussion of the criteria 
for permissions to remove and dispose of minerals. 
425 According to ss 24(3)(b), 24(3)(c) and 24(3)(d), holders of mining rights must comply, respectively, with the 
mining work programme, the requirements of the social and labour plan and the requirements of the approved 
environmental management programme. 
426 MPRDA, ss 18(3)(a) and 24(3)(a) for prospecting rights and mining rights respectively. 




“any other law”.427  It is unclear which provisions of the MPRDA will be deemed “relevant” 
for purposes of applications for renewals.  According to Dale et al,428  relevant provisions refer 
to those which are relevant for the right or permit to be renewed.  Supposedly this means that 
holders of mining rights must not be in contravention of any provision in the MPRDA that 
relate to mining rights and that provisions in relation to prospecting rights, for example, are 
irrelevant.  This is possibly the correct interpretation taking into account that the 2013 
Amendment Bill aimed to amend the criteria for renewals of prospecting rights and mining 
rights so that contravention of any provision of the MPRDA will have the effect that the 
Minister is not under an obligation to renew mining rights and prospecting rights.429  According 
to the proposed amendment, any contravention of any provision relating to mining rights will 
remove the obligation of the Minister to grant the renewals.  As a matter of common sense, 
provisions relating to prospecting rights only will not have any effect on the obligation of the 
Minister to grant renewals of mining rights.  
Still, the text of the MPRDA currently creates uncertainty and an amendment that removes the 
reference to “relevant” provisions is therefore desirable.  It is understandable that the 
government expects right holders to comply with the provisions of the Act to be granted 
renewals of their rights.  However, there does not seem to be any specific reason or objective 
for creating uncertainty regarding renewals of rights by requiring right holders to comply with 
“relevant” provisions of the MPRDA.  The uncertainty that is created therefore unnecessarily 
weakens optimal mineral tenure security.   
Furthermore, the reference to “any other law” in case of renewals of mining rights is extremely 
wide and vague.  According to Dale et al, any provision in another law that is relevant for the 
specific rights qualify as relevant provisions in any “other law” for purposes of renewals of 
mining rights.430  Although this submission seems logical, the reference to “any other law” 
creates unnecessary uncertainty.  The 2013 Amendment Bill aimed to remove the reference to 
“any other law” so that only contraventions of the MPRDA will give the Minister the discretion 
                                                 
427 MPRDA, s 24(3)(a). 
428 South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-212(3). 
429 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Bill [B15-2103] (Explanatory summary in GG 
36523 of 31 May 2013), ss 13(d) and 19(c) for prospecting rights and mining rights respectively.  President Jacob 
Zuma refused to assent to the Bill and sent it back to parliament because the Bill did not pass constitutional muster 
in his view for various reasons.  See the President’s letter of 16 June 2015 to parliament in this regard.  The letter 
is available at http://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Zuma-letter-to-the-NA-re-MPRDA-Bill.pdf. 
430 South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-212(3). 




to refuse to renew mining permits.431  Such an amendment is desirable and will increase 
certainty and strengthen mineral tenure security.  It must be considered that the government 
may wish to require that right holders comply with other laws, such as the Mine Health and 
Safety Act432 or the National Environmental Management Act, to be allowed to continue their 
mining operations.433  However, the MPRDA should specify that compliance with these Acts 
is a requirement to place an obligation on the Minister to renew mining rights.  Failure to 
specify the provisions of these Acts that will remove the obligation of the Minister to renew 
mining rights, unnecessarily creates uncertainty and weakens optimal mineral security. 
Vague and imprecise drafting, in some instances, leads to broad, uncircumscribed 
governmental discretion. Such discretionary powers, not based on objective and closely 
circumscribed criteria, cause uncertainty.  In this regard, one of the criteria for renewal of 
mining rights is that applicants must meet the requirements of the prescribed social and labour 
plan.434  The objectives of the social and labour plan are prescribed and include promoting 
employment and advancing the social and economic welfare of all South Africans.435  The 
objectives further are to contribute to the transformation of the mining industry436 and to ensure 
that holders of mining rights contribute towards the socio-economic development of the areas 
in which they operate.437   
The social and labour plan objectives are without doubt important in the South African mining 
industry.  However, the vague content of the social and labour plan has been subject to harsh 
criticism.  Dale asserts that the “formulation of the requirements of the social and labour plan 
                                                 
431 2013 Amendment Bill, s 19(c). 
432 29 of 1996. 
433 107 of 1998. 
434 MPRDA, s 24(3)(c).  S 20(b) of the 2008 Amendment Act substituted s 24(3)(d) of the MPRDA.  However, 
the Amendment Act, wrongly numbered the substitution as (c).  An application of the incorrect numbering will 
have the effect that compliance with the social and labour plan is no longer a requirement for renewals of mining 
rights.  It is, however, clear that the intention was not to remove compliance with social and labour plan as a 
requirement for renewals of mining rights.  This is evident from s 19(c) of the 2013 Amendment Bill that attempted 
to amend s 24(3)(c) of the MPRDA to require compliance with the approved (and no longer prescribed) social 
and labour plan for renewals of mining rights.  Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-17 
– MPRDA criticise the social and labour plan as a requirement for initial granting of mining rights.  Compliance 
with the social and labour plan is also a requirement for renewals of mining rights and the criticism is therefore 
also applicable here.  See Dale in Bastida et al 833 – 834 for criteria for initial granting of rights that are not based 
on objective and closely circumscribed criteria.  
435 Reg 41(a).  Also see MPRDA, s 2(f).  
436 Reg 41(b).  Also see MPRDA, ss 2(c) and (d). 
437 Reg 41(c).  Also see MPRDA, s 2(f). 




unfortunately suffers from lack of clarity”.438   According to Leon, the content of the plan is 
“unworkably vague”.439   
In an attempt to overcome the difficulties that mining companies experienced regarding what 
was expected from them in relation to the social and labour plan, the Department of Mineral 
Resources published guidelines for its implementation in 2006.440  Despite these guidelines, it 
was argued that some of the requirements of the social and labour plan remain “frustratingly 
vague”.441  For example, the original regulations require the social and labour plan to provide 
“an internship and bursary plan and [that] its implementation [must be] in line with the skills 
development plan”.442   
The 2006 guidelines attempted to clarify the requirements regarding internships and bursaries 
by requiring a “detailed internship and bursary plan, which is in line with the skills 
development plan… and how the plan would be implemented”.443  Despite the attempt at 
clarification, the guidelines do not really clarify any “desired courses of progression or desired 
outcomes” for mining companies to know what is expected of them.  In 2010, the Department 
of Mineral Resources issued revised guidelines for the implementation of the social and labour 
plan.444  Regarding bursary plans, the revised guidelines require mining companies to provide 
targets, timeframes and budgets.445  Mining companies must also inform the government 
whether the bursaries will be given to employees of the company (internal bursaries) or to 
others (external bursaries).446  It is clear that the government does not aim to provide concrete 
                                                 
438 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-17.  See MPRDA-256(11) – 256(12) for a 
general discussion of the social and labour plan.     
439 Leon 2013 JERL 186.  Also see Andersson (Bachelor Thesis) 28 - 31; Howard (LLM thesis) 84 and 85. 
440 Department of Mineral Resources 2006 Social and Labour Plan Guidelines for the Mining and Production 
Industries.  These guidelines are not currently available on the Website of the Department of Mineral Resources.  
The guidelines can be accessed at 
http://www.blacklite.co.za/portals/0/BEE_in_Mining_legislation/SOCIAL%20AND%20LABOUR%20PLAN%
20GUIDELINES.pdf.  Also see University of Stellenbosch Business School “Corporate governance: Social and 
Labour Plans in the Mining Sector” 3 – 4 available at 
http://www.governance.usb.ac.za/pdfs/No.4_Governance_Africa_case%20study%202009.pdf. 
441 University of Stellenbosch Business School “Corporate governance: Social and Labour Plans in the Mining 
Sector” 4. 
442 Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations (GN R527) in GG 26275 of 23 April 2004, reg 
46(iv). 
443 Department of Mineral Resources 2006 Guidelines, s 2.4; Andersson (Bachelor thesis) 32. 
444 Department of Mineral Resources 2010 Revised Social and Labour Plan Guidelines.  These guidelines are not 
currently available on the website of the Department of Mineral Resources.  The revised guidelines can be 
accessed at http://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/SLP-guidelines-2010.pdf.  
445 Department of Mineral Resources 2010 Revised Guidelines, s 3.6.1.1. 
446 Department of Mineral Resources 2010 Revised Guidelines, s 3.6.1.3. 




guidelines regarding the amount of bursaries that mining companies must provide.447  Instead, 
mining companies are expected to provide the government with information regarding the 
amount of bursaries that they will provide and their budget for bursaries.   
The difficulty here is that the requirements and guidelines for the social and labour plan are so 
vague that mining companies do not know what is expected from them.  Thus, at first glance, 
the discretion of the Minister to grant renewals of mining rights is circumscribed and based on 
a list of criteria: the Minister must grant renewals of mining rights if the criteria are met, 
including compliance with the social and labour plan.  However, on closer inspection, all of 
the criteria, for example compliance with the social and labour plan, are not objective and 
closely circumscribed.  There are no objectively ascertainable standards that will compel the 
Minister to conclude that applicants for renewals of mining rights meet the criteria relating to 
compliance with the social and labour plan.  There are thus no objectively ascertainable criteria 
that will place an obligation on the Minister to grant renewals of mining rights.  In reality, 
therefore, the Minister has wide and uncircumscribed discretion to grant or refuse renewals of 
mining rights. 
It is comprehensible that the nature of the objectives of the social and labour plan requires some 
discretion on the part of government and that strict rules will not benefit achieving the 
objectives.448  However, it seems unreasonably vague that no objectively ascertainable 
guidelines are provided regarding the discretionary decision-making power of the government 
to determine whether applicants for renewals of mining rights comply with the social and 
labour plan.  Regarding bursary plans, for example, the regulations can require minimum 
requirements in terms of which the amount of bursaries are expressed in relation to a percentage 
of a company’s profit in the previous financial year.  The regulations can also determine that a 
certain percentage of bursaries must be granted to internal applicants to ensure that mining 
companies contribute to the development of their employees.   
                                                 
447 See University of Stellenbosch Business School “Corporate Governance: Social and Labour Plans in the 
Mining Sector” 4 where it is stated that the reason for the vagueness can be that the “government seeks to always 
provide a generic form of guidance in cases like these, and must consider all permutations of the mining industry 
and their varied [social and labour plans]”. 
448 In the same manner that governmental discretion may be necessary to achieve the objectives of BEE 
empowerment. See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-117.  Also See Dawood v 
Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) [53] and fn 73 and Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 
2006 2 SA 247 (CC) [33] for the need for some governmental discretion in the modern state.  Also see Hoexter 
Administrative Law in South Africa 47. 




It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a detailed analysis of all of the requirements, 
advantages and shortcomings of the prescribed social and labour plan and the guidelines for its 
implementation.  However, if the requirements of the plan are so vague that applicants for 
renewal of mining rights do not know what is expected from them,449 the risks that renewals 
will not be granted increase.  This also increases the risks that holders of rights and investors 
face regarding profitable development of mines and maximization of returns on investments.  
In this regard, unnecessarily vague drafting leads to wide governmental discretion that 
unjustifiably limits optimal mineral tenure security.   
Furthermore, the requirements of the social and labour plan cannot be viewed in isolation.  The 
Mining Charter450 and the Code of Good Practice for the Mining Industry451 contain more 
concrete requirements that aim to achieve transformation of the mining industry and socio-
economic development of mining areas.  Holders of mining rights must indicate how they 
intend to meet these requirements in the social and labour plan.  One way in which the 
government can bolster certainty, and still pursue the objectives of transformation and socio-
economic development, is to draft the requirements of the Mining Charter and the Code of 
Good Practice carefully and to ensure that these documents correspond with each other.  For 
example, one of the purposes of the Code of Good Practice is to enhance implementation of 
the Charter.452  The two documents make it clear that 26%453 of mining companies must be 
owned by historically disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs).454  The Mining Charter refers 
                                                 
449 Andersson (Bachelor thesis) 32. 
450 Amended Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African Mining and Minerals 
Industry (GN 838) in GG 33573 of 20 September 2010.  Par 2.1 of the Mining Charter requires that mining 
companies had to meet 26% effective ownership by HDSA’s in 2014 and par 2.4 requires that mining companies 
had to meet 40% HDSA demographic representation by 2014 at executive management level, senior management 
level, core and critical skills, middle management level and junior management level.   Regarding housing and 
living conditions the Charter required, by 2014, an upgrade from hostels to family units at an occupancy rate of 
one person per room, and facilitation of home ownership options for employees in consultation with organised 
labour.  There are reports that a new Charter will take effect in 2016.  See Peyper 5 August 2015 MiningMx 
available at http://www.miningmx.com/page/news/markets/1653449-New-Mining-Charter-in-2016-sanctions-
raised#.VeapKE0VjIU. 
451 Code of Good Practice for the Mining Industry (GN 446) in GG 32167 of 29 April 2009.  Par 2.2.1 of the Code 
requires, with reference to the Charter, 26% ownership by HDSAs indicated by voting rights, economic interest 
and net value of mining companies. Par 2.2.2 requires 40% participation by HDSAs in the executive committee, 
top management, senior management, middle management and junior management as well as “demonstrable 
HDSA fiduciary [board] participation”.  Par 2.8.2 of the Code requires that 100% of the “total number of hostels 
in a measured entity must have been upgraded into single accommodation apartments and/or converted into 
housing units”. In terms of s 9 of the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003, the Minister 
of Trade and Industry is empowered to issue codes of good practice regarding black economic empowerment.  
452 See “Purpose of the Document” in the Code of Good Practice. 
453 See chap 5, sec 3.2.1.2 for a discussion of the manner in which the requirement of 26% black ownership in the 
Mining Charter and Code of Good Practice creates uncertainty. 
454 Mining Charter, par 2.1; Code of Good Practice, par 2.2.1. 




to effective ownership455 as the “meaningful participation by HDSAs in the ownership, voting 
rights, economic interest and management control of mining entities”.456  The Code of Good 
Practice refers to ownership as measuring and recognizing “the entitlement to the voting rights 
and economic interest associated with equity holding”.457  Certainty will be strengthened if 
these types of differences do not emerge.  Although transformation of the mining industry is 
an important governmental objective, there is no specific reason for the difference in the 
description of ownership in the Code of Good Practice and the Mining Charter.  The difference 
in description of ownership in these two documents is unjustified in the light of the objectives 
that the government pursues.  In this regard, the imprecise drafting of these documents 
unnecessarily and unjustifiably weakens optimal mineral tenure security. 
The 2013 Amendment Bill attempted to change the definition of “this Act” to include the Code 
of Good Practice, the Mining Charter as well as the Housing and Living Conditions 
Standards.458  The intention was thus that contravention of any of the provisions of these 
documents would have the effect that the Minister is not under an obligation to renew 
prospecting rights and mining rights.459  President Jacob Zuma refused to assent to the Bill due 
to concerns that about its constitutionality.460  One of the reasons for the concerns regarding 
unconstitutionality was that by changing the definition of “this Act”, the Bill elevated the Code, 
Mining Charter and Housing and Living Conditions Standards to the level of national 
legislation.461  Furthermore, the Bill would give the Minister the power to amend or repeal 
these documents without having to comply with the constitutionally mandated procedures for 
the amendment of legislation.462  The President’s refusal to assent to the Bill for these reasons 
is reassuring.  Still, the attempt to elevate the Code of Good Practice, Mining Charter and 
                                                 
455 Leon 2013 JERL 188 opines that the Charter “confusingly requires” effective ownership. 
456 Def of “effective ownership” in the Charter. 
457 Def of “ownership” in the Code of Good Practice.   
458 2013 Amendment Bill, s 1(zA); Housing and Living Conditions Standard for the Minerals Industry (GN 445) 
in GG 32166 of 29 April 2009. 
459 The 26% ownership requirement is also relevant when rights are granted.  In Mawetse SA Mining Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Others (3081/12) [2014] ZAGPPHC 11 (30 January 2014) the 
Minister requested the applicant for a prospecting right to comply with the 26% requirement in terms of s 17(4) 
of the MPRDA.  At [12] – [17], the court held that the grant of the prospecting right was therefore dependent on 
compliance with the 26% black economic empowerment ownership requirement.  S 23(1)(h) of the MPRDA 
places an obligation on the Minister to grant mining rights only if applicants can show that the granting of the 
right will, inter alia, further the objective of advancing opportunities for previously disadvantaged persons.  
460 See the President’s letter to parliament dated 16 June 2015 available at http://cer.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/Zuma-letter-to-the-NA-re-MPRDA-Bill.pdf. 
461 Presidential letter to parliament dated 16 June 2015. 
462 Presidential letter to parliament dated 16 June 2015. 




Housing and Living Conditions Standards to the level of national legislation underlines the 
importance of clear, unequivocal provisions in these documents.   
2.1.3 Synopsis: Renewal of rights; MTS strengths and weaknesses 
Taking into account the legitimate objectives of the government, the effect of the provisions of 
the MPRDA regarding renewal of rights, discussed here, on mineral tenure security may be 
summarised as follows: 
 
 Mining permits Prospecting rights Mining rights 
MTS strengthened  Compulsory granting  
if criteria are met  
Compulsory granting 
if criteria are met  
MTS weakened Wide governmental 
discretion: no 
obligation to grant or 
criteria for decision 
to grant 
Vague and imprecise 
drafting: criteria for 
renewal (“relevant 
provisions”) 
Vague and imprecise 
drafting: criteria for 
renewal (“relevant 
provisions” and “any 
other law”) 
Wide governmental 
discretion: criteria for 
renewal (social and 
labour plan) 
Table 1 Synopsis: Renewal of rights; MTS strengths and weaknesses 
In case of mining permits, the MPRDA weakens mineral tenure security by failing to provide 
for compulsory granting of mining permits and also by not listing any criteria on which 
decisions to renew permits are based.  As regards prospecting rights and mining rights, the 
MPRDA, in principle, strengthens mineral tenure security by providing for compulsory 
granting of renewals if specified criteria are met.  However, as regards obligatory renewals of 
prospecting rights and mining rights, the regulatory framework, at times, creates uncertainty 
and weakens mineral tenure security through unnecessarily vague and imprecise drafting.  
Furthermore, in case of renewals of mining rights, vague and imprecise drafting of the social 
and labour plan leads to wide governmental discretion that is not based on objective and closely 
circumscribed criteria.  This discretion unnecessarily and unjustifiably weakens optimal 
mineral tenure security.   




2.2. The ability to remove and dispose of minerals  
Apart from being able to prospect and mine, profitable development requires that right holders 
are in a position to dispose of minerals found for their own account.  The MPRDA confers the 
ability to remove and dispose of minerals found on holders of mining rights.463  The Act also 
confers this ability, with certain limitations, on holders of prospecting rights.  The MPRDA 
does not explicitly confer the ability to remove and dispose of minerals found on holders of 
mining permits.  However, the legislator probably intended to grant this ability to holders of 
mining permits.464   
Holders of prospecting rights may only remove and dispose465 of minerals for their own 
account in quantities necessary for testing, identification and analyses.466  These limitations 
provide an indication of the purpose of prospecting operations, namely to determine the extent 
and economic value of mineral deposits467 with the aim of establishing whether mining 
operations will be economically viable.  The limitations that are placed on holders of 
prospecting rights, therefore, do not have an adverse impact on mineral tenure security in 
general because they do not hinder the main aim of prospecting operations.  Furthermore, 
except in the case of diamonds, holders of prospecting rights do not need ministerial consent 
to remove and dispose of minerals for testing, identification and analysis.468  Ministerial 
consent is required if holders of prospecting rights want to remove and dispose of any quantity 
of diamonds and bulk samples of any other mineral found in the course of prospecting.469   
A point of criticism is that the MPRDA causes uncertainty by not describing the quantities of 
minerals that can be removed for testing, identification and analysis without ministerial 
consent.  The Act further does not quantify bulk samples nor does it list any criteria in terms 
of which the Minister must exercise the discretion when holders of prospecting rights wish to 
remove diamonds or bulk samples of any mineral except diamonds.470  According to one 
                                                 
463 MPRDA, s 5(3)(c).   
464 Dale et al South African Mineral and petroleum Law MPRDA–124.  
465 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law  MPRDA-256 (4) correctly argues that “dispose” in this 
context probably means “alienating” in the narrow sense of the word because it is coupled with “for his or her 
own account”. 
466 MPRDA, s 20(1). 
467 MPRDA, s 1 def of “prospecting”. 
468 MPRDA, s 20(1) does not require ministerial consent.  In terms of s 20(2) ministerial consent is always required 
in case of diamonds. 
469 MPRDA, s 20(2). 
470 S 20(2) does not list any criteria. 




argument, the quantities that are necessary for testing, identification and analysis will differ 
from one mineral type to another, and the test will therefore be the intention of the removal.471  
Thus, provided that the intention is to remove minerals for testing, identification and analysis, 
ministerial consent is not required.  Concerning bulk samples, the argument is that the emphasis 
is still on the word “samples”, meaning that ministerial consent will not be obtainable if the 
intention is to remove the minerals for any other reason than sampling.472  Ministerial consent 
will, for example, not be obtainable if the intention is to sell the minerals.473  It is thus a matter 
of evidence regarding the intention of the removal whether samples are bulk, which will require 
ministerial consent to remove, or whether samples are not bulk, in which case the holder of the 
prospecting right will not need to obtain ministerial consent.474   
The reason for requiring ministerial consent in the case of removal of bulk samples of minerals 
is understandable: If holders of prospecting rights are allowed to remove and dispose of large 
quantities of minerals, the distinction between prospecting and mining can become blurred.475  
Still, holders of prospecting rights need certainty that they will be able to remove the necessary 
samples, bulk or otherwise, to conduct tests with the aim of determining whether mining 
operations will be economically viable.  Certainty regarding removal of samples is thus 
necessary to establish whether mines can be developed profitably.  However, the MPRDA does 
not provide any guidelines regarding whether samples are bulk or not.  Furthermore, if samples 
are bulk, the Act does not list any criteria on which the Minister must base the decision to 
consent to removal.  
Guidelines concerning the quantities of minerals that can be removed and disposed of for 
testing, identification and analysis without ministerial consent will create more certainty to 
holders of prospecting rights, thus strengthening mineral tenure security.  The same is true for 
the quantities of minerals that will constitute bulk samples.  Certainty can also be fortified by 
placing an obligation on the Minister to grant consent for removal of bulk samples if specified 
                                                 
471 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-256(4).  See Richard et al (eds) Techniques in 
Underground Mining:  Selections from Underground Mining Methods Handbook 6 – 8 for a discussion of the 
technical issues concerning sampling and the minimum fragment size with respect to type of mineralisation.  
472 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-256(5).  See S v McDonald and Others 2002 1 
SACR 66 (NM) 69 where the court referred to, inter alia, the intention with which minerals were removed to 
determine if the excavation in question amounted to prospecting or mining under the Minerals Act of 1991. 
473 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-265(4). 
474 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-256(5). 
475 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-256(4) argue that removal and disposal of 
minerals found during prospecting operations in itself blurs the distinction between prospecting and mining 
operations. 




criteria are met.  The Act can, for example, provide that the Minister must consent to removal 
if an independent expert is of the opinion that removal of bulk samples is necessary for testing 
in a specific instance.476  The lack of guidelines, criteria and compulsory granting of consent 
means that the Minister has wide and uncircumscribed discretion to decide whether removal of 
bulk samples is necessary.  This wide and uncircumscribed discretion leads to uncertainty on 
the part of holders of prospecting rights regarding their ability to do the necessary tests to 
determine the economic viability of a deposit.   
As explained, the government has a legitimate interest in limiting the abilities of holders of 
prospecting rights to remove large quantities of minerals, namely to preserve the distinction 
between prospecting and mining.  However, it is not necessary to create uncertainty to pursue 
this interest.  The government can maintain the distinction between prospecting and mining 
and ensure that holders of prospecting rights do not remove large quantities of minerals without 
wide and uncircumscribed discretion that leads to uncertainty.  Certainty can be achieved by 
compulsory grant of consent to remove bulk samples that is based on objectively ascertainable 
criteria.  It therefore seems that wide governmental discretion is not justified here in the light 
of the interests of the government and such discretion therefore unnecessarily and unjustifiably 
weaken optimal mineral tenure security.   
2.3. Synopsis: Removal and disposal of minerals; MTS strengths and 
weaknesses 
Taking into account, the legitimate objectives of the government, the effect of the provisions 
of the MPRDA regarding the ability to remove and dispose of minerals, discussed here, on 
mineral tenure security may be summarised as follows: 
 Mining permits Prospecting rights Mining rights 
MTS strengthened Right holders can 
remove and dispose 
of minerals 
Right holders can 
remove  and dispose 
of minerals for 
testing and analysis 
Right holders can 
remove  and dispose 
of minerals 




                                                 
476 See Bastida 2001 JERL 37 where the author argues that procedures open to discretion is an important factor 
that fosters legal uncertainty. 




quantities that can be 




obligation to grant 
permission to 
removal bulk 
samples and no 
criteria on which 
decision is based 
Table 2 Synopsis: Removal and disposal of minerals; MTS strengths and weaknesses 
The MPRDA strengthens mineral tenure security by granting holders of prospecting rights, 
mining rights and mining permits the ability to remove and dispose of minerals.  However, as 
regards removal of samples, bulk or otherwise, the Act unnecessarily increase uncertainty and 
risks relating to profitable development of mines through wide and uncircumscribed 
governmental discretion. 
2.4. The ability to choose not to prospect and mine 
Profitable development of mines requires that holders of rights to minerals have some degree 
of freedom to choose not to prospect and mine at a given time.477  Financial reasons and market 
conditions are the most important considerations that can influence the ability to develop mines 
profitably.478    
Two issues are apparent regarding the manner in which the MPRDA regulates the ability to 
choose not to prospect and mine at a particular time.  The first issue relates to the ability of 
rights holders to decide when to commence prospecting or mining operations.479  The second 
issue concerns the ability of right holders to interrupt operations when necessary for profitable 
development of mines and still retain their rights.480   
                                                 
477 Bastida 2001 JERL 38.   
478 See Mostert Principles and Policies 138.  Before the MPRDA, other reasons to choose not to exploit minerals 
included preference not to disturb the surface due to personal attachment to the land, increasing the value of the 
land, holding unmined minerals as valuable investments and a desire to monopolise industries for financial 
reasons.  See Agri SA (CC) [45] and [50]. 
479 Sec 2.4.1 below. 
480 Sec 2.4.3 below. 




2.4.1. Commencement of prospecting and mining 
It has been argued that mineral tenure security is best served if the regulatory regime leaves 
“the decision as to whether, when and how to start mining operations” to the investor.481  This 
presumes that investors are in the best position to decide whether they can develop mines 
profitably at a given time.   
The MPRDA leaves the decision regarding when to start mining operations at the discretion of 
holders of mining permits.482  However, holders of prospecting rights and mining rights are not 
free to decide when to commence prospecting or mining operations.  On the contrary, the 
MPRDA compels holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to start prospecting activities 
or mining operations within specified times after the “effective date”,483 unless the Minister 
authorises an extension of the periods.484  Prospecting activities must commence within 120 
days from the date on which rights become effective485 and mining operations, in terms of 
mining rights, within one year from such date.486  The Minister can authorise an extension of 
the period in both cases.487  The MPRDA does not leave the decision about when to start mining 
and prospecting to holders of prospecting rights and mining rights.  Accordingly, right holders 
are not able to decide when it is most suitable to commence activities to ensure profitable 
development.   
On the one hand, this limitation of the ability of holders of prospecting rights and mining rights 
to decide not to prospect and mine poses a risk to profitable development of mines.  Forcing 
holders of rights to commence prospecting and mining may compel them to start operations in 
circumstances not suitable for profitable development of mines.  On the other hand, the 
limitation can be justifiable in light of the objectives of the MPRDA to ensure optimal 
exploitation488 of mineral resources to promote employment, as well as to improve social and 
                                                 
481 Bastida 2001 JERL 40. 
482 S 27 of the MPRDA do not contain any provisions regarding commencement of operation in term so of mining 
permits. 
483 See below in this sec for a discussion of the meaning of “effective date”. 
484 The Minister has the power to extend the periods by virtue of ss 19(2)(b) and 25(2)(b) of the MPRDA for 
prospecting rights and mining rights respectively. 
485 MPRDA, s 19(2)(b). 
486 MPRDA, s 25(2)(b). 
487 MPRDA ss 19(2)(b) and 25(2)(b) for prospecting rights and mining rights respectively. 
488 Optimal exploitation is not an objective stated in s 2 of the MPRDA, but the Act does provide for optimal 
exploitation in s 51. 




economic welfare.489  The need to ensure optimal exploitation of mineral resources to boost 
economic growth and simultaneously create employment, fight poverty and address the gap 
between rich and poor490 must thus be weighed against the objective of ensuring mineral tenure 
security.491   
One way to protect the interest of the government and the interests of right holders is by setting 
clear rules regarding the commencement of prospecting and mining and thus create certainty 
for holders of prospecting rights and mining rights in this regard.  Here, the MPRDA poses two 
challenges.  Firstly, the meaning of “effective date” (the date from which the count-down to 
commence operations start) is unclear.  Secondly, the Act does not provide any indication of 
the circumstances in which the Minister may extend the periods and also does not list any 
criteria on which the Minister must base a decision to extend the periods. 
According to the MPRDA, the effective date492 means when “the relevant rights [are] 
executed”.493  The meaning of “execution” of rights is unclear and is open to different 
interpretations.  Firstly, “execution” of prospecting and mining rights can refer to the date of 
registration of these rights in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office.494  
However, one of the obligations of right holders is to lodge their rights for registration within 
specified times after these become effective.495  The effective date, as the date of execution, is 
thus also the date from which the countdown starts for the timeframe within which to register 
rights.  The date of registration can thus not be the effective date.  Secondly, “execution” can 
refer to the date on which the Minister grants rights.  Rights are granted when applicants are 
                                                 
489 MPRDA, s 2(f).  Badenhorst 1997 De Jure 183 and 1998 Obiter 152 and 153 raises an interesting option 
regarding the manner in which problems of non-exercising of rights can be addressed.  According to the author a 
“use it or lose it” approach that follows the rules of prescription can be used. 
490 Palala Resources (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy and Others 2014 6 SA 403 (GP) [63]; 
Agri SA (CC) [2].   
491 See Meepo v Kotze [8] (although in a different context) where the court was faced with conflicting interests of 
different parties.  The court said that “when interpreting the applicable provisions of the MPRDA…, preference 
should be given to a construction which would result in the most rational balance…”. 
492 This definition was introduced by s 1(f) of the 2008 Amendment Act.  Before the 2008 Amendment Act, the 
effective date referred to the date on which the environmental plan or programme was approved.  See Dale et al 
South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-207 in general, MPRDA-243 for prospecting rights, and 
MPRDA-265 for mining rights. 
493 MPRDA, s 17(5) for prospecting rights and s 23(5) for mining rights read with the definition of “effective 
date” in s 1 of the MPRDA.   
494 In terms of the Mining Titles Registration Act 16 of 1967.  In Mawetse [19] – [20] the court rejected the 
interpretation that rights are granted only when registered.  The case was decided before the def of “effective date” 
was changed by s 1(f) of the 2008 Amendment Act.  At the time of the decision, the “effective date” thus meant 
the date on which the environmental management plan was approved. 
495 MPRDA, s 19(1)(a) for prospecting rights and s 25(2)(a) for mining rights.  




informed of the grant and the terms and conditions that attach to the right.496  Holders of 
prospecting rights and mining rights will be in a position to do a final evaluation of the 
profitability of developing a mine only when they are aware of the terms and conditions that 
attach to the right.497  Mineral tenure security will thus be strengthened if one accepts, that the 
countdown to commence prospecting and mining activities, begins once the Minister grants 
rights or permits and communicates the terms and conditions thereof to the holder.  However, 
acceptances of this nature do not create certainty.   
The uncertainty and risks for profitable development here is caused by vague and imprecise 
drafting regarding the meaning of the “effective date”.  As explained, the government has 
legitimate interests to ensure that right holders start prospecting and mining within certain time 
periods after rights are granted.  However, there are no specific reason or objective for the 
vague and imprecise drafting of the MPRDA regarding the “effective date”.  Vague and 
imprecise drafting here causes unnecessary uncertainty and unjustifiably weakens optimal 
mineral tenure security.  This uncertainty and accompanying risks can be eliminated easily by 
clearing up the meaning of the “effective date” 
Moreover, there is a risk that delays in granting rights and communicating terms and conditions 
to applicants can prevent optimal profitable development of mines. 498  Market conditions can, 
for example, change between the time of application and commencement of operations.  
Applicants may be aware of the requirement to commence prospecting and mining and take 
this into account when considering the possibility of profitable development of mines.  
However, if there are long delays between applications and granting of rights, the market can 
change in such a way that it is no longer suitable for profitable development.   
In certain instances, the MPRDA provides specified time frames in which the government must 
take decisions and notify applicants accordingly, while time frames cause uncertainty in other 
                                                 
496 Mawetse [19]; Meepo v Kotze [125].  According to Mawetse [28], the court in Meepo held that rights are 
granted when registered.  However, in Meepo, date on which the terms and conditions were communicated to the 
applicant happened to be the date of execution of the notarial deed.  In my understanding, Meepo is not authority 
for the conclusion that rights generally are granted only when registered.  Mawetse rightfully rejects the decision 
in Meepo for holding that the rights are contractual when granted.  Also see chap 6, sec 2.1 fn 804.  
497 Mawetse [19]. 
498 See Bastida 2001 JERL 37 - 38 where the author argues that there is a “need to limit the time span used by the 
government agency for granting mineral rights, approving applications and processing key documents”.  Delays 
in these procedures cause uncertainty.  According to the author this aspect of mineral tenure security is part of the 
regulatory time dilemma.  See Otto in Bastida et al for a discussion of the regulatory time dilemma in general.  
Also see Badenhorst 2014 JERL 14 where the author states that “limitation of time frames for the state to approve 
the renewal or retention of a right also improves security of mineral tenure”.   




instances.  A comparison of some aspects of the application procedures for prospecting rights 
and mining rights illustrate this.  If applications for mining rights are successful, the Regional 
Manager must accept the applications within fourteen days of lodgement.499  After the 
acceptance, the Regional Manager has another fourteen days to notify applicants to take certain 
steps.500  In case of successful applications for prospecting rights, applicants must also be 
notified to take certain steps within fourteen days of acceptance of the application.501  However, 
the MPRDA does not determine how long the Regional Manager has to accept applications for 
prospecting rights.  This means that the Regional Manager can, for example take thirty days, 
sixty days or ninety days to accept the application.  This creates uncertainty compared to the 
acceptance of mining rights which must occur within fourteen days of lodgement.   
It is possible to argue that applications for prospecting rights are deemed to be accepted within 
fourteen days if applicants do not receive the required notice that applications are unsuccessful 
during this time.502  However, interpretations of this nature do not bolster certainty.  There 
seems to be no reason why the MPRDA cannot be amended to regulate applications for 
prospecting rights in the same manner as applications for mining rights by prescribing a time 
period in which the Regional Manager must accept applications.  Such an amendment will 
certainly decrease the risk of time delays that can influence profitable development of mines.  
Optimal mineral tenure security is weakened by seemingly careless drafting of the MPRDA 
that does not seem to be in pursuit of any particular governmental objective.  Here too, the 
uncertainty can be terminated easily by placing a time limit on the Minister to accept 
applications for prospecting rights. 
The second challenge for mineral tenure security is that the MPRDA does not provide any 
indication of the circumstances in which the Minister can authorise extensions of the periods 
in which prospecting and mining must commence.  The Act also does not indicate any criteria 
on which the Minister must base decisions to extend the periods.  It is not clear whether holders 
can apply for extensions and when these will be authorised.  It is also not certain whether the 
Minister can unilaterally decide to extend the periods.  If extensions of the periods are necessary 
to ensure that mines can be developed profitably, holders of rights do not know what the 
                                                 
499 MPRDA, s 22(2). 
500 MPRDA, s 22(4). 
501 MPRDA, s 16(4). 
502 See, however, Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-15 where the authors say that 
the MPRDA “stops short of provisions…to the effect that applications must be decided within a stipulated period 
failing which the application is deemed granted”.  




requirements are that they must meet to be awarded an extension.  The wide and 
uncircumscribed discretion of the Minister in this regard creates uncertainty and poses a risk 
to right holders regarding profitable development of mines.  There is no reason why the Act 
cannot be amended to provide that the Minister must grant extensions if specified criteria are 
met.  The wide discretion of the Minister to grant extensions seems unnecessary for specific 
reasons or legitimate governmental objectives and thus unjustifiably weaken optimal mineral 
tenure security.   
Regarding commencement of prospecting and mining activities within specified times after 
rights are granted, the MPRDA provides better security of tenure to holders of mining permits 
than to holders of mining rights and prospecting rights.  In the case of mining permits, the 
decision regarding when to commence mining is left to holders of the rights.  However, mining 
permits are initially granted for only two years.  It is probably not necessary to force holders 
of mining permits to commence mining operations within specified times after permits are 
granted.  If permit holders do not start mining shortly after permits are granted, they will in all 
probability not have enough time to develop the mine profitably.  Still, in case of mining 
permits, investors can decide when it is best to start mining to ensure profitable development 
of mines.   
2.4.2 Synopsis: Obligation to commence operations; MTS strengths and 
weaknesses 
Taking into account the legitimate objectives of the government, the effect of the provisions of 
the MPRDA regarding the obligation to commence prospecting and mining, discussed here, 
may be summarised as follows: 
 Mining permits Prospecting rights Mining rights 
MTS strengthened No requirement to 
commence mining 
  



















discretion: extension  
of periods to 
commence 
of periods to 
commence 
Table 3 Synopsis: Obligation to commence operations; MTS strengths and weaknesses 
The MPRDA strengthens mineral tenure security of holders of mining permits by not requiring 
them to commence mining within specified times after rights are granted.  The weakening of 
mineral tenure security by forcing holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to commence 
operations within specified times after rights are granted is justifiable in the light of the 
objectives pursued, namely optimal exploitation of mineral resources.  However, certainty of 
holders of prospecting rights and mining rights is compromised unnecessarily by careless 
drafting of the date from which the countdown to commence activities start.  The Act also poses 
risks to profitable development by not placing a time limit on the Regional Manager for the 
acceptance of prospecting rights.  Furthermore, mineral tenure security is weakened by 
unjustifiable wide uncircumscribed governmental discretion regarding extension of periods in 
which prospecting and mining must commence. 
2.4.3. Interruption of prospecting and mining 
It has been argued that the profitable development of mines requires that holders of rights must 
be able to retain rights when they are unable “to develop the discovery due to unfavourable 
market conditions, lack of finance, or any other reason”.503  The following paragraphs 
investigate the extent to which the MPRDA provides mineral tenure security regarding the 
ability of right holders to retain rights when prospecting and mining will not be profitable at a 
given time.   
The MPRDA provides that holders of prospecting rights and mining rights must prospect and 
mine actively and continuously according to the prospecting work programme and mining 
                                                 
503 Bastida 1996 JERL 38.  The author refers to mining rights only.  It is accepted here that the same requirement 
applies to prospecting rights and mining permits in the South African context.  Also see Ayisi 2009 JERL 85 
where the author discusses the positive impact that the ability to suspend mining operations had on the reform of 
Ghana’s mining laws.  See Cawood 2004 JERL 140 for a different view on retention “licences”. 




work programme respectively.504  There is no obligation on holders of mining permits to 
continue mining operations after mining has commenced.  Holders of mining permits are thus 
free, without limitations, to choose to not to mine.  In this regard, the MPRDA strengthens the 
mineral tenure security of holders of mining permits.  The Act does not provide for any 
exception in relation to the obligation of holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to 
mine actively according to the mining work programme.  Holders of prospecting rights and 
mining rights are forced to mine even if doing so is not profitable due to prevailing market 
conditions or their own financial circumstances.  Although active development of mines is 
necessary for optimal exploitation and creation of employment, forcing holders of mining 
rights to continue operations in the face of market conditions that do not allow profitable 
development of mines is not necessary.  In fact, it is a severe setback for optimal mineral tenure 
security. 
Forcing holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to continue prospecting and mining 
irrespective of market conditions or their own financial position may well be an excessive 
regulatory measure, disproportionate to the objectives pursued.  The government can pursue 
the objectives of optimal exploitation of mineral resources, and reap the benefits thereof, 
without a blanket rule on continued operations irrespective of any circumstances.  Optimal 
mineral tenure security can be strengthened by allowing right holders of rights to discontinue 
operations and retain their rights under specifically circumscribed conditions.  These 
circumstances can include, for example, that market conditions are not suitable to prospect and 
mine profitably at a given time as well as other circumstances beyond the control of right 
holders.  
The only situation in which the MPRDA allows postponement of operations is upon completion 
of prospecting in the form of retention permits.  Retention permits are available to holders of 
prospecting rights505 who completed prospecting and who wish to postpone mining 
operations.506  These permits allow holders of prospecting rights to retain rights when they are 
                                                 
504 MPRDA, s 19(2)(c) for prospecting rights and s 25(2)(c) for mining rights.  S 19(2)(c) includes the word 
“continuously” while s 25(2)(c) refers only to “actively”.  The result of the two sections is, however, the same. 
505 MPRDA, s 31(1). 
506 This is apparent from the fact that according to s 32(1)(b) of the MPRDA, one of the requirements on which 
the discretion of the Minister to issue retention permits depend, is whether holders of prospecting rights have 
completed prospecting activities and a feasibility study.  Furthermore, according to s 33(b) the Minister has 
discretion not to grant a retention permit if the applicant has not completed prospecting and the feasibility study.  
See, however Badenhorst 2014 JERL 19 where the author says “[a] holder of a prospecting right may obtain a 




unable to develop the mineral deposit in limited circumstances.507  The availability of retention 
permits may strengthen mineral tenure security as they reduce the risk of not being able to 
develop mines profitably when prospecting has ended.  The following paragraphs investigate 
the role of retention permits in providing mineral tenure security. 
The MPRDA does not place an obligation on the Minister to issue retention permits.  According 
to section 32(1)(d), the Minister may issue retention permits based on the listed criteria.  
Similarly, section 33(a) provides that the Minister may refuse to grant retention permits based 
on the criteria listed.  This discretion can be positive and negative for mineral tenure security.  
It is arguable that the discretion weakens mineral tenure security because applicants are 
uncertain that the Minister will grant retention permits if they meet the criteria.508  However, it 
is argued below that the discretion can also strengthen mineral tenure security because it allows 
interpreting the MPRDA to include more circumstances in which retention permits are 
available.   
According to section 32(1)(d) of the MPRDA, the Minister may issue retention permits if, inter 
alia,509 holders of prospecting rights studied the market conditions and found that it will be 
uneconomical to mine due to prevailing market conditions.510  This consideration takes into 
account the lack of demand for the mineral in question as well as depressed commodity 
prices.511  According to Dale et al, the term is narrow because it does not include other objective 
market conditions for example that flooding of the market with a specific mineral will result in 
lower commodity prices.512  The mining of the mineral in this scenario may still be cost-
                                                 
retention permit to suspend the terms and conditions of the prospecting right during unfavourable market 
conditions”. 
507 Retention permits are also relevant as far the linkage between the prospecting phase and mining phase is 
concerned.  See Mostert Principles and Policies 84; Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law 
MPRDA-312. Retention permits can further be relevant to lengthen the time allowed for a specific activity.  See 
Williams Bastida et al 55. This is, however, not the case under the MPRDA because retention permits postpone 
mining upon completion of prospecting.  No prospecting or mining will thus occur during the period of the 
retention permit. 
508 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-317. 
509 Other factors listed in s 32 are “if the holder of the prospecting right has (a) prospected on the land to which 
the application relates; (b) completed the prospecting activities and a feasibility study; (c) established the existence 
of a mineral reserve which has mining potential; (d)… (included in the text above); and (e) complied with the 
relevant provisions of [the MPRDA], any other relevant law and the terms and conditions stipulated in the 
prospecting right”.  The reasons stated here which are not mentioned in the text above are of a formal nature and 
do not require the exercise of ministerial discretion.     
510 MPRDA, s 32(1)(d). 
511 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-319 and MPRDA-325; Mostert Principles and 
Policies 84. 
512 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-319 and MPRDA-325. 




effective based on prevailing market conditions, but flooding of the market will lead to closure 
of marginal mines.513  It is not clear why Dale et al insist that a reading of section 33(1)(d) 
must exclude the example mentioned.  There is no reason why objective market conditions, 
other than lack of demand for the mineral and depressed commodity prices, cannot be read into 
section 32(1)(d).514  According to Dale et al, the term “uneconomical due to prevailing market 
conditions” also does not include factors such as lack of technology, water, power, transport, 
or other forms of services or infrastructure.515   
Section 32(1)(d) must, however, be read with section 33(a).  According to section 33(a), the 
Minister may refuse to issue retention permits if the mineral can be mined profitably.516  This 
means that the Minister is not under an obligation to refuse to grant permits if the mineral can 
be mined profitably.  Thus, the Minister may grant retention permits even if minerals can be 
mined profitably.  Surely, lack of technology, water, power, transport or other forms of services 
or infrastructure can influence whether a mineral can be mined profitably.  When interpreting 
section 33(a) Dale et al state: “Whether or not the mineral can be mined profitably is a matter 
of technical advice”.517  The authors then stress that this is an objective test, which is not related 
to subjective factors pertaining to the specific applicant.518  Thus, in the context of section 
33(a), the authors accept that objective technical abilities and reasons related to infrastructure 
can influence whether a mineral deposit can be mined profitably.519  An interpretation that 
gives the Minister discretion to grant retention permits based on objective market conditions 
as well as objective technical abilities and infrastructure related factors is preferable.520  Such 
                                                 
513 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-319 and MPRDA-325. 
514 E.g. the need not to flood the market with the effect that commodity prices drop.  S 51(2) of the MPRDA that 
applies after mining has commenced, gives the Minister the power, upon recommendation of the Minerals and 
Mining Development Board, to direct holders of mining rights to take corrective measures if minerals are not 
mined optimally.  S 51(2) specifically provides that the Board must take technical and financial resources of 
holders into account before making recommendations.  S 51(2) does not apply to retention permits, but it does 
indicate that in the realm of the MPRDA, subjective factors of holders of rights to minerals are not ignored.  
515 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-319. 
516 The Minister must have regard to information submitted under section 32(1) of the MPRDA and research 
conducted by the Minerals and Mining Development Board. 
517 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-323. 
518 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-323. 
519 It is not clear whether the difference in interpretation between ss 32(1)(d) and 33(a) stem from the difference 
in the wording of the two sections.  Section 32(1)(d) refers to “uneconomical due to prevailing market conditions 
while s 33(a) refers to the mineral being mined “profitably”. 
520 This interpretation is especially pressing taking into consideration the effect of load shedding on the mining 
industry.  Load shedding occurs due to electricity demand that outweighs supply.  To avoid complete failure of 
the country’s power supply system, Eskom (the national parastatal electricity supplier) implements electricity cuts 
on a planned rotating schedule throughout the country.  See 
http://loadshedding.eskom.co.za/loadshedding/description.  These power cuts have a detrimental effect on South 
Africa’s economy including the productivity and profit-making of mines. See Allix 15 July 2015 Business Day 




an interpretation reduces the risks of not being able to develop mines profitably if objectives 
factors have the effect that profitable development is not possible after prospecting has ended.  
The MPRDA should be amended to allow holders of prospecting rights and mining rights also 
to discontinue operations and retain rights for these reasons. 
A further question is whether the Minister can take subjective factors, applicable to a specific 
applicant, into account when deciding whether to issue retention permits.  A reading of sections 
32(1)(d) and 33(a) creates the impression that subjective factors cannot be taken into 
account.521  The MPRDA, however, gives the Minister a discretionary power to issue or refuse 
to issue retention permits by stating that the Minister may issue or refuse to issue permits.522  
This can be interpreted to mean that the list of factors is not a numerus clausus and the applicant 
can deduce reasons others than those listed.523  The reasons can then include subjective factors 
such as the financial constraints of the applicant.524  Subjective factors can also include the fact 
that holders of prospecting rights hold mining rights over another piece of land that must be 
mined first.525  The wording of section 34(2), that regulates renewal of retention permits, is 
informative in this regard.  According to this section, retention permits may only be renewed if 
the criteria in subsections (a)526 and (b)527 are met.  Here it is clear that the list of factors is a 
numerus clausus and that no other factors can be taken into account  
In summary, the MPRDA can be interpreted to take into account objective market conditions, 
infrastructure-related factors and subjective factors relating to a particular applicant, when the 
Minister considers applications for retention permits.  Such an interpretation would strengthen 
                                                 
BDLive available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/industrials/2015/07/15/load-shedding-is-squeezing-the-
life-out-of-sas-factories; Van der Nest 11 February 2015 at  http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/7000-the-
economic-consequences-of-load-shedding-in-south-africa-and-the-state-of-the-electrical-grid.html.       
521 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-319 and MPRDA-323. 
522 MPRDA, ss 32(1) and 33. 
523 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-323.  See Mostert Principles and Policies 85 
where the author states that the lists of factors for granting and renewal of prospecting rights, mining rights and 
retention permits are numeri clause.  Mostert relies on Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law as 
authority, but as far as can be established Dale et al argue that the list of requirements relating to retention permits 
is not a numerous clauses.  In contrast, the lists of requirements relating to prospecting rights and mining rights 
are numeri clause.  See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA 204, MPRDA-233 and 
MPRDA-259 in relation to prospecting rights and mining rights.   
524 Bastida 2001 JERL opines that holders of mining rights should be able to retain mining permits if they are 
unable to develop discoveries and that the reasons for the retention must include lack of finance. The author 
mentions this as an important factor in the context of providing security of tenure in mining industries in general. 
525 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-319.  
526 Namely that the holder has complied with any relevant provisions of the MPRDA, any other relevant law and 
the terms and conditions of the retention permit. 
527 Namely that the market conditions in s 32(1)(d) (the market conditions that existed when the retention permit 
was applied for) still prevails. 




mineral tenure security, because it would allow for interruption of mining operations upon 
completion of prospecting for an extensive array of reasons if investors cannot develop mines 
profitably.   
Certainty would further served by obliging the Minister to grant retention permits if a numerus 
clausus of closely circumscribed criteria are met.  A closed list of factors will have the 
disadvantage of excluding subjective factors related to specific applicants.  However, the 
exclusion of subjective factors is probably justifiable in the interests of optimal exploitation of 
mineral resources.  Thus, the certainty of a closed list of objective, closely circumscribed 
factors for granting retention permits outweighs the disadvantages of excluding subjective 
factors related to specific applicants.  It is therefore submitted that obligatory granting of 
retention permits should be based on objectively ascertainable criteria and should at least 
include all objective market-related and infrastructure-related reasons that create risks for the 
profitable development of mines.   
The difficulty with criteria that is not closely circumscribed may be illustrated as follows: The 
MPRDA provides that the Minister may refuse to grant retention permits if, inter alia, the 
granting will result in the concentration of mineral resources under the control of the applicant 
and their associated companies with the possible limitation of equitable access to minerals 
resources.528  It has been argued that this criteria is vague and introduces discretionary decision-
making power in a manner that “detract from the investor-friendliness of the MPRDA”.529  The 
criteria is vague because the MPRDA does not provide any guidelines regarding its meaning 
and it is not objectively ascertainable whether applicants meet the criteria.   
The difficulty with the reference to “concentration of mineral resources under the control of 
the applicant” is two-fold.  First, granting of retention permits per se cannot result in the 
concentration of mineral resources under the control of the applicant.530  Mineral resources can 
be under the control of an entity only once mining has occurred.531  Presumably, the purpose 
of the provision is to prevent granting of further mining rights to entities that already have the 
                                                 
528 MPRDA, s 33(c). 
529 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-17.  This is not the only criteria listed by Dale 
et al that creates uncertainty. 
530 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-238 where the author comments on a similar 
provision when prospecting rights are applied for. 
531 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-238 where the author comments on a similar 
provision when prospecting rights are applied for. 




right to mine vast quantities of mineral resources.  Thus, the purpose of the provision ostensibly 
is to prevent the concentration of an unreasonable amount of mineral resources under the 
control of one entity.532     
The provision seems ill-placed, since such entities should rather be prevented from obtaining 
prospecting rights and mining rights.  In this regard, the MPRDA attempts to prevent the 
granting of more prospecting rights to entities that already control vast amounts of mineral 
resources.533  However, the Act has no such provisions regarding granting of mining rights or 
mining permits.534  If applicants for retention permits already have control of mineral resources 
by virtue of mining rights, the granting of any additional rights will result in the concentration, 
i.e. increase, of mineral resources under their control.535  This is contrary to the purpose of the 
MPRDA, which attempts to achieve equitable access to mineral and petroleum resources by 
implementing policies aimed against hoarding and monopolising of resources. 
The criteria apply when the (unreasonable) concentration of mineral resources under the 
control of the applicant is coupled with a possible limitation of equitable access to minerals 
resources.  These requirements probably attempts to prevent the granting of mining rights or 
mining permits to entities who cannot meet the empowerment obligations of the MPRDA and 
to give effect to the objective of the MPRDA to advance opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged persons.536  However, as explained above, the granting of retention permits per 
se cannot have the effect that equitable access to mineral resources will be limited.  Also the 
MPRDA requires advancing the opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons as a 
requirement for granting of prospecting rights and mining rights.537  Certainty can be increased 
here by providing that the Minister is not under an obligation (according to amendments 
suggested here) to issue retention permits if the right holders cannot comply with the black 
economic empowerment provisions of the MPRDA.    
Additionally, it is unclear to whom or what the term “associated companies” refers.  It is 
arguable that the term refers to subsidiary and holding companies as defined in the Companies 
                                                 
532 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-239, in relation to a similar provision when 
prospecting rights are applied for.  
533 MPRDA, s 17(2)(b).  For criticism see Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-238. 
534 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-238 
535 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-238 in relation to a similar provision when 
prospecting rights are applied for.  
536 MPRDA, ss 2(c) and (d). 
537 MPRDA, ss 17(2)(b) and 23(1)(h) for prospecting rights and mining rights respectively. 




Act.538  Accordingly, the Minister may refuse to grant retention permits to a holding company 
if its subsidiary already controls large quantities of the specific type of mineral by virtue of 
mining rights that the subsidiary holds and if the company is not able to comply with its 
empowerment obligations.  Thus, if the granting of the retention permit will cause an 
unreasonable concentration of mineral resources under the control of the holding company and 
its subsidiary, and these companies do not comply with their empowerment obligations, the 
Minister has the discretion to refuse the retention permit. 
Ensuring equitable access to minerals and preventing holders from monopolising industries are 
without doubt important objectives.  Furthermore, some degree of ministerial discretion is 
necessary to achieve these objectives.539  However, the government can allow discretion to 
pursue these objectives without unnecessarily increasing uncertainty as a result of unclear and 
imprecise drafting.  The MPRDA can, for example, stipulate the applicable criteria where 
applicants for retention permits already hold mining rights or mining permits.  Certainty can 
also be improved by stipulating that granting of retention permits must not lead to an 
unreasonable concentration of mineral resources under the control of applicants and their 
subsidiary and holding companies.  
If the criterion is unreasonable concentration, the Minister will still have the necessary 
discretion to prevent monopolies from controlling the industry, but it will be clear that not any 
additional concentration of mineral resources could lead to refusal of retention permits.  A 
reference to subsidiary and holding companies will enable objective determination, with 
reference to the Companies Act, whether the mining rights of another company will be taken 
into account when the Minister exercises his discretionary power to refuse retention permits. 
Retention permits are initially granted for a maximum period of three years540 and can be 
renewed for one further period not exceeding two years.541  A five-year period is sufficiently 
for the market to change and for the holders to implement strategies that will ensure profitable 
development of mines.  As with the initial granting, however, applicants are uncertain that 
retention permits will be renewed because there is no obligation on the Minister to renew 
                                                 
538 A holding company is a juristic person that controls a subsidiary as a result of certain circumstances stipulated 
in the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  See the def of “holding company” and s 3 of the Companies Act. 
539 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-117 regarding discretion that is necessary 
to achieve equitable access to mineral resources. 
540 MPRDA, s 32(4). 
541 MPRDA, s 34(3). 




them.542  The reasons for renewal are further limited to market conditions that existed at the 
time of application for the initial permit.543  Subjective factors applicable to a specific applicant 
are therefore not a valid reason for renewing retention permits.  
2.4.4. Synopsis: Interruption of operations; MTS strengths and weaknesses 
Taking into account the legitimate objectives of the government, the effect of the provisions of 
the MPRDA regarding the ability to interrupt prospecting and mining operations, discussed 
here, on mineral tenure security may be summarised as follows: 
 Mining permits Prospecting rights Mining rights 













obligatory grant of 
retention permits 
Vague and imprecise 
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Table 4 Synopsis: Interruption of operations; MTS strengths and weaknesses  
                                                 
542 According to s 34(2) of the MPRDA, retention permits “may” be renewed. 
543 MPRDA, s 34(2)(b). 




The MPRDA poses risks to profitable development of mines and weakens mineral tenure 
security by forcing holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to continuously prospect 
and mine after operations commenced irrespective of market conditions or any other factor.  
The security of tenure of holders of mining permits is strengthened by the fact that the MPRDA 
does not require continuous mining from holders of mining permits.   
The availability of retention permits for postponement of mining operation upon completion 
of prospecting, in principle, strengthens the mineral tenure security of holders of prospecting 
rights.  However, mineral tenure security is weakened by not placing an obligation on the 
Minister to grant retention permits and to renew them if specified criteria are met.  Furthermore, 
vague and imprecise drafting of some criteria for granting retention permits lead to unnecessary 
uncertainty that weakens optimal mineral tenure security.  
3. Summative remarks and findings 
The abilities to prospect and mine, to dispose of minerals for their own account and to interrupt 
prospecting and mining operations (at least to an extent) while retaining rights, are necessary 
to ensure profitable development of mines.  It is, however, accepted that the government has 
legitimate reasons to limit these abilities in pursuit of important objectives.  Optimal mineral 
tenure security requires the creation of a situation in which risks and uncertainties regarding 
profitable development of mines are minimised whiling taking into account the legitimate 
objectives of the government.  This chapter identifies certain features of the current regulatory 
regime that unnecessarily and unjustifiably weaken optimal mineral tenure security.   
The first is the existence of wide and uncircumscribed governmental discretion regarding some 
decisions that can influence profitable development of mines.  The second is excessive 
regulatory measures that cause limitation of the abilities which are disproportionate to the 
objectives pursued.  Lastly, drafting concerns, at times, create unnecessary uncertainty and 
weakening of mineral tenure security.  In this regard, the Act is at times unnecessarily drafted 
in vague and imprecise terms that cause unnecessary uncertainty.  Furthermore, there are 
instances in which the MPRDA seems to be drafted in a careless manner that unjustifiably 
weaken mineral tenure security.  





RIGHT HOLDERS’ ABILITY TO TRANSFER AND ENCUMBER 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
To ensure profitable development of mines and maximum returns on their investments,544 
holders of rights to minerals may need to conclude commercial transactions involving their 
rights.  For example, holders of rights to minerals may want to transfer their rights if they are 
no longer able to develop mines profitably.545  Similarly, shareholders of companies may 
decide to sell shares in the company or merge with other companies in an attempt to raise funds 
for the development of a mine.546  Furthermore, holders of rights may want to use their rights 
as collateral security to obtain loans for development of mines.547  An investigation into how 
the MPRDA provides mineral tenure security thus requires a consideration of the conditions 
under which rights to minerals can be transferred to an eligible third party and mortgaged to 
raise funds for development of mines.548   
This chapter comments on the extent to which the MPRDA provides security of tenure to 
holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits in relation to the abilities to 
transfer and mortgage their rights.  Furthermore, the chapter highlights the features of the 
current regulatory regime that weakens mineral tenure security.  
For the same reasons as explained in chapter 4,549 the analysis in this chapter foresees the 
possibility that governmental interference, discretionary decision-making powers and unclear 
drafting can cause uncertainty and weaken mineral tenure security.  The analysis in this chapter 
is relevant for the insight it brings on how certainty may be bolstered, and tenure security thus 
                                                 
544 See chap 1, sec 1.2 regarding profitable development of mines as an aspect of mineral tenure security. 
545 See chap 1, sec 1.1 regarding the ability to transfer rights as an aspect of mineral tenure security.   
546 See 3.2.2 below. 
547 See chap 1, sec 1.1 regarding the ability to encumber rights as an aspect of mineral tenure security. 
548 Dale 1996 JERL 300; Badenhorst 2014 JERL 14; Omalu and Zamora 1999 JERL 13 28; Ayisi 2009 JERL 77; 
Bastida 2001 JERL 36 and 37; Bastida PHD thesis 181.  See Dale in Bastida et al 830 and Dale et al South African 
Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-14 for the importance of the ability to mortgage rights to obtain funds in 
general.  Williams in Bastida et al 54 views the increased freedom to transfer rights as “perhaps the most 
significant dimension of current legal reforms” in general.  Pritchard in Bastida et al 76 includes security of tenure 
and the ability freely to pledge and alienate rights in his “Checklist of Basic Expectations of Mining Investors”. 
549 See chap 4, sec 1. 




strengthened, by minimizing risks and uncertainties that may prevent profitable development 
of mines 
2. Optimal mineral tenure security 
Identical to the abilities to prospect and mine,550 mineral tenure security will be strengthened 
when rights to minerals can be transferred and mortgaged freely without limitations.551  
However, similar to the abilities to prospect and mine, the government has legitimate reasons 
for limiting the ability of holders of rights to transfer and mortgage552 their rights.  As regards 
the abilities to transfer and mortgage rights, the government needs to be certain that entities to 
whom rights are transferred can comply with the obligations of original right holders and the 
terms and conditions of rights.553  In this regard, transferees must be able to comply with health, 
safety and environmental requirements.554  Transferees must also have the necessary technical 
and financial abilities to prospect and mine according to the prospecting work programme or 
mining work programme.555  Moreover, in South Africa, the government has an interest in the 
identities of entities to whom rights are transferred due to its commitment to providing 
equitable access to mineral resources and to advance opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged persons.556 
Similar to chapter 4, it is accepted here, from the outset, that comments regarding the extent to 
which the MPRDA provides security of tenure to right holders regarding the abilities to transfer 
and mortgage rights, need to take into account the interests of right holders and the interest of 
                                                 
550 See chap 4, sec 2. 
551 See Bastida 2001 JERL 39 – 40 and Bastida (PhD thesis) 212 where the author comments on how security of 
tenure in the mining codes of some Latin-American countries were improved.  One of the aspects that the author 
highlights is that the limitations placed on the ability to transfer and mortgage rights are limited to health, safety 
and environmental concerns. 
552 The sale in execution of a mortgaged right will result in the transfer of the right to another.  
553Mogale Alloys Ltd v Nuco Chrome Bophuthatswana (Pty) Ltd 2011 6 SA 96 (GSJ) [28]; Badenhorst and Du 
Plessis 2012 De Jure 396. 
554 According to ss 17(1)(c) and (d) of the MPRDA, prospecting rights will only be granted if prospecting will not 
result in unacceptable pollution, ecological degradation or damage to the environment and if the applicant has the 
ability to comply with the relevant provisions of the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of  1996.  Ss 23(1)(d) and (f) 
have similar requirements regarding mining rights. 
555 MPRDA, ss 17(1)(a) and (b) for prospecting rights and ss 23(1)(b) and (c) for mining rights 
556 The Minister is under an obligation to grant prospecting rights only if applicants can show that they have given 
effect to 2(d) of the MPRDA. The objective in s 2(d) is to “substantially and meaningfully expand opportunities 
for historically disadvantaged persons, including women and communities, to enter into and actively participate 
in the mineral and petroleum industries and to benefit from the exploitation of the nation's mineral and petroleum 
resources”.  S 23(1)(h) has a similar requirement regarding mining rights. See Mawetese [12] – [17] where the 
court held that the grant of the prospecting right in that case was dependent on compliance with the 26% black 
economic empowerment ownership requirement of the Mining Charter.  According to the “Preamble” of the 
Mining Charter, the Charter aims to give effect to s 2(d) of the MPRDA.  




the government.  An evaluation cannot only consider the interests of holders of rights to 
minerals. To reiterate: It cannot be concluded that the MPRDA provides mineral tenure security 
if right holders have unfettered freedom regarding the abilities to transfer and mortgage their 
rights.  Also, every limitation of the abilities to transfer and mortgage rights does not 
necessarily unjustifiably weaken mineral tenure security.  Therefore, the approach followed 
here is the same as in chapter 4: Optimal mineral tenure security means creating a state of 
certainty in relation to rights to minerals that is most attractive to investors, whilst supporting 
the legitimate and important objectives of the government.   
The following section provides a detailed analysis of the provisions of the MPRDA regarding 
the abilities of holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits to transfer their 
rights.  The objective of the analysis is to comment on the extent to which the MPRDA provides 
optimal security of tenure to right holders.  The analysis furthermore aims to identify the 
features of the current regulatory regime that unjustifiably weaken optimal mineral tenure 
security. 
3. Ability to transfer 
The MPRDA regulates the ability of holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining 
permits to conclude various commercial transactions concerning their rights. 557  Section 11(1) 
regulates the ability of holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to cede, transfer, let, 
sublet, assign, alienate, or “otherwise dispose of” these rights.  Except for the ability to assign, 
section 27(8)(b) lists the same transactions in relation to mining permits.  These transactions 
“render the rights that are granted in terms of the MPRDA commercially useful” for holders of 
such rights.558  It is beyond the scope of this work to analyse the different technical meanings 
that can be assigned to the terms in sections 11 and 27(8)(b) in any detail.559  In this chapter, 
the terms in sections 11(1) and 27(8)(b) are collectively used in a non-technical sense to refer 
to the ability of holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits to transfer these 
rights to eligible third parties. 
                                                 
557 Mostert Principles and Policies 140 refers to the ius disponendi.  See chap 2, sec 2 fn 137 for the difference 
between rights (ius) and entitlements.  
558 Mostert Principles and Policies 88. 
559 See Mostert Principles and Policies 88 – 89; Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA 
162 – 163; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13-25 and 30-9 for a discussion 
of the meaning of the terms in section 11(1). 




3.1. Transfer of mining permits 
Section 27(8)(b) prohibits the transfer of mining permits.  It is arguable that the limitation 
weakens mineral tenure security because holders of mining permits cannot transfer permits 
when they become unable to develop mines profitably.  However, mining permits are issued 
for small scale mining and for short periods (two years).560  It is therefore unlikely that holders 
of mining permits will need to transfer the permits to third parties to develop mines 
profitably.561  Because of the short lifespan of a mining permit, there is a smaller risk to holders 
of mining permits that their circumstances or market conditions will change to such an extent 
that profitable development is no longer possible in two years.  On face value, the prohibition 
against transfer of mining permits does not have an unreasonable negative impact on mineral 
tenure security.  However, as discussed below, the inability to transfer mining permits has a 
severe negative impact on the ability to use mining permits as collateral security to obtain loans 
for the development of mines.562 
3.2 Transfer of prospecting rights and mining rights 
Section 11(1) of the MPRDA allows transfer of prospecting rights and mining rights, but 
requires ministerial consent for transfers.  Ministerial consent for transfer of prospecting rights 
and mining rights is necessarily in two circumstances.  First, ministerial consent is needed for 
the transfer of prospecting rights and mining rights or interests in these rights.563  Second, 
ministerial consent is needed for the transfer of controlling interests in companies and closed 
corporations (excluding listed companies) that hold prospecting rights and mining rights or that 
have interests in these rights.564  This second part of section 11 of the MPRDA relates to 
situations where prospecting rights or mining rights are not transferred but where there is a 
change in control, through the sale of shares by a majority shareholder/s, for example, in 
companies that hold prospecting rights or mining rights.  Section 11(2) places an obligation on 
the Minister to consent to the transfer of prospecting rights and mining rights if specified 
criteria are met.  Section 11(2) limits the discretion of the Minister when exercising the power 
                                                 
560 See chap 4 sec 2.1. 
561 The same reason probably apply to the fact that MPRDA does not require holders of  mining permits to 
commence mining operations after a specific periods after mining permits are granted. See chap 4 s 2.4.1. 
562 Sec 4.2 below. 
563 Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 395 – 396. 
564 Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 397 - 400.  See sec 3.2.2 below for a detailed discussion. 




to grant or refuse consent for transfer.  Obligatory granting of consent to transfer, in principle, 
strengthens mineral tenure security. 
On the one hand, the MPRDA thus does not provide that prospecting rights and mining rights 
can be transferred freely without any limitations, which in principle weakens mineral tenure 
security.  On the other hand, the Act strengthens mineral tenure security by placing an 
obligation on the Minister, and thus limiting his discretion, to give consent for transfer if certain 
criteria are met.  However, these two observations are not sufficient to comment meaningfully 
on the extent to which the MPRDA provides optimal mineral tenure security to holders of 
prospecting rights and mining rights.  Meaningful comments require an investigation of the 
reasons for the ministerial consent requirement, the requirements for obtaining consent, and 
the certainty of right holders regarding obtaining consent.  The following sections separately 
examine these issues in respect of the two situations in which section 11(1) of the MPRDA 
requires ministerial consent for the transfer of prospecting rights and mining rights.     
3.2.1. Transfer of rights or interests in rights 
The first part of section 11(1) provides that prospecting rights and mining rights as well as any 
interest in such rights cannot be transferred without ministerial consent.  The MPRDA does 
not define “interest/s in prospecting rights and mining rights”.  To understand the prohibition 
against transfer without ministerial consent, it is necessary to understand the ambit of the first 
part of section 11(1).  In this regard, it is necessary to establish the meaning of “interest in 
rights”.  Consequently, the following section firstly investigates the meaning of the term 
“interest in rights”.  This is followed by an analysis of the requirements for consent to transfer 
prospecting rights and mining rights.  The purpose of the analysis is to comment on the extent 
to which the MPRDA creates certainty, through minimizing risks and uncertainties that may 
prevent profitable development of mines and maximising returns on investments, regarding the 
ability to transfer rights, while acknowledging the legitimate interests of the government to 
have some control over the transfer of rights. 
3.2.1.1 The ambit of section 11(1): interests in rights 
Discussions regarding the meaning of “interests in rights” are normally concerned with two 
topics. The first is whether security interests, such as mortgage bonds, are included in the ambit 




of section 11(1).565 Since this thesis is primarily concerned with the security of tenure of 
holders of rights to minerals and not with holders of security interests in rights, this topic is not 
disused here. The second topic, that form the subject-matter of the following discussion, is 
whether interests in rights in section 11(1) denotes that co-holders can jointly hold rights to 
minerals in (undivided) shares.566     
There are different opinions regarding whether the reference to “interests in rights” in section 
11(1) denotes that co-holders can jointly hold rights to minerals in (undivided) shares.567 
According to one argument, this is indeed the case.568 Accordingly, two or more entities can 
be co-holders of rights and the shares in the rights cannot be transferred without ministerial 
consent.569  However, in Minister of Mineral Resources v Sishen Iron Ore Company (Pty) 
Ltd570 (Sishen Iron Ore), the court followed a different approach. The court indicated that the 
MPRDA “does not make any provision whatsoever for granting prospecting rights or mining 
rights in undivided shares”.571  The court further held that the MPRDA “simply does not 
contemplate two right-holders in respect of the same mineral and land.”572   
The case concerned the conversion of a mining right that was held in undivided shares, in terms 
of the Minerals Act,573 before the MPRDA came into operation.574  The co-holders each had a 
                                                 
565 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-168 
566 In common law, co-ownership in undivided shares means each owner has a right to share in the entire thing.  
See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 133; du Bois Wille’s Principles 558.  However, because the MPRDA establishes 
a regulatory regime that is administrative in nature (see chap 2, sec 3.2.1 and sec 3.2.2), the term “co-holders” is 
preferred here and not common-law “joint owners”.  Security interests can also denote collateral security interests 
in rights.  See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-168 
567 In common law, co-ownership in undivided shares means each owner has a right to share in the entire thing.  
See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 133; du Bois Wille’s Principles 558.  However, because the MPRDA establishes 
a regulatory regime that is administrative in nature (see chap 2, sec 3.2.1 and sec 3.2.2), the term “co-holders” is 
preferred here and not common-law “joint owners”.  Security interests can also denote collateral security interests 
in rights.  See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-168 
568 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-168 and MPRDA-190 – MPRDA-191; 
Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 395. 
569 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-168 and MPRDA-191 – MPRDA-192.  The 
authors use the common-law joint-ownership construction.  It is unfortunate that reference is still made to the 
common-law ownership construction since the MPRDA establishes a regime that is predominantly administrative 
in nature (see chap 2 sec 3.2.1 and sec 3.2.2).   
570 2014 2 SA 603 (CC). 
571 Sishen Iron Ore [81]. 
572 Sishen Iron Ore [118]. 
573 Section 20 of the Minerals Act provided:  “(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law, 
but subject to sections 71(2)(a) and 73bis of the Deeds Registries Act, 1937 (Act No 47 of 1937), no deed which, 
if it would be registered, would give effect to (a) the division of any right to any mineral or minerals in respect of 
land among two or more persons into undivided shares; or (b) an increase in the number of holders of undivided 
shares in any right to any mineral or minerals in respect of land; shall be registered by the registrar of deeds 
concerned, unless the Director-General has under subsection (3) in writing approved such division or increase”.    
574 Sishen Iron Ore [21]. Sishen held 78.6% and AMSA held 21.4% of the right respectively. 




mining authorisation to mine that was granted in terms of the Minerals Act.575  When the 
MPRDA came into operation, the mining rights of both holders coupled with the mining 
authorisation were changed into old order mining rights.576  One party successfully converted 
the old order mining right into a new order right while the other failed to lodge the old order 
right for conversion.577  One of the main issues in the case was whether the party that converted 
his old order right also became the holder of the unconverted old order right.578  The court held 
that the unconverted old order right simply lapsed when the period allowed for conversion 
came to an end and that the right did not vest in the party that successfully applied for 
conversion.579  The court also held that the Minister could not grant the rights embodied in the 
unconverted right to anyone except to the entity that already held a mining right due to the 
successful conversion.580  
In support of the last-mentioned finding, the court relied on section 22(2)(b) of the MPRDA 
that prohibits the Regional Manager from accepting applications and granting rights when there 
is an existing right holder for the same mineral on the same land.581  The court also relied on 
the fact that sections 23 and 25 of the MPRDA refer to a single mining work programme582 and 
social and labour plan.583  The reliance on a single mining work program and social and labour 
plan assumes that, if the Minister granted the unconverted old order right to anyone except the 
holder of the converted right, each co-holder would need to submit a separate mining work 
programme and social and labour plan.  According to the court, the Act does not allow more 
than one mining work programme or social and labour plan and therefore the mining right in 
question could not be held jointly. 
It would have been useful if the court distinguished between the following scenarios: First, 
where two or more entities jointly apply for a right in terms of the MPRDA and, second, where 
a newcomer applies for a right where there is an existing right-holder to the same mineral on 
the same land.  In Sishen Iron Ore, the court addressed the second scenario.  The successful 
                                                 
575 Sishen Iron Ore [22] and [62]. 
576 Sishen Iron Ore [63].  
577 Sishen Iron Ore [24], [25] and [64]. 
578 Sishen Iron Ore [38] 
579 Sishen Iron Ore [65], [66], [67] and [70]. 
580 Sishen Iron Ore [123]. 
581 Sishen Iron Ore [115]. 
582 MPRDA, ss 23(1)(a) and 25(2)(c).  Ss 17(1)(a) and 19(2)(c) refer to a prospecting work programme in case of 
applications for prospecting rights. 
583 Sishen Iron Ore [116] and [117]. 




conversion of one of the old order rights meant there was an existing right-holder.  The 
unconverted right lapsed, which meant the only option for the previous holder thereof was to 
apply for a new order right as a newcomer.  If both parties applied for conversion, the situation 
would be similar to the situation where more than one entity jointly apply for new order rights 
in terms of the MPRDA.  Section 22(2)(b) of the MPRDA is clear that in the second scenario, 
where there is an existing right-holder, the Minister cannot grant a right584 for the same mineral 
on the same land to a newcomer.585 
Contrary to this clarity, the Act is not clear on the question whether, in the first scenario, two 
or more entities can apply jointly for the same mineral on the same land and whether the right 
can be granted to them as co-holders.  The fact that there can only be one mining work 
programme (or prospecting work programme if relevant)586 and one social and labour plan587 
does not indicate that there cannot be joint-holders.  It indicates that if entities jointly apply for 
a mining right, the joint-applicants must submit one mining work program and one social and 
labour plan and that all subsequent co-holders are bound by these documents.  The court further 
seems to contradict itself by stating that if the unconverted right in the case was successfully 
converted, the party in whom it vested before the MPRDA “would have been entitled to be a 
co-holder of the mining right under the MPRDA…”.588  
An interpretation of section 11(1) that means prospecting rights and mining rights cannot be 
held jointly will curtail the possibility of joint ventures and partnerships in the mining 
industry.589  Joint ventures and partnerships can give effect to the objectives of the MPRDA to 
promote equitable access to mineral resources590 and to expand opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged persons.591  It is therefore arguable that the intention of the legislator was not to 
                                                 
584 The Minister cannot grant any right provided for in the MPRDA to a newcomer.  In this case, there was an 
existing holder of a mining right.  The Minister could thus not grant another mining right, a mining permit or a 
prospecting right to a newcomer.  In Sishen Iron Ore [123] the court held that the government could not grant the 
unconverted “old order right” to anyone except the party that already held a mining right due to successful 
conversion.  One of the reasons advanced by the court is that ss 16(2)(b) and 22(2)(b) of the MPRDA preclude 
the granting of prospecting rights and mining rights for minerals and land where there is an existing rights-holder.      
585 See also Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-194. 
586 MPRDA, s 17(1)(b). 
587 The MPRDA does not refer to a social and labour plan in relation to prospecting rights. 
588 Sishen Iron Ore [106].  The remark of the court that only one right in respect of the Sishen mine would be 
granted and that there can therefore not be co-holders is not convincing.  Co-holders hold the same right in 
undivided shares. 
589 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-191 where, in the context of common-law 
joint-ownership, the authors say that “the genesis of co-ownership is likely to lie in unincorporated joint ventures”. 
590 MPRDA, s 2(c). 
591 MPRDA, s 2(b).  Also see Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-191. 




prevent entities to apply simultaneously for, and become joint holders, of prospecting rights 
and mining rights.592  The 2013 Amendment Bill attempted to amend section 11, to refer 
specifically to, and regulate “any transfer of a part of a prospecting right or mining right”.593  
The President refused to assent to the Bill.594  Although it remains to be seen whether a similar 
amendment will be made in future, the attempted amendment indicates that the intention of the 
legislature is to allow co-holders to hold prospecting rights and mining rights jointly. 
It is clear that the MPRDA limits the ability of holders of prospecting rights and mining rights 
to transfer their rights freely.  The limitation extends to the transfer of interests in prospecting 
rights and mining rights that are held jointly.  However, these limitations must be considered 
in view of the reasons for requiring consent for the transfer of prospecting rights and mining 
rights and the situations in which the Minister must grant consent. 
3.2.1.2. Requirements for consent 
Section 11(2) of the MPRDA limits ministerial discretion by placing an obligation on the 
Minister to grant consent to transfer mining rights and prospecting rights if the requirements 
are met.595  The requirements of section 11(2) point to the purpose of limiting the ability of 
holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to transfer their rights.  First, the acquirer of the 
right must be able to comply with the obligations and terms and conditions that attached to the 
right when it was granted.596  Second, the acquirer must comply with the requirements for 
applications of prospecting rights and mining rights in sections 17 and 23 of the MPRDA 
respectively.597  The requirements of section 11(2) aim to ensure that the acquirer of the right 
has the technical and financial capacity to prospect598 and mine599 optimally in the same manner 
as the original holder of the right and can comply with health and environmental 
                                                 
592 Also Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-190 where the authors rely on s 102 of the 
MPRDA to justify an interpretation that rights can be held jointly. In general, s 102 determines that the rights, 
programmes and plans that the MPRDA provides for may not be amended or varied without ministerial consent.  
S 102 specifically include variations “through additional… minerals or… share[s]”. 
593 2013 Amendment Bill, s 8(a) 
594 See Presidential letter to parliament dated 16 June 2015 available at http://cer.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/Zuma-letter-to-the-NA-re-MPRDA-Bill.pdf.  
595 Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 397.  Contra Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law 
MPRDA-168. 
596 MPRDA, s 11(2)(a).  See Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 396. 
597 MPRDA, s 11(2)(b).  See Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 396.  
598 MPRDA, ss 17(1)(a) and (b). 
599 MPRDA, ss 23(1)(a), (b) and (c). 




requirements.600  The requirements further aim to ensure that holders of rights to minerals 
comply with the Broad Based Socio-economic Empowerment Charter for the South African 
Mining and Minerals Industry601 as well as with the prescribed social and labour plan.602  In 
short, when rights are transferred, the requirements of section 11(2), inter alia, attempt to 
achieve the objectives of the MPRDA to promote equitable access to the country’s mineral 
resources603 and to expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons.604  It further 
attempts to promote employment and to advance the social and economic welfare of all South 
Africans.605   
It is clear that the government has legitimate interests in limiting the ability of holders of 
prospecting rights and mining rights to transfer their rights freely.  Section 11(2) contributes 
towards optimal mineral tenure security by placing an obligation on the Minister to grant 
consent if the requirements are met.  One important point of criticism is that the requirements 
in sections 17 and 23 of the MPRDA for applications for prospecting rights and mining rights, 
respectively, are not always clear and certain.  For example, according to section 23(h), the 
Minister is under an obligation to grant mining rights, or consent to the transfer thereof,606 if 
the applicant, or acquirer in case of transfer, complies with the Mining Charter.  The Charter’s 
language is generally vague and imprecise.607  It is arguable that inflexible and concrete rules 
are not suitable for the objectives of the Mining Charter.608  However, the following example 
                                                 
600 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-162 refer to sec 11 as an “anti-avoidance 
measure which is designed to prevent persons who [do not] qualify according to the criteria in the MPRDA to be 
granted a prospecting or mining right…”  Also see Mostert Principles and Policies 88. 
601 In terms of s 17(1)(f) of the MPRDA, applicants for prospecting rights for prescribed minerals must show that 
they have complied with the objective in s 2(d) of the MPRDA to expand opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged persons.  See s 23(1)(h) of the MPRDA for mining rights.  In Rhino Plat (Pty) Ltd and Another v 
Minister of Minerals and Energy and Others (34514/2008) [2009] ZAGPPHC 42 (28 April 2009) [9] and [11], 
the government refused to consent to the transfer of a prospecting right because the transfer did not conform to 
transformative requirements.  However, the decision was set aside because, in the opinion of the court, the transfer 
did not undermine the objects of the MPRDA. 
602 According to s 23(h) of the MPRDA.  The social and labour plan is not applicable as criteria for the granting 
of prospecting rights.  
603 MPRDA, s 2(c). 
604 MPRDA, s 2(d). 
605 MPRDA, s 2(f). 
606 MPRDA, S 11(2)(b) read with s 23(h). 
607 The Charters will be challenged in court for being unconstitutional as a result of being vague and contradictory.  
See Seccombe 18 August 2015 Business Day BDLive available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2015/08/18/challenge-to-set-aside-mining-charters.  Also see 
Andersson (Bachelor Thesis) 26.    
608 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-117.  See Dawood v Minister of Home 
Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) [53] and fn 73; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 2 SA 247 (CC) 
[33] for the need for some governmental discretion in the modern state.  Also see Hoexter Administrative Law in 
South Africa 47. 
 




illustrates how unnecessarily vague and imprecise drafting creates uncertainty and increases 
the risks that mines cannot be developed profitably. 
One of the requirements of the Charter is that 26% of all mining assets must be black-owned.609  
Mining companies and the Department of Mineral Resources are in disagreement regarding the 
meaning of “26% black ownership”.610  On the one hand, the Department interprets the 
requirement to mean that mining companies must, at all times, comply with the 26% black 
ownership requirements.611  Mining companies, on the other hand, prefer a “once-empowered, 
always empowered” interpretation.612  Accordingly, if a company entered into transactions in 
the past that resulted in 26% black ownership, they meet the requirements of the Charter even 
if the black owners sell their interests to non-historically disadvantaged persons.  Mining 
companies that complied with the 26% black ownership requirement in the past will thus want 
to argue that they meet this requirement and, provided they meet all other requirements, the 
Minister must consent if they apply to transfer their rights.  The Department of Mineral 
Resources will argue that the Minister is not under an obligation to consent to transfers if 
companies do not meet the 26% black ownership requirement at the time of transfer.   
Unclear drafting of this nature has the effect that holders of rights are uncertain regarding 
whether the Minister will grant consent for the transfer of rights.  The uncertainty increases the 
risks that right holders will not be able to transfer their rights if they are no longer able to 
develop mines profitably.  This consequently weakens mineral tenure security.  The pursuit of 
empowerment targets is a legitimate reason for the government to interfere with and limit the 
ability of right holders to transfer their rights.  It is also arguable that the nature of the objectives 
that the government aims to achieve, namely equitable access to mineral resources and 
expansion of opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons requires some flexibility.  
However, the uncertainty that arises as regards the 26% black ownership requirement can be 
cleared up easily by drafting the Charter in clear and unambiguous terms.  It therefore seems 
                                                 
609 Mining Charter par 2.1. 
610Jackson 22 April 2015 Miningmx available at http://www.miningmx.com/page/opinion/metal-heads/1651176-
Folly-in-taking-mining-charter-to court#.VYPWLk2JjIU – accessed 1 July 2015; Creamer 31 March 2015 Mining 
Weekly available at 
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/mining-bee-ownership-to-be-tested-in-court-minister-2015-03-31 - 
accessed 19 June 2015; van der Merwe and Ferreira September 2013 Without Prejudice 27. 
611 Seccombe 11 August 2015 Business Day BDLive available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2015/08/11/ownership-of-mines-may-revert-to-whites. Also see 
http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Mining/Courts-to-decide-on-mines-ownership-compliance-20150331.  
612 Seccombe 11 August 2015 Business Day BDLive.  Also see http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Mining/Courts-
to-decide-on-mines-ownership-compliance-20150331. 




that the objectives pursued do not justify the uncertainty that the unclear drafting of the 26% 
black ownership requirement causes.  Unnecessarily vague and imprecise drafting of this nature 
weakens optimal mineral tenure security. 
The 2013 Amendment Bill attempted to give the Minister the power to grant consent for the 
transfer of prospecting rights and mining rights “subject to such conditions as [he] may 
determine”.613  If such an amendment is made, the Minister will still be under an obligation to 
grant consent if the requirements of section 11(2) are met.  However, the Minister will have 
the authority to attach any conditions to the consent.  The Bill did not provide for any standard 
terms and conditions and also did not indicate any criteria that the Minister must take into 
account when exercising the power to ascribe conditions.  The Bill therefore appeared to confer 
wide and uncircumscribed discretion on the Minister.  Such a discretion will limit the certainty 
of holders of rights regarding the situations in which they will be allowed to transfer their rights 
in an attempt to develop mines profitably and maximise returns on their investments.  Although 
the President refused to assent to the Bill and it was subsequently sent back to parliament for 
reasons other than its impact on section 11(2),614 the intention of the legislator to confer this 
type of wide and uncircumscribed discretion on the Minister is cause for concern.  The 
uncertainty that the wide and uncircumscribed governmental discretion will create, if a similar 
amendment is made in future,615 is unnecessary for, and disproportionate to, the objectives 
pursued. 
Section 11(1) does not limit the reasons for which rights holders may apply to transfer their 
rights.  Holders of rights can thus apply for transfer if objective market conditions or their 
subjective circumstances prevent them from maximising their return on their investment.  This 
                                                 
613 2013 Amendment Bill, s 8(a).  
614 See the President’s letter of 16 June 2015 to parliament.  The letter is available at http://cer.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/Zuma-letter-to-the-NA-re-MPRDA-Bill.pdf. The President sent the Bill back to 
parliament for reconsideration of three issues regarding its constitutionality. First, the Bill attempted to elevate 
the Code of Good Practice, the Housing and Living Conditions Standard and the Amended Broad-Based Socio 
Economic Empowerment Charter to national legislation and to give the Minister the accompanying power to 
amend or repeal these documents without following the prescribed procedures for repeal and amendment of 
legislation. Second, the Bill attempted to impose quantitative restrictions on exports in contravention of South 
Africa’s obligations under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and the Trade, Development and 
Cooperation Agreement. Third, the National Council of Provinces and Provincial legislator did not sufficiently 
facilitate public participation as required by section 72 and 118 of the Constitution. Fourth, The Bill was not 
referred to the National House of Traditional Leaders for its comments in terms of section 18 of the Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2001. 
615 The reasons for the President’s refusal to assent to the Bill did not include wide and uncircumscribed discretion.  
See the President’s letter of 16 June 2015 to parliament.  The letter is available at http://cer.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/2010/08/Zuma-letter-to-the-NA-re-MPRDA-Bill.pdf. 




limits right holders’ risk of being unable to develop mines profitably and consequently 
strengthens mineral tenure security.  
3.2.1.3. Synopsis: Transfer of rights and interests in rights; MTS strengths and 
weaknesses  
Taking into account legitimate governmental objectives, the effect of the provisions of the 
MPRDA regarding transfer of rights and interests in rights, discussed here, on mineral tenure 
security, may be summarised as follows: 
 Mining permits Prospecting rights Mining rights 
MTS strengthened  Obligatory granting 
of consent if criteria 
are met 





of consent if criteria 
are met 




MTS weakened Not-transferable – 
effect apparent when 
permits used as 
collateral security616 
Vague and imprecise 




Vague and imprecise 




Table 5 Synopsis: Transfer of rights and interests in rights; MTS strengths and 
weaknesses  
The MPRDA limits the ability of holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to transfer 
their rights freely.  However, this limitation is justifiable in view of the reasons for the 
limitation.617  Section 11(2) of the MPRDA strengthens mineral tenure security by placing an 
obligation on the Minister to consent to transfer if certain requirements are met.  The fact that 
the section does not restrict the reasons for which right holders can apply for transfer further 
strengthens mineral tenure security.  However, the difference in opinion regarding the 26% 
black ownership requirement indicates that mineral tenure security is impacted negatively by 
unclear and vague drafting regarding the requirements that original holders of rights, and 
                                                 
616 See sec 4.2 below. 
617 However, see Leon 2009 JERL 624 where the author argues that the MPRDA erodes the “transferability and 
thus the bankability of prospecting and mining rights”. 




consequently transferees, must comply with for obligatory ministerial consent for transfers.  
Unclear drafting and wide governmental discretion unreasonably weaken mineral tenure 
security.   
3.2.2. Transfer of interests in companies or closed corporations 
The second part of section 11(1) provides that, with the exception of listed companies, 
ministerial consent is required for the transfer of a controlling interest in companies618 that 
hold, or have an interest in, rights to minerals.619  This means that for listed companies, 
ministerial consent is not required for the transfer of any interest, including controlling 
interests.  For unlisted companies, ministerial consent is not required, for the transfer of any 
interests, other than controlling interests.  Briefly, ministerial consent is only required for the 
transfer of a controlling interest in unlisted companies.  Thus, any interests in listed companies 
as well as any interests that is not a controlling interest in unlisted companies are transferable 
freely.  These freely transferable interests strengthens mineral tenure security. 
An understanding of the impact of the prohibition against transfer without ministerial consent 
requires investigating the ambit of the second part of section 11(1).  Therefore, the following 
section firstly investigates the interests in companies that fall within the ambit of section 11(1). 
3.2.2.1. Ambit of section 11(1): interests in companies 
As explained, the requirement for ministerial consent in the second part of section applies only 
to controlling interests in unlisted companies.  The MPRDA fails to define “listed company” 
and “unlisted company”.  The meaning of “listed company” and “unlisted company” must 
therefore be found elsewhere.  In common parlance, listed companies refer to companies whose 
                                                 
618 S 11(1) also refers to Closed Corporations (CC’s).  Due to the fact that CC’s are being phased out as a business 
structure, the discussion here focusses on companies only.  After commencement the Companies Act of 2008 on 
1 May 2011, new CC’s can no longer be registered and companies cannot be converted to CC’s.    CC’s that 
existed before the Companies Act of 2008 will remain in force until deregistered or wound up. See s 2(1) of the 
Closed Corporation Act 69 of 1984 as amended by the Companies Act of 2008.  See Cassim (ed) The Law of 
Business Structures chap 24 for a general discussion of CC’s. 
619 The Act does not qualify “company or closed corporation” as one that holds a prospecting right or mining right 
or has an interest in one of these rights.  A literal reading of the Act thus means that a change in controlling interest 
of any unlisted company requires written consent in terms of section 11(1).  However, the Act has been interpreted 
to refer only to companies that hold prospecting rights and mining rights. See Mogale Alloys [30]; Moore and 
Veldsman 2013 SALJ 87 – 88.  S 8(a)(1) of the 2008 Amendment Act, that is not yet in operation, proposes to 
correct this by requiring the company or closed corporation to hold a prospecting right or mining right 




shares are listed on an exchange, for example the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.620  The 
Income Tax Act621 refers to a “listed company” as a company whose shares622 are listed on an 
exchange.623  This includes companies listed on a local or foreign exchange.624  By implication, 
an unlisted company must be a company whose shares are not listed on an exchange.  
It is beyond the scope of this work to do a detailed analysis of the meaning of controlling 
interests in unlisted companies.625  Briefly, for an interest in an unlisted company to be 
considered a “controlling interest”, the interests must firstly be capable of being dealt with in 
terms of one of the transactions regulated by section 11(1) of the MPRDA.626  For purposes of 
this chapter, it must be possible to transfer the interest.  Secondly, the controlling interest in an 
                                                 
620 See the following cases where the courts refer to “listed companies” without providing a definition: Vlok No 
and Others v Sun International South Africa Ltd and Others 2014 1 SA 487 (GSJ) [6]; Absa Bank Ltd v Ukwanda 
Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 SA 550 (GSJ) [15]; Cape Empowerment Trust Ltd v Fisher Hoffman Sithole 
2013 5 SA 183 (SCA) [1] and [4]. 
621 58 of 1962. 
622 The Companies Act of 2008 defines a share as “the units into which the proprietary interests in a profit company 
is divided”. 
623 According to s 1 of the Income Tax Act, a listed company “means a company where its shares or depository 
receipts in respect of its shares are listed on (a) an exchange as defined in section 1 of the Financial Markets Act 
19 of 2012 and licensed under section 9 of that Act; or (b) a stock exchange in a country other than the Republic 
which has been recognised by the Minister as contemplated in paragraph (c) of the definition of “recognised 
exchange” in paragraph 1 of the Eighth Schedule.  S 1 of the Financial Markets Act of 2012 defines exchange as 
“a person who constitutes, maintains and provides an infrastructure - (a) for bringing together buyers and sellers 
of securities; (b) for matching bids and offers for securities of multiple buyers and sellers; and (c) whereby a 
matched bid and offer for securities constitutes a transaction.  The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities 
Act 12 of 2004 defines “listed company” as follows: “a company, the equity share capital of which is listed on a 
stock exchange as defined in section 1 of the Stock Exchanges Control Act, 1985 (Act 1 of 1985)”.  However, the 
Stock Exchange Control Act of 1985 was repealed by the Security Services Act 36 of 2004.  The Security Services 
Act of 2004 was in turn repealed by the Financial Markets Act of 2012.  This research revealed legislation that 
refers to “listed company” in the Income Tax Act of 1962 (for example s 181(5)(a) of Tax Administration Act 28 
of 2011) and legislation that use the term “listed company” without a definition or reference to the Income Tax 
Act of 1962 (see, for example, s 4.9 of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act of 2003 and s 3(e) 
of the Private Security Industry Regulation Act 56 of 2001), but not other definitions of “listed company/nies”.   
624 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-174 – MPRDA-175 mainly rely on the def of 
“listed company” in the Income Tax Act of 1962 for justification that listed companies include companies listed 
on foreign exchanges.  Since the publication of this source, the Income Tax Act of 1962 was amended to reflect 
the Financial Markets Act of 2012 which repealed the Security Services Act of 2004.  However, the def of “listed 
company” in the Income Tax Act of 1962 still refers to companies listed on a local or foreign exchange. Also see 
Moore and Veldsman 2013 SALJ 121. 
625 See in general Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 397 – 400; Dale et al South African Mineral and 
Petroleum Law MPRDA-17; Moore and Veldsman 2013 SALJ 104.  According to these sources, controlling 
interests refer to direct and indirect control of a company that holds, or has an interest in, a prospecting right or 
mining right.  This is supported by the fact that the MPRDA does not exempt intra-group dealings of companies 
that hold prospecting rights and mining rights from ministerial consent. The relationships between holding 
companies and subsidiary companies must thus be taken into account to determine whether ministerial consent is 
required for the transfer of a controlling interest.  If a holding company’s subsidiary, for example, is a mining 
company, the holding company has indirect control over the mining company.  In principle, therefore, a change 
in the controlling interest in the holding company will require ministerial consent.       
626 Mogale Alloys [36]. 




unlisted company “cannot be confined to a single characteristic, or criterion”.627  An entity will, 
for example, have a controlling interest if it holds more than 50% of the issued share capital628 
or more than half of the voting rights in respect of the issued share capital.629  The power to 
appoint or remove the majority of the directors of a company without the concurrence of 
another person also constitutes a controlling interest.630   
The MPRDA requires ministerial consent for any changes in controlling interests.  This means 
that if an entity has a controlling interest and concludes a transaction that will cause it to no 
longer have that controlling interest, ministerial consent is required.631  Ministerial consent is 
required even if a controlling interest will not vest in any entity pursuant to the transfer632 as 
the following example illustrates:  A holds 60% of the issued share capital in company X while 
B holds 40%.  Thus, A has a controlling interest.  If A wishes to transfer 30% of his shares to 
C and 30% to D, neither B, C or D will have a controlling interest pursuant to the transfer.  The 
transfer, however, will trigger a change in the controlling interest because A will lose his 
controlling interest as a result of the transfer.  Irrespective of the fact that no one will have a 
controlling interest after the transfer, ministerial consent is required.  
Section 8(a) of the 2008 Amendment Act will widen the ambit of section 11(1) by requiring 
ministerial consent for the transfer of any interest (not only controlling interests) in unlisted 
companies or closed corporations as well as controlling interests in listed companies.633  
Regarding unlisted companies, the amendment means that a single share will not be 
transferable without ministerial consent.634  Apart from being “unduly burdensome” and 
                                                 
627 Mogale Alloys [37]. 
628 Mogale Alloys [37].  Also see s 1(a)(i) def of “controlling interest” in the Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 and 12(2)(a) 
of the Competition Act 89 of 1998. 
629 Mogale Alloys [37].  See also s 1(a)(11) def of “controlling interest” in the Diamonds Act of 1986.  S 12(2)(a) 
of the Competition Act of 1998 refers to the majority of votes that can be cast at the general meeting of “the firm” 
and 3(a)(i) of the Companies Act of 2008 refers to the ability to control  the majority of the general voting rights 
associated with issued securities.  
630 Mogale Alloys [37].  See s 1(a)(iii) def of “controlling interest” in the Diamonds Act of 1986; s 12(2)(c) of the 
Competition Act of 1998; s 3(a)(ii) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
631 Mogale Alloys [38]; Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 403.  Moore and Veldsman 2013 SALJ 95 gives 
the example of where a company issues more shares and as a result the (former) controlling shareholder loses 
control. 
632 Mogale Alloys [38] and Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 403. 
633 The section is not yet in operation. The 2008 Amendment Act came into operation through (Proc No 14) in 
GG 36512 of 31 May 2013.  On 16 June 2013, the Proclamation was amended by (Proc No 17) in GG 36541 of 
6 June 2013 with the effect that, inter alia, the amendments to s 11(1) was indefinitely suspended.    
634 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-167; van der Merwe and Ferreira September 
2013 Without Prejudice 27. 




equally “administratively unworkable”635 for the government, these strict requirements will be 
a severe setback for the ability of investors to maximise the returns on their investments.636  As 
with transfer of prospecting rights and mining rights, the government may have legitimate 
reasons for limiting the ability of shareholders in unlisted companies to transfer their shares 
freely.  The government can, for example, aim to ensure that mining companies comply with 
black economic empowerment targets.  However, the extent of the limitation that the 2008 
Amendment Act envisages is unnecessary and excessive, even in pursuit of legitimate 
objectives.  The extent of the limitation is disproportionate to legitimate interests that the 
government may have for limiting the ability of shareholders to transfer their shares freely.  In 
this regard, excessive governmental interference and regulation unreasonably limit the interests 
of investors to maximize the returns on their investments.  Thus, excessive governmental 
interference and regulation unjustifiably weaken optimal mineral tenure security. 
Concerning controlling interests in listed companies, it has been argued that the requirement 
for consent to transfer controlling interests, is contrary to everyday trading of shares on 
exchanges.637  Although the requirement of consent will limit the ability of shareholders to 
transfer shares freely, these types of limitations are not uncommon.  For example, the 
Competition Act regulates mergers of companies with the aim of promoting competition in the 
marketplace.638  According to the Act, a merger occurs when a company acquires or establishes 
control over the whole or part of the business of another company.639  Large640 and intermediate 
mergers641 cannot take place without the approval of the Competition Commission.642  
                                                 
635 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-167. 
636 Leon 2013 JERL 201 refers to this as a “practical impossibility”.  However, the author seems to be under the 
impression that the Amendment Act proposes to require ministerial consent for the transfer of any interest in listed 
companies.  Also see “MPRDA Detrimental to SA Mining Industry” 8 March 2013 Mining Weekly available at 
http://www.miningweekly.com/article/mprda-detrimental-to-sas-mining-industry-2013-03-08 where it is said 
that “shares in listed companies will become untradeable” if the amendments come into operation. 
637 See Author unknown “MPRDA detrimental to SA mining industry” 8 March 2013 Mining Weekly where it is 
said that “shares in listed companies will become untradeable” if the amendments come into operation. 
638 Competition Act of 1998, s 2. 
639 Competition Act of 1998, s 12(1)(a).  The acquisition of control can be direct or indirect. 
640 S 11(5)(c) determines that “a large merger means a merger or proposed merger with a value at or above the 
higher threshold established in terms of subsection (1)(a).” See s 3 of the Determination of Merger Thresholds 
and Method of Calculation (GN 216) in GG 31957 of 6 March 2009 for the higher thresholds.  
641 S 11(5)(b) of the Competition Act of 1998 determines that “an intermediate merger means a merger or proposed 
merger with a value between the lower and higher thresholds established in terms of subsection (1)(a)”.  See ss 2 
and 3 of the Determination of Merger Thresholds and Method of Calculation in GG 31957 of 6 March 2009 for 
the lower and higher thresholds respectively.  
642 Competition Act of 1998, s 13A(3). With some exceptions, small mergers do not have to be approved.  See s 
13 of the Competition Act of 1998.  S 11(5)(a) determines that “a small merger means a merger or proposed 
merger with a value at or below the lower threshold established in terms of subsection (1)(a)”.  See Determination 
of Merger Thresholds and Method of Calculation in GG 31957 of 6 March 2009 s 3 for the higher thresholds.  




Shareholders who want to transfer their shares in companies that hold prospecting rights or 
mining rights, will require the approval of the Competition Commission if the transaction falls 
within the ambit of the Competition Act.  If the transaction also results in a change in the 
controlling interest of the company, further ministerial consent will be required in terms of the 
proposed amendment of section 11(1) of the MPRDA.  
In summary, the MPRDA limits the ability of shareholders of unlisted companies to transfer 
their interests freely.  The restriction, arguably, has a negative impact on the ability of investors 
to maximise the return on their investments.  The impact will be more severe if s 8(a) of the 
2008 Amendment Act comes into operation.  The Amendment Act will further limit the ability 
of shareholders of listed companies to transfer their interests freely.  However, these 
observation are not sufficient to comment meaningfully on the extent to which the MPRDA 
provides optimal mineral tenure security.  Meaningful comments require considering the 
reasons for requiring ministerial consent and the circumstances in which the Minister must 
grant consent.  
3.2.2.2. Requirements for consent 
Section 11(2) of the MPRDA indicates the purpose of requiring ministerial consent when a 
prospecting right or mining right is transferred, namely to ensure that the acquirer of the right 
complies with certain requirements.643  When prospecting rights and mining rights are 
transferred, the section further limits ministerial discretion by providing that the Minister must 
consent to the transfer if the requirements are met.  Section 11(2) only refers to transfer of the 
right (the first part of section 11(1)) and not to the transfer of controlling interests in unlisted 
companies (the second part of section 11(1).  It is thus not clear whether section 11(2) applies 
in the case of transfer of controlling interests in unlisted companies.  In Mogale Alloys Ltd v 
Nuco Chrome Bophuthatswana (Pty) Ltd644, the court held that that section 11(2) applies when 
controlling interests in unlisted companies are transferred, “otherwise there will be no apparent 
purpose, or guidelines for the Minister”,645 in these situations. 
                                                 
643 See sec 3.2.1.2 above. 
644 2011 6 SA 96 (GSJ). 
645 Mogale Alloys [29]. 




However, when interests in companies are transferred, the question should not be whether the 
acquirer of the interest complies with the requirements of section 11(2).646  The question must 
be whether the company that holds a right to minerals can still comply with the terms and 
conditions of the rights and its obligations in terms of the MPRDA after the transfer.647  For 
example, if the majority shareholders in mining companies want to sell their shares, the 
question is not whether the new shareholder can mine according to the mining work programme 
and comply with health and safety legislation.  The question is whether the mining company 
that holds the mining right (probably the selling company) can still comply with all its 
obligations.  It has been argued that a change in controlling interest is unlikely to have the 
effect that a company cannot comply with the requirements of section 11(2).648  In this regard, 
a change in shareholders unlikely to affect the technical and financial ability of a company to 
prospect and mine.  Furthermore, a change in control will probably not interfere with the ability 
of the company to comply with environmental obligations and health and safety legislation.  It 
has accordingly been argued that section 11(2) does not apply when controlling interests in 
companies are transferred.649  This means that the MPRDA contains no guidelines to assist the 
Minister when exercising the discretion to grant consent for the transfer of controlling interests 
in unlisted companies.650   
Still, the government has a legitimate interest in having some control when interests in mining 
companies are transferred.  For example, a change in the shareholders can impact on the extent 
to which a company complies with its BEE requirements. A change in shareholders can mean 
that 26% of the company’s assets are no longer “black-owned” as required by the Mining 
Charter.  It is possible to protect government’s interests and to create certainty by specifying 
the criteria on which the Minister must base the discretion when considering an application for 
the transfer of interests in mining companies.651  The criteria can, for example, include the 
effect that the transfer will have on the extent to which a company complies with its BEE 
                                                 
646 Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 400.  Contra Mogale Alloys [37] where the court held that the acquirer 
of an interest must be “vetted for regulatory purposes”.  
647 Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 400.  See Moore and Veldsman 2013 SALJ 85 88 where the authors 
argue that the purpose is, firstly, to vet the capabilities of the acquirer and, secondly, to determine whether the 
holder of the prospecting right or mining right will be able to comply with the requirements of the MPRDA for 
granting of rights. 
648 Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 401. 
649 Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 401. 
650 Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 401. 
651 See Badenhorst and du Plessis 2012 De Jure 401 where the authors highlight the importance of promulgating 
regulations regarding consent of the Minister when interests in companies are transferred in general. 




obligations.  Furthermore, the Act can strengthen mineral tenure security by placing an 
obligation on the Minister to grant consent if the specified criteria are met.   
If one accepts that section 11(2) does not apply when controlling interests in unlisted 
companies are transferred, it is clear that wide and uncircumscribed governmental discretion 
creates uncertainty.  The discretion creates unnecessary uncertainty and increases the risks that 
investors face regarding the ability to maximise the returns on their investments.  The complete 
lack of criteria on which the discretion must be based is not necessary in the pursuit of a 
legitimate governmental objective.  Optimal mineral tenure security is unjustifiably limited 
here by wide and uncircumscribed governmental discretion.  Furthermore, the existence of 
different opinions regarding whether section 11(2) applies when controlling interests in 
unlisted companies are transferred, in itself, indicates an incidence of vague and imprecise 
drafting. Unclear drafting again creates unnecessary uncertainty and unjustifiably weakens 
optimal mineral tenure security.  
If the 2008 Amendment Act brings transfer of controlling interest in listed companies within 
the ambit of section 11(2), the arguments raised in relation to transfer of controlling interests 
in unlisted companies will apply.  Thus, the government has legitimate interests in regulating 
transfer of controlling interest in listed companies.  It is, however, unclear whether section 
11(2) applies.  This uncertainty in itself weakens mineral tenure security.  Acceptance that 
section 11(2) does not apply will result in wide uncircumscribed governmental discretion and 
will consequently weaken mineral tenure security.   
3.2.2.3. Synopsis: Transfer of interests in companies; MTS strengths and weaknesses 
Taking into account legitimate governmental interests, the effect of the provisions of the 
MPRDA regarding transfer of interests in companies, discussed here, on mineral tenure 

























































Table 6 Synopsis: Transfer of interests in companies; MTS strengths and weaknesses  
The MPRDA strengthens mineral tenure security by allowing shareholders to transfer interests 
in listed companies and interests, other than controlling interests, in unlisted companies freely.  
The proposed amendment to section 11(1), in terms of which ministerial consent will be 
necessary for the transfers of any interest in unlisted companies, will result in excessive 
regulatory measures that are disproportionate to the objectives pursued.  These excessive 
regulatory measures unnecessarily and unjustifiably weaken optimal mineral tenure security.   
The MPRDA further weakens optimal mineral tenure security by not describing any criteria on 
which the consent to transfer controlling interests in unlisted companies are based.  If the 
proposed amendments to section 11(1) come into operation, ministerial consent for transfer of 
controlling interests in listed companies will also not be based on any specified objectives. 
4. Ability to encumber 
The ability to encumber rights to minerals refers to the possibility to use rights to grant real 
security rights to others.652  In general, real security rights can take the form of mortgage 
bonds653 over rights to minerals or cession of rights to minerals through cession in securitatem 
                                                 
652 Real security rights can be distinguished from personal security rights.  In case of real security rights, a debt is 
secured by specific immovable or movable property (including incorporeal property such as rights to minerals) of 
the debtor.  The property thus serves as security for payment of the debt.  In case of personal security rights, such 
as suretyships, the creditor obtains a personal right against the surety for payment of a debt of the debtor.  See 
Badenhorst et al Silberberg 357; du Bois Wille’s Principles 630 – 631; van der Merwe Sakereg 605 – 606; Lubbe 
in LAWSA par 324.  
653 In case of a mortgage bond, specific immovable property, including incorporeal property, of the debtor serves 
as security for payment of a debt.  See van der Merwe Sakereg 615; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 361; Lubbe in 
LAWSA par 335.  The reason why rights to minerals are encumbered by mortgaged and not pledged draws from 
the classification of real rights as immovable incorporeal things and personal rights as movable incorporeal things.  
See Wille’s Principles of South African Law 421 - 425 for the classification of incorporeal things as movable 
things and immovable things.  Immovable things are encumbered by way of mortgage bond while movable things 
are encumbered by way of pledge.  Van der Merwe Sakereg 40 – 42 criticises the classification of incorporeal 




debiti. In case of cession in securitatem debiti, the right is ceded to the cessionary and the 
cedent is divested of his right.  The parties contemplate recession of the right to the original 
cedent upon satisfaction of the debt.  Cession can also follow the pledge construction (or out-
and-out cessions) in terms of which the right is not ceded to the cessionary but the cessionary 
only obtains a security interests.654  It is unclear whether cession in section 11(1) of the 
MPRDA includes cession in securitatem debiti.  Some authors argue that “cession” in section 
11(1) is probably synonymous with transfer and does not include cession in securitatem debiti 
while others argue that the ordinary meaning of cession includes out-and-out cession as well 
as cession in securitatem debiti.655  If one accepts that cession in section 11(1) includes cession 
in securitatem debiti, the MPRDA is clear that ministerial consent is always required to cede 
prospecting rights and mining rights.656  This requirement of ministerial consent is subject to 
the same arguments as the requirements for ministerial consent to mortgage rights.657  The 
MPRDA is also clear that mining permits cannot be ceded.658  It is arguable that the prohibition 
against cession of mining permits increases the risks that mines cannot be developed profitably 
and thus weakens mineral tenure security in the same way than the prohibition against transfer 
of mining permits.  Holders of mining permits cannot cede their permits to obtain loans for 
development of mines.  The current analysis focuses on encumbrance of rights to minerals by 
way of mortgage bonds.  
Registered659 mortgage bonds, in general, offer good security to bondholders.  If debtors (in 
the current context holders of rights to minerals) default on their payment obligations, 
                                                 
things into movable and immovable things but nonetheless recognises the practical need for this and confirms that 
real rights are classified as immovable incorporeal things.  Also see van der Merwe in LAWSA par 17 where the 
author argues that incorporeal things should not be included in the definition of “things”.  Again, the author accepts 
the practical need to recognise situations where incorporeal things are the object of other real rights.  According 
to Badenhorst et al Silberberg 39 the importance of the classification of incorporeal things into immovable and 
movable things is that immovable things (thus real rights) are hypothecated by way of mortgage while movables 
(thus personal rights) are pledged or encumbered by way of a registered notarial bond.    
654 See Lubbe in LAWSA pars 376 fn 1, 378 and 414. 
655 Mostert Principles and Policies 88 argues that cession and transfer are probably synonymous and means 
“conveyance” of rights to minerals.  Thus, cession does not include cession in securitatem debiti.  Similarly, 
Moore and Veldsman 2013 SALJ 89 argue that cession denotes a method to transfer a right.  However, according 
to Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-173 cession includes out-and-out cession as 
well as cession in securitatem debiti.  The reason advanced is that the ordinary meaning of cession includes both 
terms. 
656  MPRDA, s 11(1).   
657 See sec 4.3.1 below. 
658 MPRDA, s 27. 
659 A real security right is only established upon registration of the bond in the deeds office.  Before registration, 
the agreement between the parties gives rise to a personal right.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 361; du Bois 
Wille’s Principles 634; van der Merwe Sakereg 621. 




bondholders can obtain a court order to sell the property (the mortgaged right to minerals) in 
execution.660  Furthermore, bondholders are secured creditors661 and will be paid first from the 
proceeds of a sale in execution of the property in case of insolvency.662  Mineral bonds are 
registered in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office663 and not in the Deeds 
Registry664 as other bonds.  There are important differences between registration in the Deeds 
Office and in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office which are discussed in 
chapter 6.665  The current chapter is concerned with the ability to mortgage rights and the impact 
of foreclosure of mortgage bonds on the ability to develop mines profitable.  The rules of 
foreclosure of mortgage bond are the same for minerals bonds and bonds registered in the 
Deeds Registries Act. 
4.1. Mortgage as a method to finance mining projects 
It has been argued that the ability to mortgage rights to minerals is “of great importance” as an 
instrument to facilitate borrowing and lending of money for the development of mines.666  
According to the argument, the ability to mortgage rights to minerals is of particular importance 
for previously disadvantaged persons to enter the South African mining industry.667 It is also 
generally stated that mineral tenure security requires the ability to mortgage rights to raise 
funds for the development of mines.668  .    
However, mortgaging of rights is not the only, or even the most important method, to raise 
funds for mining projects.  In fact, the large scale of natural resource projects often require 
“project finance and special-purpose financing structures to undertake them”.669  It is beyond 
                                                 
660 Van der Merwe Sakereg 606; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 357; Lubbe in LAWSA par 368.  See Fuchs August 
2014 LitNet Akademies 223 – 224 available at 
http://www.litnet.co.za/assets//pdf/joernaaluitgawe_11_2/11_2_Fuchs.pdf for the procedures that must be 
followed before judgement can be obtained. 
661 Firstrand Bank Limited v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa 2015 1 SA 38 (SCA) [22]. 
662 Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, s 2 def of “security” and s 95(1); Sharrock Hockley’s Insolvency Law 183; 
Badenhorst et al Silberberg 357 and especially fn; 5 Wille’s Principles of South African Law 637; van der Merwe 
Sakereg 605; Lubbe in LAWSA par 374.  
663 Mining Titles Registration Act 16 of 1967, s 1 def of “mortgage bond” read with s 5(1)(h). 
664 Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937, s 3(1)(e). 
665 See chap 6, sec 2.2. 
666 Dale in Bastida et al 830.  According to Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-14, 
registration of bonds “is of great moment to prospecting and mining companies as potential borrowers and to 
financial institutions as potential lenders”. 
667 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-14; Dale in Bastida et al 830. 
668 See chap 1, sec 1.1 regarding the ability to mortgage rights as aspect of mineral tenure security. 
669 Pritchard in Bastida et al 76.  See Benning May/June The Journal of The South African Institute of Mining 
and Metallurgy 146 where the author says that the types of finance for mining projects normally are corporate 
loans, project finance or venture capital.  Also see Coles “Debt Financing for Mining Projects” 24 Jan 2014 




the scope of this work to do describe these methods of financing mining projects.  The 
discussion that follows must therefore not be understood to mean that profitable development 
of mines depends solely on the ability to mortgage rights to minerals.  Still, mortgaging of 
rights is one method to raise funds for the development of mines. Furthermore, the MPRDA 
acknowledges and regulates the ability to mortgage rights to minerals and the matter is hence 
discussed here.  
4.2. Mortgage of mining permits 
According to section 27(b) of the MPRDA, mining permits can be encumbered for purposes of 
funding or financing the mining project to which the permits relates with ministerial consent.670  
Section 5(1)(h) of the Mining Titles Registration Act (MTRA) provides that the Director-
General has a duty to attest and register mortgage bonds.  Based on the fact that the definition 
of “mortgage bond” in section 1 of the MTRA refers to hypothecation of rights only, it has 
been argued that mining permits are not rights and that there is therefore no mechanism to 
register mortgage bonds over mining permits.671  The argument seems somewhat superficial, 
especially because the MTRA contains no definition of “permits”.  It is possible that all of the 
various rights, permits and permissions, which the MPRDA provides for, fall within the ambit 
of the definition of “right” in the MTRA.672   
A much more serious concern in the case of mining permits is that these permits are not 
transferable.673  The purpose of mortgage bonds is to secure the debt of the creditor.  Creditors 
need to sell hypothecated permits in execution if holders thereof default in re-paying the debt.  
A sale in execution will not be possible if mining permits cannot be transferred.  Thus, 
registered mortgage bonds over mining permits do not provide any security to bondholders in 
reality.674  The fact that the MPRDA provides that mining permits can be hypothecated but 
then renders the security offered by the bond worthless by prohibiting transfer of mining 
                                                 
available at https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/News/e95d56ef-7dc9-4ad8-ac1c 
5e9cd9804876/Presentation/NewsAttachment/fd68c165-dbb9-4f3d-bdf1 5f3fb16856e5/art_coles_jan2414_debt-
financing-mining-projects.pdf; “Financing Available for Mining in Africa” 19 Dec 2011 available at  
http://www.fin24.com/Companies/Financial-Services/Financing-available-for-mining-in-Africa-20111219. 
670 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13-26, 31-2 and 31-2; Mostert Principles 
and Policies 90; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 685. 
671 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-300. 
672 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa MPRDA 30-2. 
673 MPRDA, s 27(8)(b).  See 3.1 above. 
674 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-300 argue that the reference to mortgage bonds 
over mining permits must be read pro non scripto because mortgage bonds offer no security to the bondholder. 
Also see Mostert Principles and Policies 90; Dale in Bastida et al 831; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 685. 




permits is an indication of careless drafting.  The non-transferability of mining permits is 
probably justifiable because these permits only allow small-scale mining.675  However, the 
impact that non-transferability has on the security offered by bonds cannot be justified in view 
of the interests pursued by limiting the ability of mining permits to transfer their permits.  
Careless drafting therefore unreasonably and unjustifiably weaken mineral tenure security.  
Certainty can be increased by allowing the transfer of mining permits with ministerial consent 
that is based on objectively ascertainable criteria.  If ministerial consent for the transfer of 
mining permits is required, the government’s interests in having some control in the transfer of 
rights to minerals will still be protected.  Furthermore, allowing transfer of mining permits will 
remove the effect that non-transferability has on the security offered by registered bonds and 
will thus strengthen optimal mineral tenure security. 
4.3. Mortgage of prospecting rights and mining rights 
Prospecting rights and mining rights can be encumbered with mortgage bonds.676  The MPRDA 
is not clear regarding whether ministerial consent is necessary for the encumbrance.  Section 
11(1) of the MPRDA that requires ministerial consent for a wide range of transactions 
pertaining to mining rights and prospecting rights, does not expressly refer to mortgage bonds.  
Section 11(3) of the MPRDA determines that consent in the case of encumbrance by mortgage 
bonds is not required in particular circumstances.677  The difficulty with the wording of section 
11(3) is that it refers to “consent contemplated in subsection (1)” and to “encumbrance by 
mortgage contemplated in subsection (1)” while subsection (1) does not expressly contemplate 
mortgage bonds.  Section 11(1) expressly contemplates cession, transfer, letting, subletting, 
assignment and alienation of prospecting rights and mining rights. 
These provisions are open to various interpretations. According to one interpretation, the 
transactions in section 11(1) include encumbrances by mortgage.678  Justification for this 
                                                 
675 See sec 3.1 above. 
676 MTRA, definition of “mortgage bond” read with s 5(h).  Also see Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and 
Petroleum Law of South Africa 30-10; Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-14; 
Badenhorst et al Silberberg 681 and 689. The MTRA does not restrict the types of bonds that can be registered.  
This means that any bond recognised by common law can be registered over mining rights and prospecting rights 
in appropriate circumstances. See Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 31-7 – 31-
8 for a discussion on the different types of bonds.  
677 The first requirement for s 11(3) to apply is that the purpose of the encumbrance must be to obtain a loan or 
guarantee for the purpose of funding or financing prospecting or mining projects.  S 11(3) secondly only applies 
when the encumbrance takes place by way of mortgage.  The bondholder must thirdly be a bank as defined in the 
Banks Act 94 of 1990 or another financial institution approved by the Registrar of Banks. 
678 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-172 mentions but rejects this argument. 




interpretation is that it gives coherence to section 11 as a whole in line with the presumption 
against absurdity according to the rules of statutory interpretation.679  Thus, the reference to 
“mortgages contemplated in section 11(1)” in section 11(3) will be absurd if section 11(1) does 
not require ministerial consent for encumbrance by mortgage.  The interpretation also accords 
with a contextual interpretation of section 11 in line with the objectives of the MPRDA and the 
purpose of section 11.680  Justification for interpreting section 11(1) to include encumbrance 
by mortgage can also be found in the catch-all phrase “otherwise dispose of” in section 11(1).681  
In other words, encumbrance by mortgage is to “otherwise dispose of” prospecting rights and 
mining rights for which ministerial consent is necessary.  Furthermore, section 31(2) of the 
MTRA determine that bonds “may hypothecate rights of different kinds with the written 
consent of the Minister”. 
The preferred interpretation is, however, a strict one, which excludes mortgage bonds from the 
ambit of section 11(1).682  Ministerial consent is thus not required to register mortgage bonds 
over prospecting rights and mining rights in terms of the MPRDA.  Justification for this 
interpretation is that foreclosure will in any event always require ministerial consent with the 
result that not requiring consent to initially register bonds will not undermine the purpose of 
section 11.683  The preferred interpretation of section 11(1) leads to the result that “interest in 
rights”684 does not include mortgages and that mortgage bonds can be transferred without 
ministerial consent.685  The reason advanced is that it will be anomalous if prospecting rights 
and mining rights can be mortgaged without ministerial consent but that consent is required for 
the transfer of bonds.686   
The strict interpretation of section 11(1) seems to hinge on the desire to classify prospecting 
rights and mining rights as common-law limited real rights.687   Briefly, common-law limited 
                                                 
679 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-172.  See du Plessis Re-Interpretation of 
Statutes 162 – 164 regarding the presumption against absurdities. 
680 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-172.  See du Plessis Re-Interpretation of 
Statutes 111 – 115 regarding contextual interpretation in general. 
681 Mostert Principles and Policies 89.  The author raises the possibility but argues that the most appropriate 
interpretation is that mortgage bonds can be registered over prospecting rights and mining rights without 
ministerial consent and that the only restrictions are those set out in s 11(3). 
682 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-172; Mostert Principles and Policies 89. 
683 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-172. 
684 See sec 3.2.1 above for a discussion of the meaning of “interest in right”. 
685 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-168. 
686 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-169. 
687 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-172 – MPRDA-173; Mostert Principles and 
Policies 89.  




real rights can, in general, be transferred and mortgaged freely.688  The ability to transfer and 
mortgage common-law mineral rights freely was at times used as justification for classifying 
the rights as limited real rights.689  It is questionable whether common-law categories of rights 
are suitable for the classification of prospecting rights and mining rights690 as the MPRDA 
establishes a regulatory regime that is predominantly administrative in nature.691  
The 2013 Amendment Bill attempted to include specific reference to encumbrance in section 
11(1) of the MPRDA.692  Although the Bill was sent back to parliament,693 the attempted 
amendment gives an indication of the intention of the legislature regarding how to interpret the 
current section 11(1), namely that ministerial consent is required for encumbrance of 
prospecting rights and mining rights.  According to a combined reading of sections 11(1) and 
11(3), and the intention of the legislator in the attempt to amend section 11(1), ministerial 
consent is required to encumber prospecting rights and mining rights except when the 
requirements of section 11(3) are met. 
In summary, initial registration of mortgage bonds over mining permits always requires 
ministerial consent.  The fact that mining permits are not transferable, however, casts doubt on 
the viability of registering mortgage bonds over mining permits.  The provisions of the 
MPRDA regarding mortgage and transfer of mining permits do not support each other.  The 
effect of this is that mineral tenure security is weakened.  A combined reading of sections 11(1) 
and 11(3), and taking into account the attempt in the 2013 Amendment Bill to amend section 
11(1), suggests that the correct interpretation of the current section 11 is that Ministerial 
consent is always necessary for encumbrance of prospecting rights and mining rights unless 
the MPRDA provides exceptions.  It is arguable that the limitation on the ability of holders of 
prospecting rights and mining rights to mortgage rights freely weakens the possibility to 
develop mines profitably and therefore weakens mineral tenure security.  However, meaningful 
comments regarding mineral tenure security, requires an investigation into the purposes of the 
consent requirement as well as the situations in which consent is not required for encumbrance.  
                                                 
688 See chap 2, sec 3.2.2 fn 250 and fn 251.   
689 See chap 2, sec 3.2.2 fn 250 and fn 251. 
690 See chap 6, sec 3. 
691 See chap 2, sec 3.2.1 and sec 3.2.2 regarding the administrative law nature of the current regulatory regime. 
692 2013 Amendment Bill, s 8(a). 
693 See the presidential letter to parliament available at http://cer.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Zuma-letter-
to-the-NA-re-MPRDA-Bill.pdf accessed 4 January 2016.  




4.3.1. Requirements for consent 
The purposes of requiring consent to mortgage prospecting rights and mining rights are the 
same as the purposes for requiring consent to transfer rights to minerals.694  If holders of 
hypothecated rights default on payment, bondholders can enforce the terms of the secured loan 
through a sale in execution of the rights.  A sale in execution means that the right will be 
transferred to another entity.  As explained above, the government has legitimate interests in 
having some control when rights are transferred.  Furthermore, the limitation that the 
requirement of consent has on the ability of holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to 
mortgage their rights is hedged by the obligation on the Minister to grant consent if the 
requirements of section 11(2) are met.695  In this regard, the same objections as discussed 
above,696 applies, namely that vague and imprecise drafting of the criteria for the granting of 
consent (specifically the 26% BEE requirement), at times, lead to unnecessary uncertainty that 
unjustifiably weakens optimal mineral tenure security.   
A further aspect that may strengthen mineral tenure security is that the requirement for consent 
in section 11(1) to initially mortgage rights can be circumvented if the requirements of section 
11(3) are met.  Section 11(3) provides that the “consent contemplated in subsection (1)” is not 
required in respect of encumbrance by mortgage if  a bank697 or financial institution698 provides 
a written undertaking that it will not sell rights in execution without the required consent in 
terms of subsection (1).  The section applies if the purpose of the loan699 is to fund or finance 
a prospecting project or mining project.  Section 11(3) allows prospecting rights and mining 
rights to serve as real security against loans for development of mines without ministerial 
consent in specified circumstances.  The circumstances involve situations in which reputable 
financial institutions hold registered bonds over rights and where the purpose of the loan is 
directly related to profitable development of mines.  In these circumstances, ministerial consent 
is required only when debtors default on payment and creditors wish to sell hypothecated rights 
in execution.  In this way, governmental interests for requiring consent, for example, to ensure 
                                                 
694 See sec 3.2.1.2 above. 
695 See sec 3.2 above.  Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 31-3 argue that the 
discretion is wide. 
696 See sec 3.2.1.2 above. 
697 S 11(3)(a) of the MPRDA requires the bank to be registered in terms of the Banks Act of 1990. 
698 S 11(3) of the MPRDA requires that the financial institutions must be approved by the Registrar of Banks, as 
referred to in the Banks Act of 1990, on request by the Minister. 
699 Section 11(3) refers to a loan or guarantee. 




optimal exploitation of mineral resources and transformation of the mining industry are still 
protected.  However, at the time of registration of bonds, right holders do not have to follow 
procedures that may prove to be cumbersome and time-consuming if bondholders are likely to 
be reputable and the purpose of the loan is directly related to profitable development of mines.  
The fact that section 11(3) does not apply when bondholders are entities other than banks or 
financial institutions, and if the purpose of the loan is not to pursue profitable development of 
mines, protects the government from potentially unreputable bondholders and suspect reasons 
for loans.  The possibility of circumventing the requirement of ministerial consent at the time 
of registration of bonds, can be seen as an instance of clear and sound drafting of the MPRDA 
that strengthens mineral tenure security.  If the requirements of section 11(3) are met, a sale in 
execution is subject to consent “in terms of subsection (1)”.  In this regard, the Minister is under 
an obligation to grant consent if the requirements of section 11(2) are met. 
The limitation of governmental discretion in section 11(3) to grant consent contributes 
significantly to protecting investor’s interests to mortgage rights freely and government’s 
interests in having control when rights are transferred adequately.  A point of criticism is that 
banks or financial institutions may be reluctant to accept prospecting rights and mining rights 
as security for a loan readily due to the fact they will need ministerial consent to execute the 
terms of their security.  However, in this regard, the limitation of ministerial discretion to grant 
consent in section 11(2), limits the risk of banks and financial institutions of not being able to 
recover their money.  Furthermore, banks and financial institutions will be aware of the 
requirement of ministerial consent to sell rights in execution because they have to consent to 
this in writing.   
4.3.2. Synopsis: Mortgage of rights; MTS strengths and weaknesses 
Taking into account legitimate governmental objectives, the effect of the provisions of the 
MPRDA regarding mortgage of rights to minerals, discussed here, on mineral tenure security 
may be summarised as follows: 
 Mining permits Prospecting rights Mining rights 
MTS strengthened  Obligatory grant of 
consent if 
requirements are met 
(irrespective of 
Obligatory grant of 
consent if 
requirements are met 
(irrespective of 




whether consent is 
required in terms of 
ss 11(1) or 11(3)) 




consent for initial 
registration  
whether consent is 
required in terms of 
ss 11(1) or 11(3)) 




consent for initial 
registration 




mortgage   
Vague and imprecise 
drafting: criteria for 
obligatory grant of 
consent (26% BEE 
requirement) 
Vague and imprecise 
drafting: criteria for 
obligatory grant of 
consent (26% BEE 
requirement) 
Table 7 Synopsis: Mortgage of rights; MTS strengths and weaknesses 
The MPRDA strengthens mineral tenure security by placing an obligation on the Minister to 
grant consent to mortgage prospecting rights and mining rights if the requirements are met.  
Furthermore, careful and sound drafting of the Act opens a route that allows circumventing 
consent for registration of bonds when bondholders are likely to be reputable and the reasons 
for loans are directly related to profitable development of mines.  However, vague and 
imprecise drafting, regarding the criteria that will place an obligation on the Minister to grant 
consent for encumbrance, weakens mineral tenure security.  Furthermore, it seems that careless 
drafting results in incompatibility of the provisions relating to mortgage and transfer of mining 
permits and will significantly weaken mineral tenure security of holders of mining permits. 
4.4. The effect of lapsing and cancellation on security offered by bonds 
The ability to mortgage rights to minerals loses its advantages if, in practice, mortgages are 
weak and fail to offer good security to creditors.  If registered bonds lose their advantages, the 
ability to mortgage rights are, by deduction, compromised.  In this regard, the effect that lapsing 
and cancellation of prospecting rights and mining rights have on the security of bondholders 
requires investigation.700  If rights no longer exist, registered bonds over (former) rights to 
minerals cannot provide security to (former) bondholders because there will be no property to 
sell in execution.  Rights to minerals lapse in the following circumstances: liquidation or 
                                                 
700 The investigation does not include mining permits because bonds over mining permits do not offer any security 
due to non-transferability of mining permits.  See sec 4.2 above.  




sequestration of right holders;701 deregistration of companies;702 cancellation of rights by the 
Minister;703 death of right holders;704 and expiration.705   The following sections investigate the 
effect that lapsing of rights, in these different circumstances, has on the security of holders of 
registered mortgage bonds. 
4.4.1. Lapsing upon liquidation or sequestration of right holders 
Rights to minerals lapse upon, liquidation706 or sequestration707 of the estates of holders of 
hypothecated rights, except when rights are subject to registered bonds which comply with the 
requirements of section 11(3) of the MPRDA.708  If the requirements of section 11(3) are met, 
rights do not lapse upon liquidation or sequestration of holders of hypothecated rights and the 
security offered by bonds is not threatened.  Accordingly, rights will not lapse upon liquidation 
or sequestration of right holders if three requirements are met.  First, the purpose the loan is to 
fund or finance a mining project or prospecting project.709  Second, the mortgagee is a bank as 
defined in the Banks Act710 or financial institution that is approved by the registrar of banks.711  
Third, such bank or financial institution undertakes in writing that a sale in execution or 
disposal of the hypothecated right pursuant to foreclosure, will only take place with ministerial 
consent.712  If rights do not lapse upon liquidation or sequestration of right holders, rights to 
minerals can become part of the insolvent estate.713  This means that rights can be sold in 
execution and transferred to another if the requirements of section 11(2) are met.  As explained, 
                                                 
701 MPRDA, s 56(d). 
702 MPRDA, s 56(c). 
703 MPRDA, s 56(e). 
704 MPRDA, s 56(b). 
705 MPRDA, s 56(a). 
706 Winding-up of insolvent companies are regulated by chap 14 of the Companies Act of 1973 (and not by the 
Companies Act of 2008).  See Item 9 of Sch 5 of the Companies Act of 2008. The Close Corporation Act of 1984 
regulates winding-up of insolvent close corporations.  However, the Close Corporation Act incorporates many of 
the provisions of the Companies Act of 1973 and the Companies Act of 2008.  See Sharrock et al Hockly’s 
Insolvency Law 269. 
707 The insolvency Act of 1936 provides for the sequestration of the estate of a debtor.  See Sharrock et al Hockly’s 
Insolvency Law 5.  According to s 2 of the Insolvency Act of 1936, a debtor is a person or partnership, or the 
estate of a person or partnership.  Body corporates, companies, or other associations that that may be placed under 
liquidation in terms of the laws relating to companies is specifically excluded.     
708 MPRDA, s 56(d). 
709 MPRDA, s 11(3). 
710 MPRDA s 11(3)(a). 
711 MPRDA, s 11(3)(b). 
712 MPRDA, s 11(3). 
713 According to s 2 of the Insolvency Act of 1936,  “immovable property” includes “rights or interests in land or 
minerals, which is registrable in any office in the Republic intended for the registration of title to land or the right 
to mine” (own emphasis).  This definition seems wide enough to include rights granted in terms of the MPRDA 
that are registrable in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office.  See contra Sharrock et al Hockly’s 
Insolvency Law 71 where the author only refers to rights that are registrable in a deeds registry. 




the requirements of section 11(2) protect the interests of the government when rights to 
minerals are transferred.  According to the rules of Insolvency law, mortgagees (banks and 
financial institutions) will be secured creditors and will be paid first if a sale and transfer of 
rights occur.  Banks and financial institutions can thus protect their security in case of 
liquidation or sequestration of holders of hypothecated rights by complying with the 
requirements of section 11(3).  The fact that the security offered by bonds will not become 
worthless if banks or financial institutions comply with the requirements of section 11(3) 
strengthens mineral tenure security.  In this regard, it is arguable that the MPRDA is drafted in 
a sound and clear manner that strengthens mineral tenure security.  However, if bondholders 
are not banks or financial institutions714 or if loans were not for financing or funding of a 
prospecting project or mining project, 715  security offered by bonds will become meaningless 
if right holders are liquidated or sequestrated. 716  The difficulty here is that are instances, for 
example when bondholders are not banks or financial institutions, in which bondholders cannot 
protect their interests.  In these instances, bondholders have no means to ensure that the security 
offered by bonds do not become meaningless upon the liquidation or sequestration of holders 
of rights to minerals.  It is therefore also arguable that the inability of some bondholders to 
protect their interests in case of liquidation or sequestration of bondholders is a result of 
careless drafting that weaken mineral tenure security. 
It is understandable that the government has legitimate interests in lapsing of rights when right 
holders are liquidated or sequestrated.  Right holders that are liquidated or sequestrated will in 
all likelihood not have the financial resources to continue prospecting and mining according to 
the prospecting work programme or mining work programme.  The government thus has an 
interest to ensure that the rights of liquidated or sequestrated right holders are terminated and 
that similar rights are granted to entities that can contribute towards optimal exploitation of 
mineral resources.  However, there seems to be no reason why all rights (when the requirements 
of section 11(3) were not met) cannot continue to exist upon liquidation or sequestration of 
right holders.  This will provide an opportunity to bondholders to recover loans according to 
the rules of Insolvency law.  The government’s interests will still be protected because rights 
                                                 
714 Lenders can, for example, be public entities.  In this regard, s 8(c) of the 2013 Amendment Bill attempted to 
include public entities.  Bonds held over old order rights that were converted into new order rights will also not 
be covered by s 11(3) because bondholders did not agree in writing that a sale in execution will be subject to 
ministerial consent. 
715 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-14 and MPRDA-15. 
716 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-165 and MPRDA-166. 




can only be sold in execution and transferred if the requirements of section 11(2) are met.  In 
this regard, it seems that thoughtless and careless drafting of the MPRDA does not seem to be 
necessary in the pursuit of governmental objectives and creates unnecessary uncertainty that 
unjustifiably weakens optimal mineral tenure security.  The 2013 Amendment Bill attempted 
to amend the MPRDA so that all rights will not lapse upon liquidation or sequestration of right 
holders.717  Such an amendment will eliminate any negative effects that the liquidation and 
sequestration of right holders will have on the security of bondholders. 
4.4.2. Lapsing upon deregistration 
Hypothecated rights to minerals lapse upon deregistration of a company or closed corporation, 
unless an application was made for consent to cede or transfer the right and the Minister 
consented thereto.718  If no application for consent to transfer or cede719 the right was made 
prior to deregistration, rights will thus lapse and bondholders will not have any security.720  
This seems to be a harsh situation for bondholders.  However, as is explained in more detail 
below, deregistration occurs by virtue of different procedures.  Some of these procedures have 
mechanisms that provide protection to bondholders. 
In general, when companies are deregistered, bondholders will only be protected if the “consent 
[for transfer] was implemented” and the actual cession or transfer took place prior to 
deregistration.721  It will thus not be sufficient if an application for consent to transfer or cede 
hypothecated rights was made before deregistration.722  This is because there will be no entity 
that can transfer rights to transferees after deregistration.723  The company or closed corporation 
will no longer have an estate from which the rights can be ceded or transferred to a transferee.  
Generally, when a company or closed corporation is deregistered, remaining assets in the estate 
                                                 
717 S 42 the 2013 Amendment Bill attempted to delete s 56(d) and to insert s 56(g).  According to the attempted 
amendment and insertion of s 56(g), rights and permits would be part of the insolvent estate and would be 
transferable with consent as required by section 11(1) of the MPRDA.   
718 MPRDA, s 56(c).  Also see Palala Resources [44] and [45]. 
719 The requirements regarding ministerial consent to cede or transfer must also be kept in mind in the current 
context.  See sec 3.2.1.2 above. 
720 However, the interests of bondholders are protected in some cases of deregistration.  See below in this sec. 
721 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-165. 
722 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-165. 
723 Contra Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-165 who seem to suggest that the state 
could transfer rights to minerals if rights did not lapse due to merger.  Merger occurs because the state is the 
custodian of minerals and minerals resources.  The state cannot be grantor and transferee. 




becomes bona vacantia724 and fall to the state.725  It has been argued that when assets become 
bona vacantia, right holders can claim the assets to which they have rights from the 
government.726  However, in case of rights to minerals, the state is not able to transfer rights 
once assets became bona vacantia.  According to the MPRDA, the state has the authority to 
grant rights to minerals to applicants.  The state cannot be grantor and holder of rights and 
rights will therefore lapse due to merger.727  The state can thus also not cede or transfer rights 
to possible transferees.  In Palala Resources (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and 
Energy and Others728 the court did not follow the bona vacantia approach and held that rights 
to minerals lapse upon deregistration of companies, i.e. rights do not become bona vacantia.729  
If rights to minerals lapse when companies are deregistered, it is no longer possible to transfer 
rights to bondholders.  Whether right to minerals lapse upon deregistration or become bona 
vacantia and vest in the state, the position of bondholders remain the same.  An application for 
consent to cede or transfer rights is not sufficient to protect bondholders when companies are 
deregistered.  Generally, bondholders will only be protected if rights were in actual fact 
transferred before deregistration.  
However, as briefly mentioned, a company730 can be deregistered in different scenarios.  Some 
of these scenario offer protection to bondholders.  First, companies can be deregistered if it has 
been “completely wound up”.731  Insolvent as well as solvent companies can be wound up.732  
                                                 
724 Palala Resources [47].  Regarding the property of a company that ceases to exist becoming bona vacantia and 
vesting in the state see Rainbow Diamonds (Edms) Bpk. en Andere v Suid-Afrikaanse Nasionale 
Lewensassuransiemaatskappy 1984 (3) SA 1 (A) from [17]; Valley View Homeowners’ Association v Universal 
Pulse Trading 27 (Pty) Ltd (70639/2010) [2011] ZAGPPHC 154 (13 May 2011) [9]. For a critical discussion of 
the application of the rules of bona vacantia in general see Sonnekus 1985 TSAR 121. 
725 Ex Parte Sprawson: (In re Hebron Diamond Mining Syndicate Ltd) 1914 TPD 458 461.  Assets that become 
bona vacantia includes mineral rights.  See Ex Parte Marchini 1964 (1) SA 147 (T) 150 - 151; Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Oceana Development Investment Trust plc 1989 1 SA 35 (T) 36D; Ex Parte Sengol 
Investments (Pty) Ltd 1982 3 SA 474 (T) 476.  Also see Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of 
South Africa 3-17; Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 268.   
726 Sonnekus 2008 TSAR 138.  According to Sonnekus, this is limited to transferable assets.  Non-transferable 
assets, like personal servitudes cannot be transferred to the state.  This statement must, however, be qualified.  
According to another line of reasoning, claims that creditors have against the company become unenforceable 
while the company is deregistered.  It is only upon re-registration that creditors can institute claims against the 
company. See Barclays National Bank Ltd v Traub; Barclays National Bank Ltd v Kalk 1981 4 SA 291 (W) 295; 
Pama 2013 De Rebus 150.  The difference is not further investigated here because the outcome does not have any 
practical implications in the current context.  
727 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-165. 
728 2014 6 SA 403 (GP). 
729 Palala Resources [70]. 
730 In terms of the def of “company” in s 1 of the Companies Act of 2008, companies include closed corporations. 
731 Companies Act of 2008, s 82(1) 
732 Ss 79 – 81 of the Companies Act of 2008 regulate winding-up of solvent companies.  Chap 14 of the Companies 
Act of 1973 regulate winding-up and liquidation of insolvent companies.  See Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency 
Law 240. 




As explained above, in case of liquidation of insolvent companies, bondholders will be 
protected according to the rules of Insolvency law if the requirements of section 11(3) of the 
MPRDA are met.733  In case of deregistration pursuant to liquidation, where the requirements 
of section 11(3) cannot be met, the objections raised above regarding weakening of mineral 
tenure security apply.734  
Solvent companies can be wound up voluntarily735 or through a court order.736  In case of 
voluntary winding-up, the company must provide security, to the satisfaction of the Master of 
the High Court, for the payment of its debts within 12 months of the start of the winding-up.737  
The interests of bondholders are thus protected.  There is no similar requirement when solvent 
companies are wound up through a court order.  Furthermore, the court does not have to be 
satisfied that winding-up will be to the advantage of the company’s creditors.738  It thus seems 
as if the security interests of bondholders are not protected when solvent companies are wound-
up through a court order.  Holders of bonds over prospecting rights and mining rights will thus 
only be protected if a sale in execution of the hypothecated right takes place before 
deregistration. 739 
Second, the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (the Commission) can remove 
companies from the companies register in certain instances.740  The Commission can deregister 
companies if companies transfer their registration to a foreign jurisdiction.741  Failure to submit 
annual returns742 for two successive years combined with a failure to show, on the demand of 
the Commission, satisfactory reasons for not submitting returns can furthermore lead to 
deregistration.743  Lastly, the Commission can deregister a company if it has been inactive for 
seven years744 or if the Commission has determined that the company ceased to carry on 
                                                 
733 See sec 4.4.1 above. 
734 See sec 4.4.1 above. 
735 Companies Act of 2008, s 82. 
736 Companies Act of 2008, s 81. 
737 Companies Act of 2008, s 80(3)(a). 
738 Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 251.  
739 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-14 indicate that in cases other than lapsing due 
to cancellation, suspension, liquidation and sequestration mortgagees will not have an opportunity to intervene.  
See, however, sec 4.4.3 fn 753 for criticism on Dale et al in this regard.     
740 Companies Act of 2008, s 82(3). 
741 Companies Act of 2008, s 82(3)(a). 
742 In terms of s 33 of the Companies Act of 2008. 
743 Companies Act of 2008, ss 82(3)(a)(i) and 82(3)(a)(ii).  This is what happened to the mining company in the 
Palala Resources case. 
744 Companies Act of 2008, s 82(3)(b)(i).  The requirements here include that no person has demonstrated 
reasonable interests in the company or produced reasons for its continued existence.   




business745 and, due to lack of assets, will probably not be liquidated.746  When the Commission 
deregisters companies, rights to minerals lapse747 without any notification to bondholders.748  
It is clear that if the Commission deregisters companies as explained in this paragraph, 
bondholders over hypothecated rights to minerals are particularly vulnerable and really do not 
have any security.  There is no procedure in terms of which bondholders will be notified of 
deregistration.  Furthermore, there is no requirement in the 2008 Companies Act that bonds 
must be cancelled before deregistration.  This situation weakens mineral tenure security.   
If a company is deregistered by the Commission, any interested person, such as a creditor 
(bondholder) of the company may apply to have the company reinstated.749  Creditors of the 
company thus have an opportunity to apply for reinstatement to allow the company to carry on 
business in an attempt to get their money back.  In the Palala Resources case, a company that 
held¸ inter alia, a prospecting right was deregistered because it did not submit annual returns; 
but was later reinstated.750  As explained, deregistration had the effect that the prospecting right 
lapsed.751  The question arose whether the prospecting right revived when the company was 
reinstated.752  The Palala case was decided in terms of the 1973 Companies Act.753  Restoration 
in terms of that Act had the effect that the company was deemed to be in existence as if it was 
never deregistered.754  Restoration was thus retroactive and all rights and obligation that existed 
prior to registration continue to exist after restoration.755  Despite this, in the Palala case, the 
court held that the prospecting right which lapsed when the company was deregistered did not 
                                                 
745 According to s 82(b)(ii) of the Companies Act of 2008, the Commission must first receive a request here before 
deregistration. 
746 Companies Act of 2008, s 82(b)(ii).  
747 Palala Resources [43]. 
748 All creditors and all bondholders are in actual fact deprived of enforcing their rights.  See Pama 2013 De Rebus 
150. 
749 Companies Act of 2008, s 82(4). 
750 Palala Resources [6], [9] and [11]. 
751 Palala Resources [43] and [70]. 
752 Palala Resources [7]. 
753 The company was deregistered in 2010 before the 2008 Companies Act came into operation and therefore s 
73(6)(A) of the 1973 Companies was applicable regarding reinstatement.  For restoration in terms of the 
Companies Act of 1973, see Insamcor (Pty) Ltd v Dorbyl Light & General Engineering (Pty) Ltd; Dorbyl Light 
& General Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd 2007 4 SA 467 (A).   Ss 82(4) and 83(4) of the 2008 
Companies Act provide for reinstatement but it does not expressly determine that the reinstatement is retroactive. 
In Newlands Surgical Clinic (Pty) Ltd V Peninsula Eye Clinic (Pty) Ltd 2015 (4) SA 34 (SCA) [29], the court held 
that reinstatement did apply retrospectively.  See [22] of the judgment for an exposition of conflicting High Court 
decisions regarding the retroactive effect of reinstatement before the judgment. 
754 Companies Act of 1973, ss 73(6)(a) and 73(6A). 
755 Insamcor (Pty) Ltd v Dorbyl Light & General Engineering (Pty) Ltd; Dorbyl Light & General Engineering 
(Pty) Ltd v Insamcor (Pty) Ltd [23]. 




revive upon reinstatement of the company.756  The court reasoned that reinstatement revived 
the legal personality of the company and not rights that became void as a result of the 
company’s deregistration.757  Furthermore, the court reasoned that the overall objectives and 
purpose of the MPRDA requires an interpretation that rights revert to the state, to be allocated 
to others, when companies are deregistered.758  According to the court, an alternative 
interpretation, in terms of which rights to minerals are frozen in anticipation of a possible 
restoration of the company, will not advance the objectives of economic and social 
development as well as equitable access to mineral resources.759   
The reasoning of the court regarding the importance of achieving these objectives can be 
accepted without reservation.  However, these objectives can be pursued without unnecessarily 
threatening the security of bondholders and consequently raising the risks that mines cannot be 
developed profitably.  The security of bondholders can be strengthened by requiring that they 
receive timeous notification of a pending deregistration.  Such a notification will allow 
bondholders to structure the terms of the mortgage agreement to allow foreclosure when they 
receive the notification.  The MPRDA can easily be amended to provide bondholders an 
opportunity to protect their interests when companies are deregistered.   
It was already indicated above that the rules of Insolvency Law and Company Law protect 
bondholders when companies are deregistered subsequent to being wound up.  However, it 
seems that mineral tenure security can be strengthened if the MPRDA includes a general 
requirement that when rights lapse due to deregistration, bondholders must receive notification 
of the pending deregistration.  Such a requirement will not have a negative impact on the 
interests of the government to grant similar rights to entities that can prospect and mine in 
pursuit of optimal exploitation of mineral resources.  This is another example where careless 
drafting unnecessarily and unjustifiably weaken optimal mineral tenure security. 
                                                 
756 Palala Resources [50] and [70]; Also see Bright Bay Property Service (Pty) Ltd v Moravian Church of South 
Africa 2013 3 SA 78 (WC) [46].  Sonnekus 2008 TSAR 139 advances a similar argument in relation to revival of 
personal servitudes upon re-registration. 
757 Palala Resources [49].  For reasons based on rules and presumptions of Interpretation Theory see [52] – [57] 
of the judgment.  
758 Palala Resources [64] – [67]. 
759 Palala Resources [67]. 




4.4.3. Lapsing upon cancellation and abandonment 
A comparison of the situations regarding lapsing of rights to mineral upon cancellation by the 
Minister and when right holders abandon rights serves as an example of how mineral tenure 
security can be strengthened or weakened depending on the manner in which the Act is drafted. 
Rights to minerals lapse when the Minister cancels them in terms of section 47 of the 
MPRDA.760  Contrary to deregistration by the Commission, section 47(2)(d) of the MPRDA 
requires the Minister to notify the mortgagee of his intention to cancel or suspend761 rights to 
minerals.  Notification of cancellation or suspension does not mean that bondholders have an 
opportunity to intervene.762  If holders of prospecting rights and mining rights cannot remedy 
the breach, the Minister may still cancel rights with the effect that the “security offered by the 
bond is rendered nugatory”.763   
It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a detailed analysis of, and commentary on, all of 
the circumstances in which the Minister may cancel rights.  It must, however, be accepted that 
the government may have valid reasons for cancelling the rights of a specific holders.  In such 
instances, optimal exploitation of mineral resources requires that similar rights may be granted 
to other entities.  When rights are cancelled, the security of bondholders is naturally threatened.  
However, the fact that the MPRDA requires that bondholders be given notice of the 
cancellation mitigates against this threat.  Notification means that bondholders can structure 
the provisions of the mortgage contract in a way that will allow them to foreclose if they receive 
the notification.  Here the MPRDA is drafted in a manner that protects the interests of 
                                                 
760 MPRDA, s 56(e). According to section 47(1) of the MPRDA, the Minister may cancel or suspend rights if 
holders (a) “is conducting…, prospecting or mining operations in contravention of [the MPRDA]; (b) breaches 
any material term or condition of such rights [or] permit…; is contravening the approved environmental 
management programme; or (d) has submitted inaccurate, false, fraudulent, incorrect or misleading information 
for the purposes of the application or in connection with any matter required to be submitted under [the MPRDA]”.  
761 S 56 does not state that rights lapse when the Minister suspends them. Suspension can lead to cancellation if 
holders do not comply with the direction given by the Minister in terms of s 47(3) to remedy the contravention 
that lead to the suspension. 
762 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-14; Dale Annual Survey 2002 576 where 
the authors state that mortgagees have no opportunity to intervene when rights lapse due to suspension, 
cancellation, sequestration and liquidation.  However, when rights lapse upon liquidation and sequestration, 
bondholders do not need to intervene due to the liquidation and sequestration processes.  Dale et al are 
contradictory by also stating that “in instances other than cancellation, suspension, liquidation or sequestration, 
…[the] lapsing provision does not safeguard or preserve the rights of the mortgagee with the result that the 
mortgagee has an opportunity to intervene”.  Also see Dale in Bastida et al 831, where the last-mentioned 
contradictory information in Dale et al regarding the opportunity of bondholders to intervene is duplicated.   
763 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-166. 




bondholders while acknowledging the interests of the government.  In this regard, careful 
drafting strengthens optimal mineral tenure security. 
As with lapsing due to cancellation, optimal exploitation of minerals requires that similar rights 
are granted to entities that have the capacity to prospect and mine.  Contrary to cancellation of 
rights, the MPRDA does not provide that bondholders must receive notification when rights to 
minerals lapse as a result of abandonment by right holders.  Upon abandonment of rights, the 
security offered by registered bonds is thus rendered worthless. 764  The MPRDA does not 
provide that bondholders must receive notification of abandonment.765  The lack of notification 
to bondholders seems particularly unreasonable since holders of right to minerals are under an 
obligation to comply for a closure certificate if they abandon their rights.766  Abandonment is 
thus not a unilateral act on the part of right holders and the government will be aware of the 
abandonment.767  It therefore seems unreasonable that the MPRDA does not require that 
bondholders receive notification of abandonment.  Notification to bondholders of abandonment 
will further have no impact on the interests of the government to grant similar rights to entities 
that can prospect and mine in pursuit of optimal exploitation of mineral resources. In this 
regard, it seems that careless and thoughtless drafting of the MPRDA is unnecessary for the 
pursuit of governmental interests and unnecessarily and unjustifiably weaken optimal mineral 
tenure security.  
4.4.4. Death and expiration 
Rights to minerals lapse when holders are deceased and there are no successors in title.768  
Bondholders over rights to minerals that are held by natural persons are thus vulnerable.769  The 
bondholder is, however, only vulnerable if the holder of the hypothecated right does not have 
                                                 
764 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-166. 
765 See, for example, s 47(1)(f) of the Precious Stone Act of 1964 that required notice to the government of an 
intention to abandon mining rights. 
766 MPRDA, s 43(3)(a). 
767 Also see Van den Heever v Minister of Minerals and Energy and Others (unreported, Case No. 2090/2010, 
Northern Cape High Court, 19 December 2011) [37] where the court held abandonment of the rights held in terms 
of the Minerals Act of 1991 could not established by a unilateral act.  
768 MPRDA, s 56(b). 
769 See Dale et al South African Minerals and Petroleum Law MPRDA-165.  Dale et al states that the bond held 
by natural persons will be vulnerable.  It rather seems that bondholders are vulnerable when the hypothecated 
right is held by a natural person.  




any testate or intestate heirs.770  Bondholders are thus vulnerable to losing the security offered 
by registered mortgage bonds in very limited situations. 
Lastly, rights to minerals lapse when they expire.771  Bond holders will know when rights expire 
at initial registration (thus when they accept bonds as security) and they are not at risk to lose 
the security offered by bonds in situations over which they do not have control.772   
4.4.5. Synopsis: Lapsing and cancellation of right; MTS strengths and 
weaknesses 
Taking legitimate governmental objectives into account, the effect of the provisions of the 
MPRDA regarding lapsing and cancellation of rights, discussed here, on mineral tenure 
security may be summarised as follows: 








sound and clear 
drafting: rights 
do not lapse if 
bondholder 

















s 11(3) is not 
possible 
   
Table 8 Synopsis: Lapsing and cancellation of right; MTS strengths and weaknesses  
The analysis regarding the effect of lapsing and cancellation of rights on the security of 
bondholders demonstrates how sound and careful drafting of the MPRDA, at times, strengthens 
mineral tenure security while careless drafting, at times, weaken mineral tenure security  In 
                                                 
770 In case of an intestate heir, the deceased did not leave a valid will or other document containing testamentary 
provisions while, in the case of a testate heir, there was a valid will or other document containing testamentary 
provisions.  See du Bois Wille’s Principles 668. 
771 MPRDA, s 56(a). 
772 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-165.  S 42 of the 2013 Amendment Bill 
attempted to delete s 56(a) of the MPRDA.  




this regard, the analysis demonstrates that, on the one hand, sound drafting arguably allows 
bondholders to protect their security interest in registered bonds, in case of liquidation or 
sequestration of holders of rights to minerals, by complying with the requirements of section 
11(3) of the MPRDA.  On the other hand, careless drafting has the effect that bondholders who 
cannot comply with the requirements of section 11(3), cannot protect their security interests in 
case of liquidation or sequestration of holders of rights to minerals.   
Furthermore, sound and careful drafting has the effect that, in case of lapsing of rights to 
minerals, i.e. when the Minister cancels them, bondholders can protect their security interests 
as a result of being notified of the intention of the Minister to cancel rights to minerals.  
Conversely, careless drafting has the effect that bondholders are not notified of lapsing of rights 
as a result of deregistration of companies by the Commission and abandonment and are thus 
not given an opportunity to protect their security interests.  
5. Summative comments and findings 
Profitable development of mines, at times, requires that right holders can conclude commercial 
transactions involving their rights.  This chapter analyses the ability of holders of rights to 
minerals to conclude two commercial transactions that may be necessary for profitable 
development of mines, namely transfer and encumbrance of rights.   
Mineral tenure security will be served best if right holders have unfettered freedom to transfer 
and mortgage their rights.  However, the government may wish to limit these abilities in the 
pursuit of legitimate governmental objectives.  Optimal mineral tenure security requires the 
regulatory regime to minimise risks associated with profitable development of mines and to 
create as much certainty as possible, while acknowledging the legitimate interests of the 
government that may weaken mineral tenure security. 
This chapter demonstrates that the MPRDA strengthens optimal mineral tenure security in 
certain instances.  However, the chapter also indicates that the Act, at times, unjustifiably 
weaken optimal mineral tenure security.  In this regard, the current chapter demonstrates that 
the same features, as identified in chapter four, unnecessarily limit the abilities of holders of 
rights to mineral to transfer and mortgage their rights and therefore unjustifiably weaken 
optimal mineral tenure security. 




First, wide and uncircumscribed governmental discretion that is unnecessary for achieving 
legitimate objectives unjustifiably weakens mineral tenure security.  Second, excessive 
regulatory measures that are disproportionate to the objectives that the measures pursue create 
unnecessary uncertainty regarding profitable development of mines and maximization of 
returns on investments and as a result unjustifiably weaken optimal mineral tenure security.  
Finally, unnecessarily vague and unclear drafting as well as careless drafting of the MPRDA, 
at times, unjustifiably weaken optimal mineral tenure security. 





REGISTRATION: LIMITATIONS OF A PROPERTY-LAW 
RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH ON MINERAL TENURE 
SECURITY  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction  
The concept “real right” is central to private law and the distinction between real rights and 
personal rights forms the basis for distinguishing property law from other branches of law, 
especially the law of obligation.773  Practically,774 the distinction between real rights and 
personal rights are important for two inter-related reasons.  Firstly, the nature of the right is 
associated with registration in the deeds office.775  Secondly, the private-law nature of rights 
determines their enforceability.776  Generally, only real rights can be registered.777  Registration 
of real rights fulfils the function of publicity778 and publicity contributes to the enforceability 
of real rights.779  In the context of land rights, it has been argued that real rights “represent 
                                                 
773 Van der Merwe Sakereg 58; van der Merwe in LAWSA par 59; van der Merwe The Law of Things and Servitudes 
35.  The courts accept the distinction.  See Smith v Farrelly’s Trustee 1904 TS 949 958; Lorentz v Melle & Others 
1978 3 1044 (T) 1050D-E; National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd & Others v Firstrand Bank Ltd 2011 2 SA 
157 (SCA) [31]; Absa Bank Limited v Keet [21]. 
774 For the theoretical distinction see Badenhorst et al Silberberg 50 – 65; du Bois Wille’s Principles 428 – 430; 
van der Merwe in LAWSA par 60.  The distinction is by no means easy to make.  This is illustrated by van der 
Merwe in LAWSA par 68: “…neither legal dogmatics nor precedent provides a workable criterion by which one 
can distinguish between real and personal rights. This shows that the distinction between these rights does not 
depend on the inherent nature of them but rather on the rules of the system. These rules are often the result of 
historical development and expediency rather than logic.”  This conclusion is reiterated in du Bois Wille’s 
Principles 443. 
775 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 50. 
776 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 50. Also see Cooke The New Law of Land Registration 3. 
777 Deeds registries Act, s 63(1); Houtpoort Mining and Estate Syndicate Ltd v Jacobs 1904 TS 105 111; Hollins 
v Registrar of Deeds 1904 TS 603 605 – 606; du Bois Wille’s Principles 427.  According to the proviso to s 63(1) 
of the Deeds Registries Act, personal rights can be registered if they are intimately connected to real rights.  See 
van der Merwe Sakereg 83 – 88; du Bois Wille’s Principles 444 for exceptions relating to the rule against non-
registration of personal rights. Some personal rights are by custom registered in the Deeds Office.  Also see Nel 
Jones Conveyancing in South Africa 209. 
778 Oriental Products (Pty) Ltd v Pegma 178 Investments Trading CC 2011 2 SA 508 (SCA) [13]; Prophitius v 
Campbell 2008 3 SA 552 (D&CLD) 558; Frye's (Pty.) Ltd v Ries 1957 3 SA 575 (AD) 582; Ex Parte Menzies et 
Uxor 1993 3 SA 799 (C) 805-806; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 81; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 
403; van der Merwe in LAWSA par 10.  According to du Bois Wille’s Principles 535, publicity of ownership and 
lesser real rights “avoids double sales and protect creditors and proposed holders of security rights in land”.  In 
case of movable property, the various forms of delivery fulfils the publicity function.  See Badenhorst et al 
Silberberg 175; van der Merwe Sakereg 340; van der Merwe in LAWSA par 10.  
779 Pienaar 2006 TSAR says that ownership is better protected than other rights and this “is mainly ensured by the 
application of the publicity principle” (thus by registration).  Also see Laurens October 1984 De Rebus 480. 




better, more secure forms of titles” as a result of registration and enforceability.780  For the 
same reasons, it is arguable that it will be favorable to mineral tenure security if rights to 
minerals are considered real rights in property.781   
The MPRDA labels prospecting rights and mining rights as limited real rights. 782  The labelling 
takes place despite the fact that the Act’s regulatory framework is predominantly administrative 
in nature and that it legislated mineral rights, which were classified as limited real rights, out 
of existence.783  As already argued, current prospecting rights and mining rights are not 
comparable to common-law mineral rights.784  Prospecting rights and mining rights under the 
MPRDA can be compared best with the administrative prospecting permits and mining 
authorizations that existed before the Act came into operation.785  Still, the MPRDA’s explicit 
typification of prospecting rights and mining rights as “limited real rights” perpetuates a 
perception that rights so classified result in better protection (i.e. better mineral tenure 
security).786  On the face of it, assigning a proprietary nature to the rights is preferable to 
                                                 
780 Mostert in Cooke Modern Studies 5.  Pienaar 2006 TSAR 435 440 opines as follows in the context of land 
reform: “[t]he existing deeds registration system provides security of tenure to those whose rights are registered 
in the different deeds registries”.  This hierarchical approach is, however, criticised.  Registration in the Deeds 
Office can protect tenure security, particularly because the register is accurate and reliable.  Although the South 
African registration system is classified as a negative system, which means that the correctness of the information 
in the register is not absolutely guaranteed, the system is generally reliable and accurate.  See Pienaar 2006 TSAR 
440 – 441; Mostert 2011 PER 95; Pienaar 1996 TSAR 205; Pienaar 1990 TSAR 29 – 30; Badenhorst “From Waurn 
Ponds” 2009 TSAR 794; van Der Merwe Sakereg 344; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel; Badenhorst et 
al Silberberg 236. 
781 See Mostert Principles and Policies 114 where the author argues that registration in the mineral and petroleum 
titles register “resembles that of the deeds register in all material respects”.  Mostert opines that therefore 
registration on the mineral and petroleum register, “affords the same security of title as the preceding systems of 
registration…” (own emphasis).  
782 MPRDA, s 5(1).  It is, therefore, generally accepted that prospecting rights and mining rights are limited real 
rights.  See Agri SA [CC) [25]; Meepo v Kotze [8]; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South 
Africa 13-20; Badenhorst 2014 JERL 5 17; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 678 and 686 for prospecting rights and 
mining rights respectively; Dale et al South Africa Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-137.   
783 See chap 2, sec 3.2.1 and sec 3.2.2. 
784 See chap 2, sec 3.2.2. 
785 See chap 2, sec 3.2.2. 
786 Badenhorst 2014 JERL 13 states that “[a] real right offers the best form of security of tenure.  In the context of 
development of a new mining law policy (before the MPRDA came into operation) Dale 1997 Resources Policy 
22 opines that one option is a “private mineral right system whereby mineral rights vest in private holders”.  
Protagonists of such a system list “good security and continuity of tenure” as a factor which contribute to them 
preferring such a system.  There is also a perception that investors find a proprietary overlay preferable to a purely 
administrative regime.  See Chamber of Mines Memorandum to the Director-General par 61.7 where, 
commenting on the fact that the Minerals Development Draft Bill, (GN 4577) in GG 21840 of 18 December 2000, 
did not classify any rights to minerals as limited real rights, the chamber argued that such a classification would 
“promote the perception of security and continuity of tenure” (own emphasis).  Also see Dale et al South African 
Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-12; Dale in Bastida et al 828; Dale Annual Survey 2002 575.    




protection stemming from a purely administrative law regime.787  Real rights are, after all, 
enforceable against anyone and everyone who interfere with those rights. 788   
Apart from creating the impression that rights are better protected and enforced than will be 
the case if rights are purely administrative in nature, a proprietary overlay also supports the 
notion that governmental interference is limited in prospecting and mining. 789 790  Lower levels 
of governmental interference mean less governmental discretionary decision-making power 
and more certainty for holders of rights to minerals.  Less governmental interference and 
discretion lessen the risks that holders of rights and investors face regarding profitable 
development of mines and maximization of returns on investments.  The analyses in chapters 
4 and 5 already indicate that the government extensively regulate the abilities of holders of 
rights to minerals to prospect and mine and to transfer and mortgage their rights.  The 
typification of prospecting rights and mining rights is thus not sufficient to limit governmental 
interference in prospecting and mining. 
The current chapter aims to indicate that a proprietary overlay also presents limitations to 
mineral tenure security as regards registration and enforceability of rights to minerals.  To 
achieve the aim of the chapter, the next section explains the effect that a private-law rights-
                                                 
787 Mostert Principles and Policies 113.  Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-137 
accept that the mere classification of rights as limited real rights in the MPRDA “removes them from the ambit 
of the debate which raged as to whether common-law prospecting contracts and rights to prospect simpliciter (i.e., 
not coupled to an option), were real rights”.  However, on the same page, the authors opine that the incidences of 
rights granted in terms of the MPRDA must all be gathered from the statute since the rights are creatures of statute.  
788Absa Bank Limited v Keet [20]; Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Member of The Executive Council for Economic 
Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others CCT 216/14 [40] and [106]; Agri 
SA (CC) [9]; Cowin NO and Others v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association and Others (12/11377) [2013] 
ZAGPJHC 121 (25 February 2013) [9]; National Stadium South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others v Firstrand Bank Ltd 
[33]; Cape Explosive Works Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd 2001 3 SA 569 (SCA) [16]; Ex parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 
155 163.  In AXZS Industries v AF Dreyer Pty (Ltd) 2004 4 SA 186 (W) 196 the court said “[a] real right such as 
ownership, is as every first year law student knows, enforceable against the whole world”. In National Credit 
Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) [61], the court said that the right to claim restitution on the basis of 
enrichment is a personal right and enforceable against a specific person and not against all like a real right.  Also 
see Van der Walt and Maass 2012 TSAR 228 231; van der Merwe in LAWSA par 9; du Bois Wille’s Principles 
428; Nel Jones Conveyancing in South Africa 207 – 208; Hamilton and Banks in McHarg et al 26; Barton in 
McHarg et al (eds) 97.  
789 Dale 1996 JERL 300 criticises state-orientated systems because they allow high levels of state interference.   
Bastida 1996 JERL 35 acknowledges that the questions whether rights are privately owned, real rights in property 
or in the realm of administrative law have important implications for the levels of state interference.  Also see 
Ayisi 2009 JERL 88. 
790 This does not mean that private property rights are always free from governmental interference.  See van der 
Merwe in LAWSA par 4.  The legitimate regulatory powers of the state in property law is also apparent from the 
analysis of the relationship between state and private actors in Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 21 – 26.  
Bastida 1996 JERL 35 stresses that the question whether rights to minerals are in the realm of administrative law 
or private law are not decisive for the levels of governmental interference. 




based approach, to registration and enforceability of rights, has on mineral tenure security.  
This is followed by a discussion of a different approach to registration and enforceability of 
rights in the interest of mineral tenure security.  The chapter finally comments on whether a 
private-law, rights-based approach continues to be an appropriate lens through which to view 
and analyse rights to minerals granted in terms of the MPRDA.  
2. Registration and enforceability 
In property law, a distinction is drawn between ownership and limited real rights.  Ownership 
is the real right that a person has in his own property, 791 whereas limited real rights are 
derivative rights, finding their content from the ownership of another. 792  Limited real rights 
are, thus, real rights in the property of another, with limited content.793  As stated, one of the 
characteristics of real rights is that the rights are enforceable against anyone and everyone who 
interfere with them.  For limited real rights, this means, inter alia, that rights are enforceable 
against the current landowner as well as any successors in title to the current landowner.794  
Thus, irrespective of how many times the property that is subject to a limited real right, is sold 
and transferred to a new owner, the limited real right is enforceable against the new owner. 795 
However, the question of enforceability also depends on registration of rights in certain 
circumstances.  A distinction is drawn between original acquisition and derivative acquisition 
of real rights.  Original acquisition takes place when a real right “is constituted by a unilateral 
act or series of such acts by the person who acquires it”.796  Derivative acquisition takes place 
when a limited real right already exists and is transferred from one person to the next or when 
                                                 
791 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 47. 
792 Mostert Principles and Policies 9. 
793 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 47; van der Merwe Sakereg 69. 
794 In arguing that registered prospecting contracts, before the MPRDA, were real, Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy 
in LAWSA par 48 mention that these real rights were enforceable not only against the immediate parties but also 
against “any gratuitous or onerous successor in title of the grantor, including a trustee on insolvency or a liquidator 
of a company, as well as upon any bona fide purchaser who would be bound by the contract registered against the 
title to the land or to the right to minerals”. 
795 Cowin v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association [9]; Odendaalsrus Gold, General Investments and 
Extensions Ltd V Registrar of Deeds 1953 1 SA 600 611; Manganese Corporation Ltd v South African Manganese 
Ltd 1964 2 185 (W) 189; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 81; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of 
South Africa 27 – 3; Dale Annual Survey 2002 575 – 576; Kilbourn The ABC of Conveyancing in South Africa 2 
– 5.  Concerning registration as a requirement for mineral leases to be binding on third parties see Roets v 
Secundior Sand Bk 90; Wiseman v De Pinna and Others 48.  For a discussion of the Roets case see Badenhorst 
and van Heerden 1989 TSAR 452.  Also see Badenhorst 1998 Obiter 146. 
796 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 71.  In the context of acquisition of ownership see du Bois Wille’s Principles 488. 




a real right is acquired as a result of an agreement between two parties.797  When real rights are 
acquired through a derivative method of acquisition, i.e. as a result of an agreement between 
two parties, registration is a requirement798 for the acquisition of the real right.799 800  
Importantly, the enforceability of such rights extends beyond the parties to the agreement to 
third parties, only if rights are registered.801  Unregistered rights will be enforceable against 
third parties only if they had knowledge of the existence of the right.802  The requirement of 
registration for derivative acquisition of real rights does not mean that, generally, registration 
                                                 
797 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 71 fn 2 and 72.  In the context of acquisition of ownership see du Bois Wille’s 
Principles 488 and 519. 
798 Registration is not the only requirement.  There must, for example, also be a real agreement between the parties.  
The real agreement refers to the intention of the parties to transfer and receive the real right.  See Air-Kel h/a 
Merkel Motors v Bodenstein 1980 3 SA 917 (A) 922; van der Merwe Sakereg 303 – 304.  Also see Sonnekus 2010 
TSAR 586.  Regarding the general requirements to transfer real rights see Badenhorst et al Silberberg 72 – 74.  
Acquisition of real rights must also comply with certain formal requirements.  For example, before the MPRDA, 
prospecting contracts and mineral leases had to be in writing and signed by the parties in terms of s 2(1) of the 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981.  The def of land in the Alienation of Land Act includes “any interest in land, 
other than a right or interest registered or capable of being registered in terms of the Mining Titles Registration 
Act, 1967”.  Prospecting contracts and minerals leases were registered in the Deeds Office and were therefore not 
excluded from s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act.  S 2(1) is no longer applicable because all rights to minerals 
are now registered in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office.  S 16 of the Deeds Registries Act 
requires transfer of real rights to be in notarial form.  
799 According to s 102 of the Deeds Registries Act a “real right includes any right which becomes a real right upon 
registration” (own emphasis).  S 16 of the Deeds Registries Act also requires registration for the transfer of real 
rights.  See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Oceana Development Investment Trust plc 37; 
Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13 – 21; Sonnekus 2005 TSAR 411.   
Badenhorst et al Silberberg 73 regard registration as one of the essential elements for the transfer of real rights.   
Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 97 regard registration as the origin of derivative acquisition of real 
rights; Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA- 67 refer to Murphy v Labuschagne and 
Others 1903 TS 393 400 where it was held that real rights “dates from registration”.  At MPRDA-13 the authors 
say that “to constitute” real rights registration is required.  Commenting on the doctrine of notice, Van der Walt 
and Maass 2012 TSAR 228 says it is a “requirement that all real rights must be registered to acquire the status” of 
a real right (own emphasis).  Also see Laurens October 1984 De Rebus 480.  In the context of derivative acquisition 
of personal servitudes see Sonnekus 1987 TSAR 376. 
800 Registration is not required in case of original methods of acquiring real rights or limited real rights in 
immovable property.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 82; Sonnekus 2010 TSAR 578; Nel Jones Conveyancing in 
South Africa 27 – 28; Cary Miller and Pope Land Title in South Africa 53 – 55 for exceptions when registration 
is not required for acquisition of ownership. In Oriental Products (Pty) Ltd v Pegma 178 Investments Trading CC 
[19] and [21] – [24], the court estopped the owner of immovable property from claiming ownership as a result of 
the owner’s negligence for failing to take steps to correct the register while knowing that the registry contained 
incorrect information.   
801 See van der Vyfer 1988 SALJ 12 and 13 where the author demonstrates that unregistered real rights are not 
enforceable against successors in title. 
802 In terms of the doctrine of notice, unregistered (real) rights to minerals are also enforceable against third parties 
if they had knowledge of their existence.  Regarding the doctrine of notice in general see Willoughby’s 
Consolidated Co Ltd v Copthall Stores Ltd 1913 AD 267 280; Grant v Stonestreet 1968 4 SA 1 (A) 24; Manganese 
Corporation Ltd v South African Manganese Ltd 196; Frye's (Pty) Ltd v Ries 582; Van der Walt and Maass 2012 
TSAR 228 – 232.  In Vansa Vanadium SA Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 444, the court held that the doctrine of notice 
was not applicable in case of prospecting contracts because prospecting contracts gave rise to personal rights only.  
However, according to Badenhorst et al Silberberg 83 and especially fn 96, the doctrine of notice applies to 
knowledge of all personal rights.  As regards the doctrine of notice in case of mortgages see Lubbe in LAWSA par 
351. 




of rights can change any personal right into a real right.803  On the contrary, it is a general rule 
of property law that registration cannot change a personal right to a real right.804  The 
requirement of registration for the derivative acquisition of real rights means that a right that is 
capable of being real must be registered for acquisition to be complete.   
According to the courts, a right is registrable if it satisfies the subtraction from dominium test.  
According to the test, rights are real if the correlative obligation is a burden upon the land, i.e., 
a subtraction from the dominium.805  This means that a right is registrable if it confers on its 
holder an entitlement that normally vests in the landowner or if it prevents the landowner from 
exercising one or more of the entitlements of ownership.806  Furthermore, the intention of the 
parties must be to bind not only the current owner but all his successors in title.807  The 
subtraction from dominium test combined with the intention test has been applied in numerous 
cases808 and has been the subject of much academic debate and criticism.809 
                                                 
803 Van der Vyfer 1988 SALJ 13 stresses that registration has the consequence of rendering rights enforceable 
against successors in title but does not create real rights.  Also see Mostert 2011 PER 95 and especially fn 77. 
804 Odendaalsrus Gold, General Investments and Extensions Ltd V Registrar of Deeds 602;  Fine Wool Products 
of S.A v Director of Valuations 1950 4 SA 490 (E) 499; British South Africa Co v Bulawayo Municipality 1919 
AD 84 93; van der Merwe v Wiese 1948 4 SA 8 (C) 11; Denel (Pty) Ltd v Cape Explosive Works Ltd 1999 2 419 
(T) 435; Badenhorst et al Silberberg 66; van der Merwe Sakereg 83; van der Merwe in LAWSA par 69; Carey 
Miller and Pope Land Title 96 – 97.  In Registrar of Deeds (Transvaal) Appellant v The Ferreira Deep Ltd 
Respondent 1930 AD 169 180, the court held that certain personal rights, jura in personam ad rem acquirendam, 
change into real rights upon registration.  In Odendaalsrus Gold, General Investments and Extensions Ltd V 
Registrar of Deeds 607, the court relied on the Ferreira Deep decision and held that personal rights that become 
real rights upon registration does not present a contradiction.  The decisions are, however, criticised.  See 
Badenhorst et al Silberberg 67 – 69.  Also see Nel Jones Conveyancing in South Africa 208; Carey Miller and 
Pope Land Title 109. 
805 Ex Parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 164; Schwedhelm v Hauman 1947 1 SA 127 (E) 135; Ex parte Pierce 
1950 3 SA 628 (O) 634. 
806 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 56; du Bois Wille’s Principles 435; van der Merwe in LAWSA par 65. 
807 Ex Parte Geldenhyus 164; Cape Explosive Works Ltd v Denel (Pty) [12]; Nel v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue 1960 1 SA 227 (A) 233; Erlax Properties (Pty) Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1992 1 SA 879 (A) 885; Cowin 
NO and Others v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association and Others [10].  Also see Carey Miller and Pope 
Land Title 98 – 101. 
808 Fine Wool Products of South Africa Ltd v Directors of Valuations; Odendaalsrus Gold, General Investments 
and Extensions Ltd v Registrar of Deeds; Hotel De Aar v Jonordan Investments (Edms) Bpk 1972 2 SA 400 (A); 
Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds1990 4 SA 614 (C); Kain v Khan 1986 4 SA 251 (C); Cape Explosive 
Works Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd; Cowin NO and Others v Kyalami Estate Homeowners Association and Others.  In 
Lorentz v Melle 1978 3 SA 1044 (T) 1052, the court said the curtailment of ownership had to be “in relation to 
the enjoyment of the land in the physical sense”.  The test does not provide an easy answer to the question whether 
rights are real or personal.  The difficulties encountered with the subtraction from dominium test combined with 
the intention test has led van der Merwe in LAWSA par 68 to conclude that “neither legal dogmatics nor precedent 
provides a workable criterion by which one can distinguish between real and personal rights. This shows that the 
distinction between these rights does not depend on the inherent nature of them but rather on the rules of the 
system. These rules are often the result of historical development and expediency rather than logic”. 
809 See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 55 – 65; van der Merwe Sakereg 73 – 82; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg 
Vonnisbundel 102 – 120; van der Merwe in LAWSA pars 65 – 87; du Bois Wille’s Principles 434 - 442 for a 
general discussion of the subtraction from dominium test.  Also see Badenhorst 2000 THRHR 499; Badenhorst 




The following section provides a detailed discussion of the effect that private-law rules 
regarding acquisition, registration and enforceability of rights have on mineral tenure security.  
2.1. Property law approach 
The MPRDA classifies prospecting rights and mining rights as limited real rights.  The Act 
foresees a different office for the registration of these rights than other real rights in land.  
Whereas other real rights in land are registered in the Deeds Office, holders of mining rights 
and prospecting rights are under an obligation to lodge rights for registration in the Mineral 
and Petroleum Titles Registration Office. 810  The differences in the purposes of registration in 
the Deeds Office and in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office are discussed 
below. 
From a property law paradigm, holders of prospecting rights and mining rights must acquire 
rights by virtue of either original or derivative acquisition.  Right holders do not acquire rights 
by a series of unilateral acts and therefore do not acquire rights through original acquisition. 
Derivative acquisition of rights require either that rights already exist and are transferred to 
right holders from the government or that right holders acquire rights as a result of an agreement 
between themselves and the government.  Rights to minerals do not exist before the 
government grants them to right holders and it can thus not be said that the government 
transfers rights to right holders.811  From a property-law paradigm, the best-suited construction 
is that right holders acquire rights as an agreement between themselves and the government 
and thus through a derivative method of acquisition. The only circumstance in which right 
holders will acquire rights originally is through expropriation (where the state unilaterally 
divests the holder of such rights).812  However, in the majority of cases, right holders will obtain 
rights through the applications procedures that the MPRDA prescribes.  Therefore, the 
                                                 
and Coetser 1991 De Jure 375; Badenhorst “Erroneous Omission of Real Right from Subsequent Tittle Deed” 
2001 Obiter 190.  
810 MPRDA, ss 19(2)(a) for prospecting rights and 25(2)(a) for mining rights. 
811 Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 520. 
812 Regarding expropriation as an original method of acquisition of real rights see Badenhorst et al 173 – 174.  
Prescription also comes to mind as a potential method of original acquisition of rights to minerals.  However, in 
terms of s 5A(b) of the MPRDA it is an illegal act to prospect or mine without a prospecting right, mining right 
or mining permit.  The rules of original acquisition of real rights, generally, do not apply where possession (or the 
exercise of rights) is illegal because it contravenes a statutory provision.  Entities that prospect and mine without 
the necessary permission will thus not be able acquire rights through prescription.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 
165 and especially fn 285. 




following discussion analyses the effect of the rules of derivative acquisition of real rights on 
mineral tenure security.  
According to property law theory, prospecting rights and mining rights are personal rights 
when the Minister grants them.813  The act of granting rights and permits is contractual and 
rights flowing from the contract are personal in nature.814  The contract exists between the 
grantor of the rights, thus the state, and the grantee, thus the holder of rights.  At this stage, 
holders of rights can enforce their rights against the state only.  When prospecting rights and 
mining rights are registered, the personal rights are extinguished and real rights come into 
existence.815  The rights are then also enforceable against third parties.816  Third parties include 
the current landowners whose property is subject to the rights as well as subsequent landowners 
should the property be sold and ownership transferred to another.  Third parties can also refer 
to persons who attempt to obtain rights to minerals over the same property.  If unregistered 
rights are not enforceable against third parties the risks increase that right holders will not be 
able to develop mines profitably.  The same is true for the ability of investors to maximize the 
returns on their investments.  The property-law rules of derivative acquisition of real rights 
thus weakens mineral tenure security. 
The MPRDA and the MTRA can be criticized for echoing the rules of property law regarding 
derivative acquisition of real rights.  According to section 5(1) of the MPRDA, prospecting 
rights and mining rights granted in terms of the Act and that are registered in terms of the 
MTRA are limited real rights.817  Section 5(1)(d) is consistent with the rules of property law 
                                                 
813 This construction was accepted in Meepo v Kotze [46.3] and Doe Run Exploration SA (Pty) Ltd v Minister of 
Minerals and Energy & Others [20] and [21].  In Mawetse SA Mining Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral 
Resources and Others [24] and [26] the court rejected Meepo v Kotze and held that the granting of rights is not 
contractual but is a “unilateral administrative act” by the Minister.  However, at [19] the court accepts that limited 
real rights come into existence when rights are registered.  Also see Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and 
Petroleum Law of South Africa 13-22; Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 520.  Dale et al South African Mineral and 
Petroleum Law MPRDA-138 criticises Meepo v Kotze for falling short of giving proper regard to the fact that the 
act of granting rights is an administrative act.   
814 This construction was also accepted in Meepo v Kotze [46.3] but rejected in Mawetse SA Mining Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Others [24] and [26].  Also see Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral 
and Petroleum Law of South Africa 13-22. 
815 Commenting on the position before the 2008 Amendment Act, Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 520 regards this as the 
dogmatically correct interpretation.    
816 Commenting on the position before the 2008 Amendment Act, Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 520 regards this as the 
dogmatically correct interpretation. 
817 Before the 2008 Amendment, s 5(1) of the MPRDA did not expressly require registration as a requirement for 
rights granted in terms of the MPRDA to be limited real rights.  This gave rise to various possible interpretations 
regarding the moment when the real right came into existence.  According to one possibility, the act of granting 
rights is an ex lege creation of real rights by the Minister. This interpretation is dogmatically incorrect in terms of 
property law theory.  However, the interpretation accords with the objectives of the MPRDA to provide security 




according to which registration is required for derivative acquisition of real rights.  
Furthermore, according to section 2(4) of the MTRA, registration of a right in the Mineral and 
Petroleum Registration Titles Office constitutes a real right binding on third parties.818  Section 
2(4) is consistent with the rules of property law, namely that if registration is a requirement for 
real rights to come into existence, rights are generally enforceable against third parties only 
upon registration.   
Considering the compulsory consultation process that the MPRDA requires,819 unregistered 
prospecting rights and mining rights will probably be enforceable against the landowner at the 
time when rights are granted.  However, enforceability can prove to be a problem if ownership 
of the property that is subject to an unregistered prospecting right or mining right, is transferred 
to a new owner who is unaware of the right.  In theory, the new owner can prevent a right 
holder from exercising his rights by arguing that the right holder never acquired a limited real 
right because one of the requirements for derivative acquisition of real rights, namely 
registration, was not complied with.  The question whether this was truly the intention of the 
legislator in the light of the objectives of the MPRDA is discussed in more detail in the next 
section. 
The MPRDA is silent regarding the nature of mining permits.  Holders of mining permits are 
under an obligation to lodge permits for recording (and not registration as prospecting rights 
and mining rights) in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office.820  It is unclear 
whether recording fulfils a different function than registration.821  It is thus unclear whether 
holders of mining permits acquire real rights when permits are recorded. The silence of the 
MPRDA regarding the nature of mining permits, along with inconsistencies between the 
MPRDA and MTRA, resulted in strong criticism822 as well as various interpretations regarding 
                                                 
of tenure to holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits.  Regarding the interpretations before 
the 2008 Amendment Act see Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 519 - 521; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum 
Law of South Africa 13-19  - 13-24 and 30-2 – 30-5. 
818 It has been argued that the reference to “binding on third parties” in section 2(4) is superfluous because real 
rights are by their nature binding on third parties. See Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of 
South Africa 13-5; Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 520. 
819 MPRDA, ss 16(4)(b), 22(4)(b) and 27(5)(a) for prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits 
respectively. 
820 MPRDA, s 27(7)(e). 
821 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 30-3 raises the possibility that recording 
does not entail an act of attestation.  
822 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 30 – 5.  Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 519 
where the author opines that “[t]he literal reading of the provisions of the two Acts is absurd, to put it mildly”. 




the private-law nature of mining permits.823  As stated, registration can only serve as one of the 
requirements for derivative acquisition of real rights if rights are registrable in the first place. 
To determine if mining permits are registrable, the judiciary will investigate whether permits 
comply with the subtraction from dominium test.  It is beyond the scope of this work to provide 
a detailed analysis of whether mining permits satisfy the requirements of the subtraction from 
dominium test.  However, on the face of it, mining permits meet the prerequisites of the test.824 
825   Firstly, mining activities will inevitably encroach upon the entitlements of landownership.  
Landowners whose property is subject to mining permits will not be able to exercise the 
entitlement to use and enjoy the property fully.826  Secondly, it seems reasonable to accept that 
the government and holders of mining permits have the intention that rights are enforceable 
against third parties.  An alternative intention would be contrary to the objective of the MPRDA 
to provide security of tenure in case of prospecting and mining and will also be not serve 
optimal exploitation of mineral resources.   
If mining permits are registrable according to the subtraction from dominium test, it seems 
artificial to argue that right holders do not acquire limited real rights when permits are recorded 
                                                 
823 For a general discussion of the different possible interpretations see Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and 
Petroleum Law of South Africa chap 30 and 13-19 – 13-24.  According to one view, all the rights, including mining 
permits, not specifically classified as limited real rights are personal rights.  Central to the view that mining permits 
are personal rights is that permits have a much narrower scope than the rights that are classified as limited real 
rights.  The content of mining permits is restricted specifically by the prohibition against transfer, cession, letting, 
subletting, alienation and disposal of mining permits in s 27(8)(b) of the MPRDA.  In this regard, it is 
acknowledged that an inconsistency arises as a result of the ability to encumber registered mining permits with 
mortgage bonds in certain instances.  See Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 
30-8 – 30-11; Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 523 and 524.  Also see Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum 
Law MPRDA-68 – MPRDA-69 regarding mining permits being personal rights.  Critically, Badenhorst and 
Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 30-10 and 30-12 indicate that the ability to encumber mining 
permits with a mortgage bond gives rise to the possibility that mining permits can in some instances be limited 
real rights.  However, Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-300 persuasively argue that 
the prohibition against transfer of mining permits requires that the reference to the ability to mortgage mining 
permits must be read pro non scripto.    
824 Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-131.  It has also been argued that before the 
MPRDA, registered prospecting contracts were real in nature because the rights flowing these contracts resulted 
in a subtraction from dominium. See Franklin and Kaplan The Mining and Minerals Laws of South Africa 630 
citing Kotze v Newmont SA Ltd 1977 3 SA 368 (NK); Badenhorst and Olivier 1997 TSAR 583 595; Badenhorst, 
Mostert and Dendy in LAWSA par 48.  Contra Vansa Vanadium SA Ltd v Registrar of Deeds 1996 442. 
825 The test was also used to justify that common-law mineral rights were real rights.  See Odendaalsrus Gold, 
General Investments and Extensions Ltd V Registrar of Deeds 604; Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg 
Platinum Mines Ltd and Others 516; Badenhorst Minerale 579 – 580.  
826 Also referred to as the ius utendi.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 92. Regarding the entitlements of 
landowners, it is not the entitlements to prospect and mine that are limited.  These entitlements no longer vests in 
landowners.  Even if one accepts that ownership of unmined minerals still vests in landowners, landowners no 
longer have the ability to prospect and mine.  Entities can only obtain the abilities to prospect and mine if the 
governments grants them prospecting rights, mining rights or mining permits. See chap 2, sec s 3.2.1. 




while holders of prospecting rights and mining rights acquire real rights upon registration.  It 
thus seems as if the above analysis, regarding the effect of applying property-law rules of 
derivative acquisition of real rights to prospecting rights and mining rights, applies mutatis 
mutandis to mining permits.  As with prospecting rights and mining rights, unrecorded mining 
permits probably will be enforceable against the landowner at the time when the Minister grants 
permits due to the consultation process that the MPRDA requires.  Again, the tenure security 
of holders of unrecorded mining permits is threatened if ownership of the property over which 
the permit applies, is transferred to a new owner without knowledge that the Minister granted 
a mining permit.  
In summary, according to a property-law rights-based approach, unregistered or unrecorded 
prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits are unenforceable against the landowner’s 
successor in title, who was unaware of the rights when he obtained ownership.  This inability 
to enforce rights seriously prejudices the ability of right holders to develop mines profitably 
and the interests of investors to maximise returns on investments.  A property-law rights-based 
approach to rights to minerals thus weakens mineral tenure security.  The next section explores 
an alternative approach to registration of rights to minerals. 
2.2. An alternative approach 
When the MPRDA came into operation, it was accompanied by the Mining Titles Registration 
Amendment Act.827  The Amendment Act revived the Mining Titles Registration Act (MTRA) 
and converted the Mining Titles Office into the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration 
Office.828  Currently, all rights to minerals granted in terms of the MPRDA must be registered 
or recorded in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office.829  Before the MPRDA, 
mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights, as limited real rights, were registered in 
the Deeds Office.830  Rights other than mineral rights, prospecting rights and mining rights 
                                                 
827 24 of 2003. 
828 MTRA, s 2(1). 
829 MTRA, s 53, read with the schedule to the Act, repealed all provisions of the Deeds Registries Act of 1937 
dealing with registration of rights to minerals in the deeds registry.  Confusion existed for a while as to the place 
of registration as a result of inconsistencies between the Schedule of the MTRA and Schedule I of the MPRDA.  
The confusion was cleared up by the Minerals and Energy Law Amendment Act 11 of 2005.  See Badenhorst and 
Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 29 – 2; Bandenhorst and Mostert 2004 De Rebus 25 in this 
regard.  
830 Ex Parte Pierce 634; Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 27 – 3; Badenhorst, 
Mostert and Dendy in LAWSA par 41. 




were registered in the Mining Titles Office.  These rights were “statutory rights, separate from 
the ownership of the land to which they pertained.”831   
The Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration replaced the Deeds Office as the location where 
rights to minerals are registered.  It is therefore tempting to transfer the private-law rules and 
effects of registration in the Deeds Office to the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration 
Office.  However, the functions and purposes of registering rights in the Mineral and Petroleum 
Titles Registration Office and the Deeds Office “differ significantly”.832  The Deeds Office 
functions in a private-law system that endorses a hierarchical approach to rights.833  Real rights 
are higher in the hierarchy than personal rights and are stronger and better protected than rights 
that are not registrable.834  The apartheid government used this private-law rights hierarchy to 
ensure that white people had strong and secure rights in land while other race groups could 
only obtain weak and insecure use-rights.835  In this regard, only white people could obtain 
ownership of land in the largest part of the country while other racial groups could obtain 
inferior use- rights only.836  These inferior use rights took the form of statutory rights based on 
permits and tribal land rights.837  Considering the inextricable link between ownership and the 
ability to prospect and mine before the MPRDA,838 mineral wealth accumulated in white 
hands.839 
In the context of land reform, the private-law hierarchical approach to right has come under 
scrutiny and has been subject to criticism in recent times.840  The system is criticised for 
perpetuating the inequitable results of the apartheid regime concerning rights in land.841  
                                                 
831 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 27 – 4; Badenhorst 2005 Obiter 521.  
832 Badenhorst and Mostert Mineral and Petroleum Law of South Africa 27 – 4. 
833 Regarding the hierarchical approach see Van der Walt Koers 261 – 263; Pienaar 2006 TSAR 447; Mostert in 
Cooke Modern Studies 5.  
834 It has been argued that ownership is at the pinnacle of this hierarchy.  See Van der Walt Koers 262; Pienaar 
2006 TSAR 447; Mostert in Cooke Modern Studies 5 – 6.  Badenhorst et al Silberberg 238 refers to “categorisation 
of rights” that places ownership and limited real rights “in a superior position…as far as enforcement and 
publicising thereof is concerned”.  
835 Bandenhorst et al Silberberg 69 – 70 and 238 – 239; Pienaar 2006 TSAR 447; Van der Walt Koers 261 – 263.  
Also see Mostert 2011 PER 103. 
836 See Cooke The New Law of Land Registration 8. 
837 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 69 – 70; Van der Walt Koers 262; Mostert in Cooke Modern Studies 6. 
838 See chap 3, sec 2.1. 
839 Agri SA (CC) [1] and [65]. 
840 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 69 – 70 and 238 -239. The dissatisfaction with the hierarchical approach primarily 
stems from the fact that land-rights have fragmented into different use rights.  See in general Van der Walt 1992 
SAJHR 431; Van der Walt Koers 264; Mostert 2011 PER 103.  For criticism on the fragmented use-rights model 
see Pienaar 2006 TSAR 448 – 449.  On the historical development of fragmentation see González in McHarg et 
al 62. 
841 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 69 - 70 and 238 – 239; Mostert in Cooke Modern Studies 5 – 6. 




Furthermore, the hierarchical approach provides security of tenure to holders of registered real 
rights but does not promote the tenure security of holders of informal land rights that are not 
registrable.  It has therefore been suggested that the practice of registering rights in lands in the 
Deeds Office may need to be extended to include registration of a wide variety of use rights in 
land.842  Furthermore, it has been argued that security of tenure can also be ensured through 
“extensive regulation of rights” and publicising rights through methods other than 
registration.843  Along similar lines, it is strongly arguable that the Mineral and Petroleum Titles 
Registration Office should not endorse the private-law hierarchical approach where some rights 
are stronger and better enforceable than others.844   
This is supported firstly by the fact that the MPRDA is transformative in nature and does not 
endorse a system where rights to minerals are privately held according to the rules of private 
law.845  In this regard, the MPRDA terminated the framework that preceded it in terms of which 
some rights to minerals were held privately.846  Instead, the MPRDA determines that the state 
is the custodian of the nation’s mineral resources for the benefit of all the people of South 
Africa.  The objectives of the Act include to promote equitable access to the nation’s mineral 
resources,847 and to expand, meaningfully and substantially, opportunities for historically 
disadvantaged persons to participate in the mining industry.848  The only way to obtain minerals 
in terms of the MPRDA is to apply to the government through an administrative procedure.  
The emphasis of the MPRDA is thus not on privately held minerals and regulation according 
to the rules of property law.  It is therefore also arguable that the question of registration and 
enforceability must not be analysed using a private-law rights-based approach. 
Secondly, a consideration of registration and enforceability of rights to minerals must be 
considered against the backdrop of the administrative nature of the MPRDA.  Rights to 
minerals granted in terms of the MPRDA are enforceable against anyone as long as holders of 
                                                 
842 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 69 – 70 and 238 – 239; Pienaar 2006 TSAR 450.  Van der Walt Koers 264 267 - 
268 argues that land-reform requires abolishing the hierarchical approach and adopting a use-rights model. Also 
see Mostert 2011 PER 89 – 92; Mostert in Cooke Modern Studies 19 – 24.  
843 Badenhorst et al Silberberg 69 – 70 and 238 – 239.  Also see Mostert in Cooke Modern Studies 19 – 24; 
Mostert 2011 PER 89 – 92. 
844 See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 239. 
845 See Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-67 whether the authors state that the 
commentary on the Mining Titles Office prior the MPRDA must be read keeping in mind that minerals and 
minerals resources are now under the custodianship of the government.  
846 See chap 2, sec 3.2.1. 
847 MPRDA, s 2(c). 
848 MPRDA, s 2(d). 




rights comply with the terms and conditions to which the rights are subject and with the 
provisions of the MPRDA.  If holders of rights do not comply with their obligation to lodge 
their rights for registration or recording, the Minister can invoke the procedures for suspension 
and cancellation in terms of section 47 of the MPRDA.849  According to these procedures, 
holders of rights must receive notification of the complaint of non-compliance and the intention 
of the Minister to cancel or suspend rights.850  Holders of rights should also have an opportunity 
to show why their rights or permits must not be suspended or cancelled.851  Furthermore, before 
cancelling or suspending rights, the Minister must direct holders to take specific measures to 
correct the contravention that led to the invoking of the suspension and cancellation 
procedures.852  Certainly, if the contravention is non-registration or non-recording, the Minister 
will direct holders of rights to register or record rights.  Holders of rights who wish to continue 
mining or prospecting certainly will comply with the directive of the Minister to lodge rights 
for registration or recording.   
It therefore seems that the consequences of non-compliance with the obligation to register or 
record rights are that the Minister can take administrative steps to correct the contravention.  If, 
after these administrative steps, holders of rights still fail to register or record rights, they can 
face losing their rights through cancellation.  Cancellation will, of course, prevent right holders 
from enforcing their rights.  However, it seems unlikely that the consequences of failure to 
register rights per se are that private parties can prevent holders of rights from enforcing their 
rights according to the rules of private law. 
                                                 
849 Contra Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-398 where the authors argue that only 
provisions directly related to prospecting and mining “operations” can lead to suspension and cancellation in terms 
of s 47.  Examples of provisions directly related to prospecting and mining “operations” according to the authors 
include the obligation to commence prospecting and mining within certain time periods in ss 19(2)(b) and 25(2)(b) 
of the MPRDA as well the obligations to prospect and mine continuously in ss 19(2)(c) and 25(2)(c) of the 
MPRDA.  Dale et al argue that the obligation to lodge rights for registration is not directly related to “operation” 
and can therefore not result in the activation of suspension and cancellation procedures in s 47.  However, if Dale 
et al is correct, non-compliance with black economic requirements and the socio-economic obligations will also 
not activate s 47.  It seems clear that the government is set on suspending and / or cancelling rights due to non-
compliance with black-economic requirements and socio-economic obligations.  See Mantshantsha 11 August 
2014 Business Day BDLive available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/mining/2014/08/11/state-threatens-to-
halt-gold-fields-operations-over-transgressions; Harvey 3 September 2015 Business Day BDlive available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/2015/09/03/revoking-mining-licences-no-cure-for-poser. 
850 MPRDA, ss 47(2)(a) and (b). 
851 MPRDA, s 47(2)(c). 
852 MPRDA, s 47(3). 




Registration of rights is a necessary element of mineral tenure security.853  In this regard, as the 
position in the Deeds Office, registration of rights still serves the important function of 
publicizing rights.854  A notice to the world that a specific entity holds rights to minerals must 
certainly give some assurance to investors that their rights are protected.  However, registration 
also serves other purposes.  The existence of a reliable register provides an easy reference for 
the government regarding rights that have been granted.  Such a reference will certainly make 
it easier for the government to ensure that right holders comply with their obligations, such as 
environmental, socio-economic and empowerment responsibilities.855  Furthermore, a record 
of rights also makes it easier for the government to ascertain where resource-rich land is not 
exploited.  Knowing where rights have not been granted856 has the potential to facilitate the 
government’s pursuit of optimal exploitation of the country’s mineral resources. 
It remains to be seen whether the courts will interpret the registration provisions of the MPRDA 
and the MTRA to follow the rules of a private-law rights-based paradigm.  As indicated above, 
a literal reading of these two Acts certainly allows such an interpretation.  To avoid a situation 
where private entities can prevent right holders from exercising their rights due to non-
registration, it is desirable to amend the MPRDA and MTRA.  An amendment that removes 
the semantic classification of prospecting rights and mining rights by eliminating all references 
to “limited real rights” in the MPRDA and the MTRA will have the desired effect.857 858 Such 
an amendment will eradicate the possibility that private parties can prevent right holders from 
enforceing their rights as a result of non-registration.  The proposed amendent will thus 
decrease the risks that mines cannot be developed profitably and that returns on investments 
cannot be maximised and will therefore strengthen mineral tenure security.       
                                                 
853 See chap 1, sec 1.1. 
854 Mawetse SA Mining Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Mineral Resources and Others [19]. 
855 See Coetzee v Rabie en ‘n Andere 1964 2 SA 626 (C) 629 regarding prospecting licenses on state land in terms 
of  s 35 of The Mineral Law Amendment Act 16 of 1907. 
856 According to Dale et al South African Mineral and Petroleum Law MPRDA-13, registration also improves 
access to rights.  According to this argument, searches of the registers will reveal whether rights to specific 
minerals on specific land have been granted to a third party.    
857 This will require deleting s 5(1) of the MPRDA and s 2(4) of the MTRA. 
858 It is difficult to foresee any negative consequences of the proposed amendment.  All of the characteristics of 
rights that can be influenced by such an amendment, for example the abilities to mortgage and transfer rights, are 
regulated by the MPRDA and semantic classification of the rights as limited is not going to change the way that 
it is regulated. 




3. Suitability of a private-law, rights-based approach to rights to 
minerals 
The question that arises is whether it is appropriate to continue to investigate rights to minerals 
from a private-law paradigm and to force the rights into the established categories of private 
law rights, namely real rights and personal rights.859  Apart from the limitations of a private-
law rights-based approach in strengthening mineral tenure security, right to minerals granted 
in terms of the MPRDA do not exhibit the characteristics that were used for justification that 
common-law mineral rights were limited real rights. 860   
Still, the typification of prospecting rights and mining rights as limited real rights necessitates 
considering that these rights are statutorily created limited real rights with its own 
characteristics and advantages.861  In this regard, the creation of limited real rights by statute is 
not a novelty.862  For example, the Mining Rights Act863 and Precious Stones Act864 vested the 
rights to mine for petroleum, precious metals and precious stones in the state.  This was 
regarded by some as the creation of statutory mineral rights865 that were real in nature, in favor 
of the state.866  Earlier legislation also acknowledged statutory real rights to minerals held by 
private persons.867  Furthermore, when statutory real rights are created it is not unusual for the 
                                                 
859 Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa argues that “perpetuating an understanding embedded in the concept 
of a private-law mineral right is erroneous in terms of the current statutory regime dealing with minerals” (own 
emphasis). 
860 See chap 2, sec 3.2.2 fn 250 and fn 251. Barton in McHarg et al 91 argues that one way to determine whether 
permits granted by statute is proprietary, is to consider whether the permits have one or more characteristics of 
property rights in general.  At 95 the author states that “if a statutory licence is determined to be property or 
statutory property, then an accepted set of consequences should follow, unless the legislation or the dictates of 
fairness require another result”. 
861 See chap 2, sec 3.2.2. 
862 In the context of mining, Bastida PHD 64 – 65 refers to “administrative real property rights”.  Badenhorst and 
van Heerden 1992 THRHR 223 refers to “statutêre mineraalregte” (statutory mineral rights).  Also see Badenhorst 
Die Juridiese Bevoegdheid om Minerale te Ontgin 620 – 621.  Another example of a statute that creates real rights 
is s 2 of the Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971.  The Act creates a new type of res and allows ownership of part of a 
building.  See Badenhorst et al Silberberg 442 – 447; van der Merwe Sakereg 402 – 410; Sonnekus and Neels 
Sakereg Vonnisbundel 507.  
863 20 of 1967, s 2(1)(a).  Subject to exceptions in the transitional provisions, the statutory mineral rights were 
terminated when the Minerals Act of 1991 came into operation.  See Badenhorst and van Heerden 1992 THRHR 
227. 
864 73 of 1964, s 2. Subject to exceptions in the transitional provisions, the statutory mineral rights were terminated 
when the Minerals Act of 1991 came into operation.  See Badenhorst and van Heerden 1992 THRHR 227. 
 865 Badenhorst Die Juridiese Bevoegdheid om Minerale te Ontgin; Badenhorst 1999 Stell LR 102 – 103.    
866 Badenhorst Die Juridiese Bevoegdheid om Minerale te Ontgin 94; Badenhorst 1999 Stell LR 104. 
867 For example, ss 12(1) and 5(1) of the Mining Rights Act of 1991 and Precious Stones Act of 1967, respectively, 
vested the rights to prospect for precious metals and precious metals on alienated state land in the landowner.  See 
Badenhorst Die Juridiese Bevoegdheid om Minerale te Ontgin 94. Subject to exceptions in the transitional 
provisions, the statutory mineral rights were terminated when the Minerals Act of 1991 came into operation.  See 
Badenhorst and van Heerden 1992 THRHR 227.   




statute to describe the attributes, including the abilities and limitations to transfer and mortgage, 
of these rights.868  
However, when rights created by statute are regulated to such an extent that they exist and 
operate only through the administrative powers of the government, it becomes questionable 
whether it remains appropriate to analyze these rights from a private-law paradigm.869  The 
question arises whether the abilities of holders of rights that resemble the attributes of common-
law real rights in land are not merely characteristics that are administratively attributed to 
rights.870  In this regard, the abilities to register or record, transfer and mortgage prospecting 
rights, mining rights and mining permits are characteristics that are administratively attributed 
to the rights by the MPRDA.  Thus, the rights are administrative rights that can be registered, 
transferred and mortgaged according to the provisions of the MPRDA.871  An analysis of the 
abilities to transfer and mortgage prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits 
indicated that the MPRDA rigorously regulates these abilities.872  The abilities to transfer and 
mortgage rights do not seem to be a feature of the rights as a result of their common-law nature, 
namely real rights in property.  It simply appears to be a feature of the administrative regime.  
Furthermore, registration or recording of rights do not appear to be based on their private-law 
nature as real rights in land.  Registration appears to be administratively required for specific 
purposes.873   
Contemplation of statutorily created rights to minerals seems to necessitate distinguishing 
between two scenarios.  First, rights can be administratively granted after which rights operate 
                                                 
868 Bastida (PhD thesis) 63.  See Badenhorst, Mostert and Dendy in LAWSA par 49 where the authors mention that 
most of the real rights created by previous mining legislation could have been transferred and mortgaged.  
869 See Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 92 where, in the context of the MPRDA, the authors say that 
although it may be impossible to divorce the rules regarding the subsurface from the property law context, there 
is an argument made for positioning them in administrative law.  There are arguments to the contrary.  See, for 
example, Badenhorst 2011 4 SALJ 776 and 783 – 784 where the author argues that old order rights which were 
created by the transitional provisions in sch II of the MPRDA were real although they lost most of their 
characteristics as real rights, including the abilities to transfer and mortgage.  Also see Badenhorst Die Juridiese 
Bevoegdheid on Minerale te Ontgin 610 – 624 where the author argues that statutory rights to minerals in terms 
of the Mining Rights Act of 1967 and the Precious Stones Act of 1964 were limited real rights in the private 
sphere.  However, the author argues in a system where private ownership of mineral rights and mineral resources 
were possible. 
870 Barton in in McHarg et al 93 refers to “statutory rights that include property characteristics”. 
871 See, however, Bastida (PhD thesis) 65 where the author gives examples of countries where rights are subject 
to administrative law only.  The author then says that these rights cannot be transferred or used as security to 
obtain loans at all. 
872 See chap 5, sec 3 and sec 5 regarding regulation of transfer and mortgage rights in the MPRDA respectively. 
873 See sec 2.2 above. 




as real rights in property with limited governmental interference.874  Second, rights can be 
granted administratively but then operate only according to the administrative powers of the 
government.875  The limited analysis876 in this thesis indicates that prospecting rights, mining 
rights and mining permits may fall in the second scenario.877  If rights are truly only 
administrative in nature, it is unclear why the MPRDA labels prospecting rights and mining 
rights as limited real rights.  One possible reason is that the legislator inserted the term “limited 
real right” in response to objections that rights in the Minerals Development Draft Bill, that 
preceded the MPRDA, were not limited real rights in land.878  However, following the 
objections, prospecting rights and mining rights were labelled limited real rights, but no 
changes were made to the characteristics of rights that would resemble characteristics of 
common-law real rights.879   This creates the impression that the legislator inserted the term 
“limited real rights” into the MPRDA as an afterthought and in an attempt to silence critics. 
4. Conclusion 
The MPRDA’s explicit typification of prospecting rights and mining rights as limited real 
rights perpetuates a perception that a proprietary overlay to rights to minerals strengthens 
mineral tenure security.  Generally, registered real rights are stronger and better enforceable 
than rights which cannot be registered.  However, this chapter reveals that a private-law rights-
based approach to minerals present limitations for mineral tenure security.880 
According to property-law theory, right holders acquire rights to minerals through a derivative 
method of acquisition of real rights.  The private-law rules regarding acquisition of real rights 
and enforceability of rights weaken mineral tenure security.  These rules include that 
registration is a requirement to complete derivative acquisition of real rights and rights are 
enforceable against third parties only upon registration.  The effect of these rules is that private 
parties can prevent holders of rights from exercising their rights if they fail to comply with their 
                                                 
874 Bastida (PhD thesis) 64 – 65.  This seems to be the scenario that Bastida 2001 JERL 39 and 40 refers to.   
875 Bastida (PhD thesis) 65. 
876 The thesis does not provide a detailed examination of all of the rights and permits that the MPRDA provides 
for or of conditions under which rights can be lost.  Also, final conclusions regarding the nature of rights to 
minerals require an investigation into conflict resolution between holders of rights and landowners. 
877 For a different approach that focuses on the relationship between state powers and private parties see Mostert 
November 2014 Recht in Africa 21 – 26. 
878 Chap 2. 
879 Chap 2. 
880 See Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 16 where the author demonstrates other weaknesses of a purely 
private-law approach to the conceptualisation of mineral rights, even before the MPRDA. 




obligations to register or record rights.  Thus, private-law rules regarding derivative acquisition 
or real rights have a negative impact on the enforceability of rights to minerals. 
The rules of deriviative acquisition of real rights function in a private-law system that endorses 
a hierarchical approach to rights where registered real rights are stronger and better enforceable 
than rights that can not be registered.  This chapter argues that registration of rights to minerals 
should not endorse this hierarchical private-law rights-based approach.  Instead, regsistration 
of rights to minerals in the Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office should follow an 
approach in terms of which one of the functions of registration is that it is a means to assist 
rightholders to prove the existence of their rights.  Registration should thus facilitate 
enforcement of rights and the exclusivity of rightholders.  Lack of registration should not have 
the effect that rights become unenforceable against third parties.  
Apart from the limitations that a private-law rights-based approach to rights to minerals pose 
for mineral tenure security, rights granted in terms of the MPRDA do not exhibit the 
characteristics that were used for classifying  common-law mineral rights as limites real rights  
Furthermore, rights to minerals in the MPRDA functions in an administrative regime.  The 
characteristics of rights depend on the regulatory legislation and not on the rules of private law.  
This opens the door to arguments that rules of private-law are no longer suitable for analysing 
rights to minerals





RULE OF LAW: LEGALITY AS A SAFEGUARD FOR 
MINERAL TENURE SECURITY 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
The MPRDA pursues multiple, complex and at times diverging objectives.  One of the central 
themes of the MPRDA is to transform the mining industry and to provide equitable access to 
South Africa’s mineral resources.881  At the same time, the Act aims to promote economic 
growth and mineral resource development882 and to provide security of tenure in prospecting 
and mining.883 Within this complex framework, the preceding chapters identified certain 
shortcomings of the MPRDA in strengthening mineral tenure security.   
First, in certain instances, the MPRDA contains excessive regulatory measures that are 
disproportionate to the objectives pursued.  Second, wide and uncircumscribed governmental 
discretion that is unnecessary for achieving legitimate governmental objectives are at times 
encountered.  The third shortcoming emerges from unnecessarily vague and, at times, poor 
legislative drafting in the MPRDA.  These shortcomings result in unnecessary and unjustifiable 
increases in risks associated with profitable mine development and maximised investment 
returns.  This, in turn, unjustifiably weakens mineral tenure security.   
Some argue that the MPRDA infringes section 25(2) of the Constitution as it amounts to 
“creeping expropriation”.884 However, pursuant to the decision in Agri South Africa v Minister 
of Minerals and Energy,885 it seems improbable that the Constitutional Court will, in the near 
future, find that the MPRDA is unconstitutional for infringing fundamental rights. In Agri 
South Africa, the court decided that the coming into effect of the MPRDA did not result in the 
expropriation of certain categories of pre-MPRDA mineral rights.886  Although the case may 
                                                 
881 MPRDA, ss 2(c) and (d).  Provision of equitable access to mineral resources is also part of the short title of the 
MPRDA.  Also see Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 7.  
882 MPRDA, s 2(e). 
883 MPRDA, s 2(f). 
884 Leon 2009 JERL 597. 
885 2013 4 SA 1 (CC) 
886 Specifically unused old order rights.  See Agri SA (CC) [14] and [68] – [72]. 




not be direct authority for the constitutionality of the MPRDA in general,887 the decision 
strongly supports the transformative objectives of the Act.888  In this regard, it has been argued 
that in coming to its decision, the Court “nailed its pro-redress colours to the mast from the 
start.”889 The Constitutional Court thus made it clear that it strongly supports the transformative 
objectives of the MPRDA and that strong persuasion will be required to declare the Act 
unconstitutional.   
Acceptance of the importance of the transformative nature of the MPRDA and the correctness 
of the decision in Agri South Africa do not relegate the shortcomings of the MPRDA in 
strengthening mineral tenure security.  Even though the Act may not infringe fundamental 
rights, it poses challenges to mineral tenure security.  The MPRDA, therefore, has the potential 
to deter investment in South Africa’s mining industry.  If the government wishes to continue 
attracting investment in the country’s mining industry, it needs to amend the MPRDA to 
overcome these shortcomings.      
This chapter argues that the constitutional framework itself provides the necessary justification 
for amendments to the MPRDA to address shortcomings in strengthening mineral tenure 
security.  The rule of law is the very heart of our constitutional framework.890 Particularly 
foundational to South Africa’s Constitution, as part of the rule of law, is the principle of 
legality.     
                                                 
887 In Agri South Africa [75], the court held that it would be inappropriate to decide, definitely, that expropriation 
in terms of the MPRDA could never be established.  
888 See Agri SA (CC) [1], [61] – [64], and [73]. 
889 Mostert November 2014 Recht in Africa 20.  Also see Mostert and van den Berg in Zillman et al 88. 
890 According to s 1(c) of the Final Constitution, 1996, the rule of law is one of its founding provisions.  See Chief 
Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another 2000 1 SA 409 (CC) [11], [16], [19] and [22]; First National 
Bank of South Africa Ltd v Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa and Others; Sheard v Land and 
Agricultural Bank of South Africa and Another 2000 3 SA 626 (CC) [5] – [6]; Metcash Trading Ltd v 
Commissioner, South African Revenue Service, and Another 2001 1 SA 1109 (CC) [50]; De Beer NO v North-
Central Local Council and South-Central Local Council and Others (Umhlatuzana Civic Association Intervening) 
2002 1 SA 429 (CC) [11]; President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd  2005 5 SA 3 (CC) [39]; Affordable Medicines Trust and Others v Minister of Health and Another 2006 3 SA 
247 (CC) [48]; Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa 2009 1 SA 417 (CC) [65]; Currie and de Waal 
Bill of Rights Handbook 10.  It is uncertain whether the foundational values, including the rule of law and legality, 
give rise to independent enforceable rights.  In Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention 
and the Re-integration of Offenders 2005 3 SA 280 (CC) [21], the court said that they do not.  In South African 
Liquor Traders Association and Others v Chairperson Gauteng Liquor Board and Others 2009 1 SA 565 (CC) 
[36], the court seems to accept that the rule of law does give rise to independent constitutional challenges by the 
following statement: “[T]he applicants are not complaining of a breach of one of their fundamental rights, but of 
an infringement of the rule of law…”.   For a more detailed discussion regarding whether the foundational values 
give rise to independent enforceable claims see Fowkes in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 13-
16 – 13-18.  Michelman in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 11-3 opines the rule of law gives 
rise to stand-alone enforceable claims.   




2. Conceptualization of the rule of law     
The South African Constitution abolished parliamentary sovereignty891 and provides for 
constitutional supremacy.892  By entrenching the rule of law as a foundational principle, the 
Constitution requires that the exercise of all public power must adhere to rule-of-law 
standards.893  This includes executive decisions894 (including administrative action895 and the 
exercise presidential powers),896 and primary legislation, such as the MPRDA, enacted by 
Parliament.897  The rule of law thus provides a mechanism for the control of the exercise of all 
public power, including the public power that Parliament exercised when it enacted the 
MPRDA.898   
                                                 
891 Before the Constitution, parliament was sovereign in South Africa.  See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others 
v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 1999 1 SA 374 [28]; Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others 2000 2 SA 674 [40]; Mceldowney 2013 TSAR 271; Michelman in Constitutional Law of South Africa 
11-1. 
892 Final Constitution, 1996, s 2.  Also see Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and 
Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [40]. 
893 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
[32] [34] [59]; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others [17] [20] [40] [51]; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health  
[48]; Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 2000 3 SA 936 [17]; President 
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) 
[38]; S v Mamabolo 2001 3 SA 409 (CC) [38]; AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council 
2007 1 SA 343 (CC) [29]; Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others 2008 5 SA 171 (CC) [62];  Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others 
2010 3 SA 293 (CC) [49].  
894 Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa and Others 2013 1 SA 248 (CC) [12]; Masethla v President 
of the Republic of South Africa 2008 1 BCLR 1 [77] – [81]. 
895 Administrative action will, however, be reviewed according to the provisions of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.  The rule of law should only be engaged once norms of greater specificity, 
such as the right to administrative action, have been exhausted.  See Currie and de Waal The Bill of Rights 
Handbook 12.  
896 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In Ex Parte President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Others [79].  
897 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
[32]; Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 3 SA 347 (CC) [55]; Currie and de 
Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 136.  Furthermore, policy decisions also seem to be subject to rule-of-law 
standards. In NICRO [58] - [61], the court relied on the Canadian case of Sauvé v Canada (Chief Electoral Officer) 
2002 S.C.C. 68.  In that case the majority of the court decided that the policy choice was subject to legality review 
and held there was no rational connection between the policy decision and the infringement of the right to vote.  
The court in NICRO did not make a direct finding on the whether the policy decision was rationally connected to 
a legitimate governmental objective.  At [67], the court held that there was not enough information before it.   
898 Under parliamentary sovereignty, the courts had limited power to invalidate governmental action and thus to 
control the exercise of public power. Public power was constrained by the rules of administrative law and 
especially judicial review of legislative and executive action.  See President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others [148]; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of 
South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [37].  




The rule of law is a difficult, complex and elusive concept, which has a number of different 
meanings.899 At its most basic, the rule of law requires that all state action must be undertaken 
according to law900 and every person and every institution, including state institutions,901 is 
subject to the law.902  Modern accounts of the rule of law depend on whether a formal or 
substantive interpretation of the concept is accepted.903  Formal interpretations of the rule of 
law generally set requirements regarding the manner and procedures for the promulgation of 
laws.904 Contrary to formal interpretations, substantive interpretations of the rule of law are 
concerned with, not only procedural requirements, but also with the content of laws and the 
protection of fundamental rights.905   
The Constitutional Court has not, as yet, provided an outright indication of its conceptualization 
of the rule of law as either a formal or substantive concept.  As can be expected, the Court’s 
annotations on the concept depend on the facts of the case before it.  In some instances 
involving constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights, the Court has adopted a more 
substantive understanding of the concept.906  However, a survey of the judgments of the 
                                                 
899 Barnett Constitutional and Administrative Law 76; Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law (2009) 17; 
Tamanaha On the Rule of Law 3.  It has been argued that the uncertainty regarding the meaning of the rule of law 
might cause the concept to become a phrase without meaning.  See Tamanaha On the Rule of Law 114; Schweitzer, 
Sylvester and Saks 2006 – 2007 De Paul Law Review 615. 
900 Wade and Forsyth Administrative Law 17. 
901 Currie and de Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 10 
902 Barnett Constitutional and Administrative Law 73. 
903 Tamanaha On the Rule of Law 91; Craig 1997 Public Law 467; Bachmann and Frost 2012 De Jure 306 308; 
Kruger 2010 3 PER 475; De Ville 2006 Acta Juridica 66; Schweitzer, Sylvester and Saks 2006 – 2007 De Paul 
Law Review 619; Fombad 2014 AHRLJ 418.  Baxter Administrative Law refers to “a minimalist or a normative 
concept”.  The minimalist concept corresponds with formal theories whereas the normative concept is similar to 
substantive theories. 
904 Tamanaha On the Rule of Law 91 – 92; Craig 1997 Public Law 468 - 470; Kruger 2010 PER 476. 
905Tamanaha On the Rule of Law 102 – 103; Craig 1997 Public Law 477; Kruger 2010 PER 478; Bachmann and 
Frost 2012 De Jure 308. 
906 See Chief Lesapo v North West Agricultural Bank and Another  [1], [11], and [22] and President of the Republic 
of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd  [39], [40], [41] and [46] (the right of access to 
courts and the principle against self-help); De Beer [11] and Twee Jonge Gezellen (Pty) Ltd and Another v Land 
and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa t/a The Land Bank and Another 2011 3 SA 1 (CC) [58] (right 
to a fair hearing).  Also see the following minority judgements: Ngcobo J in van der Walt v Metcash 2002 4 SA 
317 (CC) [36] and Madala J in van der Walt v Metcash [65] (right to equality).    See Mostert in Mostert and de 
Waal Essays in Honour of CG van der Merwe 88 – 95 for an argument that, in the context of the right to housing, 
substantive interpretations of the rule of law have been followed in President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd; Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom 
and Others 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) and 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg and Others 2008 3 SA 208 
(CC).  For further annotations regarding the substantive nature of the rule of law see Du Toit v Minister for Safety 
and Security and Another 2009 12 BCLR 1171 (CC) [24]; Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of Republic 
of South Africa and Others, Freedom Under Law v President of Republic of South Africa and Others, Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies and Another v President of Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 5 SA 388 (CC) [30] 
and [40]; minority judgement of Sachs J in Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa  




Constitutional Court, reveals that the Court, unequivocally, at least, requires the exercise of all 
public power, including primary legislation, such as the MPRDA, to comply with a formal 
interpretation of the rule of law that is mainly based on the (constitutionally developed) 
principle of legality.907  The Court requires such compliance irrespective of whether 
fundamental rights are in question.  In this regard, it has been argued that, in South Africa, the 
rule of law is given effect to by the development of traditional common-law doctrines908 of 
which the most common is the principle of legality.909 
3. Legality and the shortcomings of the MPRDA 
In common-law, administrative decision-making was subject to judicial review, including the 
principle of legality.910  However, as a result of parliamentary sovereignty, the common-law 
principle of legality as part of administrative law, gave the courts limited power to control the 
exercise of public power.911  In particular, under parliamentary sovereignty, the courts could 
not, as a general rule, invalidate primary legislation, such as the MPRDA, enacted by 
Parliament.912  The role of the courts was confined to interpreting the legislation and applying 
it to the facts of the case before the court.913   
In the Constitutional dispensation, the principle of legality derives directly from the 
Constitution,914 and as such, has been extended to include standards for the review of the 
                                                 
(referred to as Matatiele (1) for the remainder of the chapter) 2006 5 SA 47 (CC) [107] and [110].  Also see Price 
2010 SAPL 371. 
907 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
[40] [56] and [58]; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [17] and [24]; President of the Republic of South Africa and 
Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others [34]; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 
[49]; Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others [49]; Masethla v President of the 
Republic of South Africa [33]; Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) [32]; 
[81]; Fowkes in Woolman et al  Constitutional Law of South Africa 13-15. 
908 Fowkes in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 13-55. 
909 Fowkes in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 13-54.  Devenish 2004 TSAR 678 regards legality 
as the “core of seminal meaning of the rule of law”.  As regards, the content of common-law legality see 
Michelman in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 11-1; Dyzenhaus 2007 SALJ 736. 
910 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 115 read with 122. 
911 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
[28]; Dyzenhaus 2007 SALJ 736. 
912 Opposed to legislation enacted by parliament, subordinate legislation was subject to judicial review.  See 
Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
[29] – [31]. 
913 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
[28] and [29]; Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 115; Dyzenhaus 2007 SALJ 736. 
914 Price 2013 SALJ 649, 653 and 656; Michelman in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 11-2.  
The common-law grounds for judicial review of administrative action are still relevant.  They have, however, 
been “subsumed” by the Constitution and gain their force from the Constitution.  See Pharmaceutical 




exercise of all state power,915 including the enactment of primary legislation.916  Although the 
principle of legality under the Constitution is a more convoluted concept than in common 
law,917 the principle is still associated with a set of (constitutionally developed) common-law 
doctrines.918  These common-law doctrines include the ultra vires doctrine,919 rationality 
review and the rule against vagueness.920  The following discussion indicates that these 
doctrines contain elements that highlight the shortcomings of the MPRDA in strengthening 
mineral tenure security, namely excessive regulation, vagueness and broad discretionary 
powers. The discussion provides an exposition of the elements of the ultra vires doctrine, the 
rule against vagueness, and rationality review, that direct attention to the shortcomings of the 
MPRDA, without differentiating between its common-law and Constitutional understandings.     
3.1. Ultra vires and the rule against vagueness 
According to the principle of legality, the legislature and executive may only exercise the 
powers and perform the functions that the law confers on them.921  The exercise of any public 
power that is not authorised by law will be ultra vires and thus not in adherence to rule-of-law-
standards.922  This means that, if an executive functionary performs an executive action that is 
beyond the powers that the MPRDA confers on such functionary, the action will be against the 
principle of legality as a result of being ultra vires.  The discussion here is primarily concerned 
with the legality of the MPRDA itself (the exercise of legislative power) and not with the 
                                                 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others [33].  As regards the common-law ultra vires doctrine see Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of 
Health [50].   
915 Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 124.  The standard according to legality is generally accepted as 
“rationality”.  See Price 2013 SALJ 649 and sec 4.2 below. 
916 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others [40]; Michelman in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 11-
11.  It has been argued that under the Constitution, the principle of legality has been developed to regulate the 
exercise of public power that specifically does not amount to administrative action.  See Price 2013 SALJ 658 – 
659. 
917 Rationality review has “evolved” to include certain procedural aspects.  See Price 2013 SALJ 645 – 655. 
918 Fowkes in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 13-54.  
919 See Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [50] where the court held that what would have been ultra 
vires under common law, is invalid under the Constitution as an infringement of the principle of legality.  
920 Fowkes in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 13-54 – 13-56.  In See Affordable Medicines 
Trust v Minister of Health [108] where the court held that the doctrine of vagueness is a common-law doctrine 
that is now founded on the rule of law. 
921 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
[58]; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [49]; Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 
[32]. 
922 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others 
[59]; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others [20] and [50]; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [50]. 




exercise of executive power in terms of the MPRDA.  The extent to which the ultra vires 
principle applies to executive action, it is not discussed further here.  Therefore, the discussion 
does not consider whether a specific executive action was authorised by the MPRDA, or 
whether an executive functionary acted outside the scope of his powers when he performed an 
executive action.  The following paragraph indicates that the ultra vires principle is, at times, 
associated with the legality of legislation itself.     
In the Affordable Medicines case,923 the court struck down some provisions of regulations 18(3) 
and 18(5) of the Medicines and Related Substances Act924 for being ultra vires.925  In coming 
to this conclusion, the court took into account that the regulations were not formulated in an 
accessible manner.926  Furthermore, the regulations did not, with reasonable certainty, indicate 
to affected persons, what was relevant for the exercise of the power that affected them and in 
which circumstances they could seek relief against an adverse decision.927  The approach of 
the court, in Affordable Medicines Trusts, with regard to vagueness, is discussed in more detail 
below.928  It is clear, however, that, for the court, there was a connection between the vagueness 
of the relevant provisions of the regulations and its conclusion that the provisions were ultra 
vires.   
Legality restricts the vagueness of legislation more directly through the rule against 
vagueness.929  In this regard, legality entails an element that restricts the vagueness of statutory 
authorizations for official action.930   According to the Constitutional Court, the rule of law 
requires legislation to be written in a clear and accessible manner.931  Legislation that is 
impermissibly vague will violate the rule against vagueness, which is an aspect of the rule of 
law.932  The rule against vagueness requires reasonable certainty in contrast to absolute 
                                                 
923 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2006 3 SA 247 (CC). 
924 101 of 1965. 
925 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [119] and [123]. 
926 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [121]. 
927 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [121]. 
928 Sec 4.1.2.1 below. 
929 Fowkes in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 13-54 
930 Michelman in Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 11 – 1 fn 3.  According to Plasket 
“Administrative Law” 2008 Annual Survey 42, “none could argue with the proposition that an executive 
instrument that is incorrigibly vague would offend against the value of certainty that is part of the rule of law”. 
931 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [47].  Also see Du Toit v Minister for Safety and 
Security and Another [24]; Kruger v President of the Republic of South Africa [67]; Veldman v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) 2007 3 SA 210 (CC) [26]. 
932 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [108]; South African Liquor Traders Association and Others 
v Chairperson Gauteng Liquor Board and Others [27]. 




certainty of laws.933  It requires “reasonable certainty to those who are bound by it to know 
what is required of them so that they may regulate their conduct accordingly”.934   
The rule against vagueness further applies where legislation confers wide discretionary powers 
on the government.  In this regard, discretionary powers that contain no express constraints, 
can have the effect that those who are affected by it will not know what is relevant for the 
exercise of the power and in which circumstances they will be entitled to seek relief in case of 
an adverse decision.935  People affected by the discretionary power will also not know which 
factors are relevant to a decision that impacts on them.936  Broad discretionary powers that 
contain no express constraints can, therefore, violate rule-of-law standards937 as a result of 
violating the rule against vagueness.   
The rule against vagueness can be invoked to overcome two challenges that the MPRDA poses 
for mineral tenure security, namely drafting concerns and wide governmental discretionary 
powers.  Previous chapters of this thesis indicated various examples of both challenges.938  It 
can be argued that there is not a watertight distinction between these challenges.  In this regard, 
some instances of wide discretionary powers that this thesis revealed, are arguable a result of 
vague and imprecise drafting of the MPRDA.  For example, the wide discretion that flows from 
the failure of the MPRDA to place an obligation on the Minister to grant mining permits, can 
be seen as a result of poor drafting of the Act.  Similarly, it is arguable that some instances of 
vague drafting, revealed in this thesis, necessarily widens governmental discretion in decision-
making.  For example, one of the criteria that right holders must meet, to place an obligation 
on the Minister to grant consent for the transfer of mining rights, is compliance with the Mining 
Charter.939  This thesis proposes that as a result of vague and unclear drafting, it is uncertain 
when some of the requirements of the Mining Charter are met.940  However, it is also arguable 
that the uncertainty, regarding when the requirements of the Charter are met, widens the 
discretion of the Minister when deciding whether to grant consent for the transfer of 
                                                 
933 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [108]. 
934 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [108] referring to R v Jopp and Another 1949 (4) SA 11 (N) 
at 13-4.     
935 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [47]; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of 
Health [34]. 
936 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [47]. 
937 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [47]. 
938 See chap 4: table 1 sec 3.1.2, table 2 sec 2.3, table 3 sec 2.4.2 and table 4 sec 2.4.4; chap 5: table 5, sec 3.2.1.3 
and table 7 sec 4.3.2.   
939 MPRDA, s 11(2)(b) read with s 23(h). 
940 See chap 5, sec 3.2.1.2. 




prospecting rights and mining rights.  Thus, vague drafting causes wide discretionary powers.  
In this way, wide discretionary powers can be viewed as a sub-set of vagueness. 
It is argued here that the rule against vagueness can be invoked to challenge vague provisions 
of the MPRDA from two angles.  First, vague provisions can be challenged simply because of 
the uncertainty that the vagueness causes to holders of rights to minerals regarding what is 
expected from them to develop mines profitably.  Second, vague provisions can be challenged 
because they result in wide governmental discretion that causes uncertainty regarding 
profitable development of mines.  For ease of reference, with regard to the application of the 
rule against vagueness from these two angles, the first angle is referred to as “simple” 
vagueness” and the second angle as “compound vagueness”.  
The approach of the Constitutional Court to vagueness and discretionary powers, and the 
suitability of this approach to overcome the challenge that wide governmental discretion poses 
for mineral tenure security, is discussed in more detail below.  As a precursor to this discussion, 
the next section illustrates that rationality review, as an aspect of legality, highlights the 
challenge that excessive regulatory measures, at times encountered in the MPRDA, poses for 
mineral tenure security.   
3.2. Rationality review  
Legality requires that executive decisions,941 as well as legislation,942 must be rationally related 
to the purpose for which the power was given.943 This requirement of rationality is a “minimum 
                                                 
941 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [75]; Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa and 
Others [27]; Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others [49]; Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others [85]; Prinsloo v van der Linde and Another 1997 3 SA 1012 [25]. 
942 Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport [32]; Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others [55]; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [74] citing S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 
1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) [44]; United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 11 
BCLR 1179 (CC) [55]; New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1999 3 SA 
191 [19].  In South African Transport and Allied Workers Union v Garvas 2013 1 SA 83 (CC) [37] and [49], the 
court held that legislative provisions that are open to more than one interpretation must be interpreted in a manner 
that will render the provision rationally related to its purpose. The reason for adopting a rationality standard seem 
to lie in the doctrine of separation of powers.  See New National Party v Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others [24]; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [86].  For a detailed analysis of the 
justification for rationality review in the context of equality cases see Bishop 2010 SAPL 317 – 321.  Also see 
Price 2010 SAPL 358 – 359. 
942 New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others [19] and [24]. 
943 Price 2010 SALJ 581; Price 2013 SALJ 649; Currie and de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 11- 12. 




threshold” for the exercise of public power,944 even when no fundamental right is in question.945  
Legislation will pass rationality review, if it is aimed at a legitimate governmental purpose and 
if there is a rational connection between such purpose and the means chosen to pursue it.946   If 
the legislation serves no legitimate governmental objective at all, it is irrational and 
unconstitutional.947  Furthermore, even if the legislation aims to achieve a legitimate 
governmental purpose, the legislation will not pass rationality review if there is no rational 
connection between its purpose and the means chosen.948  Rationality review thus incorporates 
some form of a means-ends analysis.949    
Rationality review draws attention to the challenge that excessive regulatory measures, which 
are disproportionate to the objectives pursued, pose for mineral tenure security.  It was 
indicated in previous chapters that the means used in the MPRDA to achieve the legitimate 
purposes that the Act pursues, are at times excessive and unnecessary.950  The effect of these 
excessive regulatory measures is that mineral tenure security is unjustifiably weakened.  The 
Constitutional Court’s approach to rationality review and the suitability of this approach to 
justify amending the MPRDA to overcome the challenges of excessive regulation is discussed 
in the next section.   
4. Approach of the Constitutional court to legality and its 
application to the MPRDA 
The rule against vagueness and rationality review draw attention to the challenges that the 
MPRDA poses for mineral tenure security.  The aim of this section discussion is to consider 
whether the judiciary’s approach to vagueness and rationality review is suitable to overcome 
                                                 
944 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others [90]; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [78]. 
945 Price 2010 SAPL 347. 
946 In Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [77], the court said that “legislation that regulates practice 
will pass constitutional muster if (a) it is rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate government purpose; 
and (b) it does not infringe any of the rights in the Bill of Rights.  Also see [34]; Merafong Demarcation Forum 
and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [62] and Law Society of South Africa v Minister 
of Transport [114].  Price 2010 SALJ 582 refers to the “purpose requirement” and the “effect requirement”.   
According to Price 2010 SAPL 361, rationality review requires that the law serves only one purpose. 
947 Price 2010 SAPL 375.   
948 If there is no rational connection, the exercise of the power will be arbitrary.  See New National Party v 
Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others [19] and [24]; Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 
of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [85]; Democratic 
Alliance v President of South Africa and Others [27].  See Price 2010 SAPL 365 – 366 regarding the meaning of 
arbitrariness. 
949 Democratic Alliance v President of South Africa and Others [32]; Price 2013 SALJ 650. 
950 See chap 4 table 4 sec 2.4.4; chap 5 table 6 sec 3.2.2.3. 




the challenges that the MPRDA pose for mineral tenure security. To achieve this aim, the 
section provides an analysis of the Constitutional’s Court’s approach to the rule against 
vagueness and rationality review.  This analysis is followed by comments on the difficulties 
that arise from the Court’s approach to the rules against vagueness and rationality review.  
4.1. Vagueness 
The rule against vagueness can be applied from two angles in an attempt to justify amending 
the MPRDA to overcome two challenges that the Act poses for mineral tenure security.  Both 
challenges cause unreasonable uncertainty to right holders regarding profitable development 
of mines and maximising returns of investments.  From the first angle, “simple” vagueness 
causes unreasonable uncertainty to holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining 
permits.  From the second angle, the MPRDA confers wide discretionary powers on the 
government that cause unreasonable uncertainty to right holders.  The second angle is referred 
to as “compound” vagueness.   
4.1.1. “Simple” vagueness 
The rule against vagueness requires that laws must be reasonably certain, in contrast to absolute 
certainty of laws.951  Those who are bound by the law must be reasonably certain regarding 
what is expected from them.952  Legislation that is unreasonably vague can be declared 
unconstitutional for violating the rule against vagueness. 
The question whether legislation is unreasonably vague, to the extent that those who are bound 
by it do not reasonably know what is expected from them, depends on the facts of each case.  
In South African Liquor Traders Association,953 the Constitutional Court held that the 
definition of “shebeen” in the Gauteng Liquor Act954 was void for vagueness.955  According to 
the Act, a “shebeen” was an unlicensed operation whose main business was to sell less than a 
                                                 
951 See sec 3.1 above. 
952 See sec 3.1 above. 
953 South African Liquor Traders Association and Others v Chairperson Gauteng Liquor Board and Others 2009 
(1) SA 565 (CC).  See HTF Developers v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2007 4 All 
SA 1108 (SCA) [8] and [9] where the Supreme Court of Appeal held that a specific item in regulations that were 
made in terms of s 21(1) of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 were void for vagueness as a result of 
unreasonable uncertainty that it caused. 
954 2 of 2003. 
955 South African Liquor Traders Association and Others v Chairperson Gauteng Liquor Board and Others [26] 
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certain quantity of beer.956  The vagueness of the definition was a result of the failure of the 
Act to specify the period in which the prescribed quantity was sold.957  The Court held that the 
omission of a time period in which the liquor had to be sold, was “impermissibly vague” and 
that the definition was therefore unconstitutional.958        
Previous chapters of this thesis revealed instances where it was argued that vague provisions 
of MPRDA cause unreasonable uncertainty to right holders regarding what is expected from 
them.959  This uncertainty increases the risks associated with profitable development of mines 
and maximising returns of investments.  For example, the MPRDA requires holders of 
prospecting rights and mining rights to commence operations within specified times after “the 
effective date”.960  The “effective date” means the date on which rights are “executed”.961  The 
MPRDA, however, does not indicate what is meant by “execution of rights”.  This thesis argues 
that mineral tenure security will be strengthened if “execution of rights” refers to the date on 
which the Minister grants rights and communicates the terms and conditions, attached to such 
rights to applicants.962    
However, certainty is not served where there is a need for arguments of this nature: the current 
formulations of “effective date” and “execution of rights” in the MPRDA cause unreasonable 
uncertainty.  This uncertainty has the effect that holders of prospecting rights and mining rights, 
who are bound by the relevant provisions, do not have reasonable certainty regarding what is 
expected of them to regulate their conduct according to the provisions of the MPRDA.  
Therefore, the provisions of the MPRDA that regulate the requirement to commence 
prospecting and mining within specified times after rights are executed, contravene the rule 
against vagueness.  The MPRDA should therefore be amended to clear up the uncertainty that 
the current drafting of “effective date” and “execution of rights” causes, so as to comply with 
rule-of-law standards. 
The approach of the Constitutional Court to “simple vagueness”, in terms of which the rule 
against vagueness requires reasonable certainty of laws, is suitable to justify amending the 
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957 South African Liquor Traders Association and Others v Chairperson Gauteng Liquor Board and Others [26].  
958 South African Liquor Traders Association and Others v Chairperson Gauteng Liquor Board and Others [28]. 
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“effective date” in s 1. 
961 MPRDA, s 1 def of “effective date”. 
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MPRDA in those instances where the Act is unreasonably vague.  The next section investigates 
whether the approach of the judiciary to vagueness that leads to wide governmental discretion 
(“compound” vagueness) is suitable to justify amending the MPRDA to overcome the 
challenges that it poses for mineral tenure security.   
4.1.2. “Compound” vagueness 
As explained, according to the rule against vagueness, legislation that confers broad 
discretionary powers with no express constraints on the government, can violate rule-of-law 
standards.963  The difficulty with discretionary powers is that they are necessary for the 
administration and functioning of any state and indeed “play a crucial role in any legal 
system”.964  Discretionary powers are important because they allow “abstract and general rules 
to be applied to specific and particular circumstances”.965  Furthermore, there are situations in 
which decision-makers have specific expertise that places them in a better position than the 
legislator to make decisions.966  Broad discretionary powers are also justifiable where the 
decision-maker must take copious factors into account and it is not appropriate or possible for 
the legislator to identify all factors in advance.967  Discretionary powers may also be acceptable 
where the factors to be taken into account are uncontestably clear.968  Discretionary powers are 
thus an inevitable part of any administration and the judiciary needs to show some level of 
respect for the existence of discretion. 
The need for discretionary decision-making power, however, overlooks the fact that decision-
makers can act unreasonably.969  It therefore remains essential to retain some form of control 
over decision-makers who act according to discretionary powers.970  In the context of the 
MPRDA, the need to control discretionary decision-making powers is apparent from its 
negative impact on mineral tenure security as demonstrated in previous chapters of this thesis. 
                                                 
963 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [47]. 
964 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [53]; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of 
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government”.  Also see Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 47. 
965 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [53]; Metcash [13].  Also see Baxter 
Administrative Law 84. 
966 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [53]. 
967 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [53]; Baxter Administrative Law 92. 
968 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [53].  Also see Affordable Medicines Trust v 
Minister of Health [126]. 
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It seems that the level of control required, and the degree of deference that the Constitutional 
Court shows, for vagueness and discretionary powers, is influenced by the question whether 
fundamental rights are limited.  The following paragraphs indicate the difference in approach 
by comparing certain aspects of the judgments in the Affordable Medicines Trusts971 and 
Dawood972 cases. 
4.1.2.1. Level of deference for discretionary powers 
The Dawood case concerned a constitutional challenge to the Aliens Control Act,973 which 
determined that a person who is not a South African citizen may not enter or reside in the 
country without a valid permit.974  Section 25(9) of the Act established a general rule that 
immigration permits could only be granted if applicants were outside South Africa.975  Section 
25(9)(b) of the Act made an exception to this rule, namely that, inter alia,976 spouses of South 
African citizens who were in possession of a valid temporary residence permit did not have to 
be outside South Africa to be granted an immigration permit.977  However, the ability of foreign 
spouses to remain in South Africa while their applications for immigration permits were 
considered depended on the discretion of the Director-General to extend their temporary 
residence permits.978  If the Director-General refused to extend temporary residence permits 
the effect was that foreign spouses had to leave the country while their applications for 
immigration permits were considered.979  The court held that such a refusal limited the right to 
dignity in section 10 of the Constitution.980   
Having established that the right to dignity was infringed, the court continued to determine 
whether the limitation was justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.981  The court 
considered the discretion of the Director-General to extend temporary residence permits in the 
context of the limitation analysis.982  One of the problems with the discretionary power was 
that the Aliens Control Act did not provide any guidance regarding the factors that the Director-
                                                 
971 Affordable Medicines Trusts and Others v Minister of Health and Another 2006 3 SA 247 (CC).  
972 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others ; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs 
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973 96 of 1991. 
974 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [2]. 
975 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [25] [38]. 
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977 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [25] [38]. 
978 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [38] [52]. 
979  Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [39]. 
980 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [39]. 
981 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [40] – [60]. 
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General had to take into account when considering extending temporary residence permits.983  
The Court found that this was problematic, especially since the rule of law requires legislation 
to be written in a clear and accessible manner.984  This means that the discretionary powers 
conferred by the Aliens Control Act contravened the rules against vagueness.  Furthermore, 
the court held that there was no legislative purpose for the lack of guidance in the exercise of 
the discretionary power.985  This was despite the fact that the Aliens Control Act pursued a 
legitimate objective namely to control immigration into South Africa.986   Furthermore, none 
of the abovementioned factors that render discretionary powers justifiable were present.987 
The decision in the Dawood case can be contrasted with the much more deferential approach 
that the court showed to the discretionary powers in the Affordable Medicines Trusts case. The 
constitutional challenge involved certain provisions and regulations of the Medicines Act that 
introduced a licencing scheme for health care practitioners to compound and dispense 
medicine.  One of the constitutional challenges that was lodged was against the provisions of 
the Medicines Act that required the issuing of a licence to be linked to specific premises.988  
The applicants contended that the linking of a licence to specific premises infringed the right 
to choose a profession in section 22 of the Constitution.989  After an analysis of section 22,990 
the court decided that the linking of a license to specific premises merely regulated the 
profession and did not infringe the right to choose a profession.991  Having discarded of the 
challenge based on the infringement of section 22, the court proceeded to treat the discretionary 
powers of the Director-General with great deference.  
The degree of deference that the court showed is evident from the constitutional challenge that 
was lodged against section 22C(1)(a) of the Medicines Act according to which the Director-
General can issue a licence to compound and dispense medicine “on the prescribed 
conditions”.992  The applicants contended that by allowing the Director-General to prescribe 
any conditions, section 22C1(a) was overbroad and vague and in breach of the principle of 
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legality.993   The court held that this was not overboard because the Director-General was only 
allowed to impose conditions that were rationally related to the purpose for which the 
discretionary powers were given.994  The legislation served a legitimate governmental purpose, 
namely to increase access to medicine that is safe for consumption.995  According to the court, 
the exercise of the discretionary power was sufficiently constrained by, inter alia,996 the fact 
that the Director-General could only prescribe conditions that were necessary for achieving the 
purpose.997  The court did not investigate the purpose of the discretion apart from the legitimate 
governmental purpose of the legislation.  Instead, the court held that section 22C(1)(a) had to 
be construed in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution including the doctrine of 
vagueness if possible.998     
The applicants further challenged certain provisions of regulations 18(3) and 18(5) of the 
Medicines Act that set out the factors that the Director-General had to take into account when 
exercising the discretion to issue a licence.  The applicants contended that these regulations did 
not provide any guidance to the Director-General and therefore amounted to the arbitrary 
exercise of governmental power and was contrary to the principle of legality.999   The court 
struck down some provisions of the regulations for being ultra vires and held that the remaining 
factors were unambiguous and therefore not void for vagueness.1000  One of the provisions the 
court did not strike down was regulation 18(5)(f) that empowers the Director-General to take 
into account any information that he deems necessary when considering a licence to compound 
and dispense medicine.1001 As with the power to prescribe any conditions, the court said that 
the discretion to take any information into account is constrained by the objectives of the 
Medicines Act namely to increase medicine that is safe for consumption.1002 
The comparison between the Affordable Medicines Trust and Dawood cases offered here 
suggests that the Court shows more deference, and thus applies a more lenient test, when 
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constitutional rights are not infringed.  Thus, when fundamental rights are not infringed, the 
court will not easily find that discretionary powers do not pass the legality test for contravening 
the rule against vagueness.  Conversely, when the discretionary powers infringe fundamental 
rights, the Court shows less respect for the legislator and applies a stricter test.  Hence, when 
fundamental rights are infringed, the court will more easily find that discretionary powers are 
in breach of the rule against vagueness and therefore do not pass legality-review.   
4.1.2.2. Difficulties with the level of deference: the MPRDA as example   
The difficulty with the Constitutional Court’s approach to vagueness that leads to wide 
governmental discretion, is that discretionary powers can have a severe negative impact on 
individual entities or entire industries without infringing fundamental rights.1003  Despite the 
negative consequences, the judiciary will show high levels of deference for the vagueness and 
discretion if fundamental rights are not infringed.  The exercise of the power will, of course, 
amount to administrative action that can be reviewed in terms of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act.1004  However, the fact that administrative action can be reviewed 
does not eliminate the negative consequences of the existence of the discretion.1005  
This thesis has indicated various instances where wide discretionary powers result in 
uncertainty that increase risks associated with profitable development of mines and maximising 
returns on investments.1006  For example, one of the requirements for renewal of mining rights 
is that right holders must comply with the social and labour plan.1007  The requirements of the 
social and labour plan are exceptionally vague.1008  This vagueness leads to wide governmental 
discretion that is not based on objective, closely circumscribed criteria, when the Minister 
considers applications for renewal of mining rights.1009  Since it is unlikely that the MPRDA is 
unconstitutional as a result of infringing fundamental rights,1010 the Constitutional Court will 
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probably show high levels of deference when considering whether the requirements for renewal 
of mining rights contravene the rule against vagueness.     
However, the discretionary powers can have a severe negative impact on holders of mining 
rights.  As a result of the discretionary powers, holders of mining rights do not know what is 
expected from them to comply with the requirements of renewal of rights.  If mining rights are 
not renewed, the risks associated with profitable development of mines increase and mineral 
tenure security weakens.  Furthermore, the existence of these types of broad discretionary 
powers can dissuade investors from investing in the country’s mining industry.1011  Decreased 
investment in the country’s mining industry not only negatively impacts the industry, but also 
the entire economy.  It is argued below that an extended version of rationality review can 
overcome the difficulties with the level of deference that the Constitutional Court shows for 
vagueness and discretion when rights are not infringed. 
4.2. Rationality review 
The Constitutional Court applies a rationality test for legality-review of primary legislation.  
This rationality test incorporates some form of means-ends analysis. The following section 
provides an exposition of the strictness of the test that the Constitutional Court requires 
regarding the means-ends analysis.  The section also comments on the suitability of the test to 
overcome the challenge that excessive regulatory measures in the MPRDA, at times, pose for 
mineral tenure security.      
4.2.1. Test: means-end analysis 
The test for rationality review is in general not strict and the Court requires “a very limited 
connection between means and end”.1012  Rationality review does not involve evaluating 
different options that the legislature has to achieve the stated purpose.1013  It is possible that 
there is more than one rational way to deal with a specific problem.1014  Legislation that uses 
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1012 Bishop 2010 SAPL 315. 
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any one of the rational alternatives will pass rationality review.1015  The judiciary is generally 
not willing to “second-guess” the option that the legislature chose.1016  Furthermore, if there is 
a rational connection between means and ends, a court “cannot interfere simply because it 
disagrees with it or considers the legislation to be inappropriate”.1017  Rationality review also 
does not include an element of fairness.1018  Reasonableness is not in itself a ground for 
invalidating legislation.1019  Reasonableness and proportionality only become relevant when an 
act infringes on a fundamental right and it is necessary to determine whether the infringement 
complies with the limitation clause.1020   
Accordingly, the courts have rarely struck down legislation for being irrational.1021 The reason 
for the court’s adoption of this lenient test (referred to as “mere rationality” in the remainder 
of the discussion) and the accompanying unwillingness to interfere in the choices of the 
legislators stem from the doctrine of separation of powers.1022  The doctrine of separation of 
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powers is part of the rule of law and requires the court to show respect and deference for the 
democratically elected branches of government.1023  
4.2.2. Difficulties with the means-end-analysis test: the MPRDA as example  
The “mere rationality” approach is understandable where applicants allege that the legislation 
under review infringes their fundamental rights and where the exercise of public power 
amounts to administrative action.1024  As regards legislation that infringes fundamental rights, 
the limitation must be justifiable according to section 36 of the Constitution.1025  One of the 
factors that must be taken into account in terms of section 36 is the relationship between the 
limitation and its purpose.1026  This factor involves a proportionality analysis.  It thus seems 
unnecessary to require anything more than a mere rational connection between the legislation 
and its purpose as a threshold requirement for the exercise of legislative power.1027  The 
question whether the legislation is proportional and reasonable is evaluated in terms of the 
justification-analysis in section 36 of the Constitution.  
Furthermore, when the exercise of public power amounts to administrative action, that action 
can be judicially reviewed in terms of section 33 of the Constitution and the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act.  Grounds for review include the reasonableness and proportionality 
of the administrative action.1028  Again, it seems unnecessary to impose a stricter test than 
“mere rationality” for the legislation to pass constitutional muster.   
However, as explained above, legislation, including the MPRDA, can have a severe negative 
impact on individual entities and on entire industries without infringing fundamental rights.  
For example, the MPRDA excessively regulates prospecting rights and mining rights by not 
providing any exceptions regarding the obligations of right holders to prospect and mine 
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continuously.1029  The effect of the ubiquitous obligation to prospect and mine is that holders 
of prospecting rights and mining rights may be forced to prospect and mine during times in 
which they cannot develop mines profitably.  It was argued in chapter 4 that, while taking into 
account the legitimate objective of the government to pursue optimal exploitation of minerals 
and mineral resources, the obligation to prospect and mine continuously creates unnecessary 
uncertainty regarding the ability to develop mines profitably.1030  Accordingly, the obligation 
unjustifiably weakens mineral tenure security.   
These measures weaken mineral tenure security but nevertheless pass the “mere rationality” 
test that the Constitutional Court requires when reviewing primary legislation for legality:  
There is a minimal connection between the legislative means and the legitimate governmental 
ends.  In the abstract, forcing holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to conduct 
operations continuously, is minimally connected to the achievement of a legitimate 
governmental objective, namely optimal exploitation of minerals and mineral resources.  
The next section argues that the difficulties with the judiciary’s approach to “mere rationality” 
can be overcome with an extended version of legality. 
5. A plea for “extended legality” 
Following the decision in Agri SA, it is unlikely that the Constitutional Court will, in the near 
future, decide that the MPRDA is unconstitutional for infringing fundamental rights.  
Consequently, the MPRDA will be subject to “mere rationality” review and not to the stricter 
standards of reasonableness and proportionality.  Some, or all, of the provisions of the MPRDA 
that weakens mineral tenure security will pass the “mere rationality” test.  Furthermore, the 
judiciary will probably show high levels of deference for wide governmental discretion that is, 
at times, encountered in the MPRDA.  “Mere rationality” and the judiciary’s approach to 
vagueness that involves governmental discretion, does not justify amending the MPRDA to 
overcome the challenges that it poses for mineral tenure security.  Still, certain provisions of 
the MPRDA have severe negative consequences for rights holders, investors and the entire 
mining industry. 
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It has been argued that “the type, scope and scale of a specific regulatory scheme needs to be 
considered directly in any attempt to restrain the abuse of public power”.1031  In this regard the 
extensive regulatory regime established by the National Water Act,1032 has been criticised for 
allowing wide governmental discretion and simultaneously creating high levels of uncertainty 
about the future of water rights.1033  The criticism includes that the uncertainty creates “special 
costs”,1034 (or challenges) including corruption, discouraging investment and environmental 
degradation.1035  These costs have been associated specifically with erosion of rule-of-law 
standards.1036  The “special costs” of the extensive regulatory regime that the MPRDA creates, 
include weakened mineral tenure security that deters investment.  It is argued here that these 
costs (or challenges) justify extending the judiciary’s approach to legality review in appropriate 
circumstances.  The circumstances include legislation, such as the MPRDA, that brings about 
large-scale, extensive regulatory change that result in high levels of uncertainty and 
governmental discretion.          
The approach of the judiciary to rationality review has been criticised, in the context of equality 
cases and a modified approach to rationality review has been suggested.1037  In equality cases, 
the judiciary applies “mere rationality” when the right to equality in section 9(1) of the 
Constitution is infringed.1038  Opposed to “mere rationality” when section 9(1) is infringed, 
unfair discrimination that is prohibited by section 9(3) of the Constitution, is subject to 
proportionality review.1039  Thus, in case of more serious infringements of section 9(3), 
proportionality-review applies while “mere rationality” applies in case of less serious 
infringements of section 9(1).  It is accepted here that the right to equality, and especially the 
prohibition against unfair discrimination, is particularly important in South Africa.1040  A 
careful approach should therefore be followed in applying jurisprudence regarding the right to 
equality, and especially unfair discrimination, in any context such as mineral regulation.  
However, it seems reasonable to apply jurisprudence regarding less serious infringements of 
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the right to equality in section 9(1) to overcome the serious consequences that some provisions 
of the MPRDA have on right holders, investors and the entire mining industry.    
According to Bishop, rationality review “fails to do what it is meant to do” in the context of 
equality cases.1041  The author therefore suggests a modified approach to rationality review.  
This approach demands accepting that the rationality test cannot be applied mechanically but 
that it is malleable and requires judges to make substantive decisions.1042  According to Bishop, 
the purpose of rationality review is not only to show that legislation that differentiates between 
people serves a legitimate governmental purpose, but also to ensure a culture of 
justification.1043  Although Bishop advances the modified test only for equality cases,1044 some 
of the elements of the test can be applied to all rationality review including rationality review 
of the MPRDA.  Such a modified approach to rationality review can be applied, firstly, to 
overcome the challenges that excessive regulation pose for mineral tenure security.  The 
approach can, secondly, overcome the challenges of vagueness associated with wide 
governmental discretion that are not addressed by the judiciary’s application of the rule against 
vagueness.  
The remainder of this section argues that Bishop’s modified rationality serves as a basis for 
“extended legality” that can be used to overcome the challenges to mineral tenure security 
posed by the MPRDA.  The following section examines three features of extended legality and 
gives examples of cases where the Constitutional Court suggests that it is willing to apply these 
features.  This examination is followed by two examples of how “extended legality” can be 
applied to overcome the shortcomings of the MPRDA in strengthening mineral tenure security.  
5.1. Features of “extended legality”     
The first feature of extended legality relates to the level of generality at which the purpose of a 
legislative provision is cast.  In this regard, extended legality requires that the purpose of a 
legislative provision is formulated at an appropriate level of generality.1045  On the one hand, 
                                                 
1041 Bishop 2010 SAPL 313. 
1042 Bishop 2010 SAPL 340 – 342.  Even when the approach of the Constitutional Court regarding rationality 
review is accepted, it is acknowledged that substantive elements play a part.  See Price 2010 SALJ 582 where the 
author argues that the question whether the legislation “serve valuable ends” requires “substantive judicial review” 
and Price 2010 SAPL 355 where it is stated that the question of legitimacy calls for an “evaluative judgment”. 
According to Michelman in Constitutional Law of South Africa 11-1, arbitrariness have “substantive overtones”. 
1043 Bishop 2010 SAPL 339.  Also see Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 32. 
1044 Bishop 2010 SAPL 314. 
1045 See Bishop 2010 SAPL 325 – 326 where the author uses an example to explain the levels of levels of generality.  




the purpose of a legislative provision must not be couched in such general terms that it is 
impossible to doubt its legitimacy and that inevitably there will be a connection between the 
purpose and the legislative measures.1046  Examples of these types of purposes include 
promoting the general welfare and public health and safety.1047  On the other hand, the 
legislative purpose must not be set as such a level of specificity that it “reduces the means to 
the end”.1048  In other words, the result of the legislation must not be accepted as its purpose.1049  
If the means and the ends are the same, rationality review will be meaningless as all legislation 
will be a perfect fit for the purposes that it pursues.1050  According to Bishop, the required level 
of generality is one where “there is a potential for a court to conclude – even if it requires only 
the most tenuous of connections – that the means fails to serve the end”.1051  Furthermore, 
where legislation serves multiple purposes, extended rationality review requires that all 
purposes must be taken into account.1052  In case of contradictory purposes, extended rationality 
requires that a balance must be struck between these purposes.1053  To ensure that the courts do 
not unduly interfere in other spheres of government,1054 Bishop argues that the courts must 
generally accept the purpose advanced by the government unless the purpose is stated at such 
a level of generality or specificity that it justifies the law automatically.1055  
In van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund,1056 the Constitutional Court acknowledged the 
ineffectiveness of setting the purpose of the legislation at an inappropriate level.1057  The court 
had to decide on the rationality of section 18(b) of the Matrimonial Property Act.1058  The 
challenge was against section 18(b) that allowed spouses married in community of property to 
                                                 
1046 Bishop 2010 SAPL 326 – 327. 
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a law that prevented foreigners from working as security guards.   
1048 Bishop 2010 SAPL 326. 
1049 It seems that this is the case in Merafong Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others.  At [16], the court held that the purpose of the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005 
was to change provincial boundaries.  It seems that changing provincial boundaries was rather the effect of the 
Amendment Act of 2005 and that the true purpose for the circumstances in had to be couched in terms such as “to 
eradicate cross-boundary municipalities” or to “increase service delivery”.  See, for example, [25, [28] [30] [34] 
[49] [58] and [65] of the judgment.    
1050 Bishop 2010 SAPL 326. 
1051 Bishop 2010 SAPL 328. 
1052 Bishop 2010 SAPL 328. 
1053 Bishop 2010 SAPL 328. 
1054 Bishop 2010 SAPL 341. 
1055 Bishop 2010 SAPL 342. 
1056 2006 4 SA 230 (CC). 
1057 Bishop 2010 SAPL 327. 
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institute claims for damages for non-patrimonial loss against each other, but not claims for 
patrimonial loss arising from bodily injury.  According to the respondents, the purpose of the 
differentiation was to regulate proprietary consequences of marriage.1059  In holding that the 
provision was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective,1060 the court held 
that this generic purpose did not override the specific purpose of the provision under attack, 
namely to “avoid the futility of spousal claims”.1061   
The second feature of extended legality involves the level of connection between a legislative 
provision and its purpose.  The extent to which rationality review requires legislation to meet 
its objectives can be described according to a spectrum that requires different levels of 
connection between means and end.1062  At its most lenient, rationality review requires a trivial 
connection between means and end.1063  Legislation will pass rationality review as long as the 
law has the potential to further its purpose in some marginal way.1064  According to Bishop, a 
trivial or hypothetical connection is not sufficient for the modified test that he suggests1065 
because it will render rationality review “toothless”.1066  As explained, the Constitutional Court 
generally requires a very limited connection between means and end, especially when 
legislation reviewing legislation that do not infringe fundamental rights.1067   
At the strictest end of the spectrum the law must be tailored as narrowly as possible to achieve 
its purpose.1068  At the strictest end of the spectrum, rationality review demands a very close fit 
between means and end.  Stated differently, at the strict end of the spectrum, legislation will 
pass constitutional muster if, substantially and materially, it advances its objectives.1069  The 
strict end of the spectrum, according to Bishop, is also too strict for the modified test that he 
proposes as it will allow too much judicial interference in the affairs of the government.1070  
Extended legality, based on a culture of justification, requires exclusion of the two extreme 
ends of the spectrum and requires judges to find a connection between the means and the end 
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between the two extremes.1071  As discussed in the following paragraphs, the required level of 
connection between means and end is closely related to the third manner in which rationality 
can be extended meaningfully, namely, reasons and empirical evidence that justify the 
legislative means.  
The third feature of extended legality concerns the consideration of empirical evidence.  In this 
regard, extended legality requires that the court must consider empirical evidence related to the 
purpose of the legislation and the extent to which the legislation achieves its purpose.1072  This 
does not mean that there is, in all instances, an evidentiary burden on the government to prove 
the purpose of a legislative measure or to present evidence that the legislative choice serves its 
purpose.  On the contrary, as explained above, the court must generally accept the purpose of 
the legislation that the government asserts.1073  However, the court must consider empirical 
evidence, adduced by either party to the dispute, regarding the extent to which the legislative 
measures achieve its purposes.1074  Upon consideration of such evidence, the court must strike 
down a legislative provision if necessary.1075   
Furthermore, if the legislative purpose is couched at an inappropriate level of generality, the 
court “should recast the purpose at a level so that, if presented with the right evidence, it could 
conclude that the purpose was not met”.1076  Similar to the purpose of the legislation, the onus 
is on the government only to show that the legislation has more than a hypothetical or trivial 
connection to its purpose.1077  The government does not have to show that the legislation, 
meaningfully or substantially, serves its purpose.1078  However, the court must consider 
available empirical evidence regarding the purpose and effect of the legislation.1079   
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The decision in Affordable Medicines Trust, suggests that the Constitutional Court is willing 
to consider empirical evidence in certain instances.1080  In this case, the court held that the 
Medicines Act served a legitimate governmental purpose namely to increase access to medicine 
that is safe for consumption.1081  However, the court did not accept this general purpose as the 
purpose of some of the factors that the Director-General had to take into account in considering 
whether to grant a licence to compound and dispense medicine.  The factors included the 
existence of other licensed health facilities in the vicinity of the premises from where the 
compounding and dispensing of medicines were intended to take place,1082 the geographic area 
that the applying medical practitioner would serve,1083 and the estimated number of health care 
users in the geographic area that the applying medical practitioner would serve.1084  The court 
rejected the purpose of these factors, asserted by the government, for two reasons.1085  Firstly, 
the court took the language and context of the factors into account.1086  Secondly, the court 
relied on empirical evidence raised by the applicants in evidence, namely the National Drug 
Policy.1087  Having established the true purpose of the factors in terms of the National Drug 
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Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (1) 2006 5 SA 47 (CC) which concerned the 
constitutionality of the Constitution Twelfth Amendment Act of 2005.  In this case the transfer of Matatiele 
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Network and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [6] regarding the purpose of the 
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decision was unnecessary and decided that the transfer of the municipality was invalid because the Kwazulu-Natal 
legislature did not comply with the public participation requirement in s 118(1)(a) of the Constitution.  Contrary 
to the Constitutional Court’s seemingly willingness to investigate the reasons for the legislation choice in 
Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (1), the Court refused to investigate the 
“motives” of the legislator in a similar situation in Poverty Alleviation Network and Others v President of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others [73].  Also see how, in a minority judgment, Moseneke in Merafong 
Demarcation Forum and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [172] – [174] makes use 
of empirical evidence in deciding that the decision of the Gauteng Provincial legislature to incorporate Merafong 
municipality into the North West instead of Gauteng was rational   
1081 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [21] and [22]. 
1082 Regulation 18(5)(a); Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [111]. 
1083 Regulation 18(5)(c); Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [111]. 
1084 Regulation 18(5)(d); Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [111]. 
1085 According to the government, the purpose of these factors were to “enhance the scope for efficient utilisation 
of resources . . . [and] allow the government to plan and implement its health programme more effectively”.  See 
Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [113]. 
1086 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [114]. 
1087 Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health [112], [115], [117], [118]. 




Policy, the court held that the matter required a direct response from the government.1088  
However, the government did not provide any explanation for the evidence that contradicted 
the asserted purpose of the factors.1089  The court accordingly held that the factors were ultra 
vires because the real purpose was not authorized by the empowering statute.1090 
5.2. MPRDA: Application of extended legality 
Application of extended legality to overcome the challenge of excessive regulation can be 
illustrated by the obligation of holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to conduct 
operations continuously.1091  The purpose of the obligation can be set at various levels of 
generality.  For example, the purpose can be to regulate prospecting and mining.  However, 
this is not an appropriate level of generality since the legislative provision will, as a matter of 
cause, achieve the purpose.1092  The purpose of the obligation can also be to ensure that holders 
of prospecting rights and mining rights conduct operations continuously without interruption.  
If the purpose is set at this level of specificity, the means and the ends are the same with the 
result that the provisions inevitably can achieve the purpose.1093     
The appropriate level of generality of the purpose of the obligation to prospect and mine 
continuously is probably to ensure optimal exploitation of minerals and mineral resources.  At 
this level, it will be possible for a court, if presented with empirical evidence, to find that the 
legislative measures fail to achieve their objective.1094  It does not take a lot of persuasion to 
accept that it is possible to present evidence proving that forcing right holders to prospect and 
mine, during times in which they cannot do so profitably, in fact hampers optimal exploitation 
of mineral resources in the long run.  Compelling right holders to prospect and mine, during 
times when they cannot make profits, certainly elevates the possibility that mines will shut-
down and, as a result, not exploit any mineral resources.   
If the purpose of the obligation to prospect and mine continuously is set at this level of 
generality, the effectiveness of extended rationality in this scenario can be illustrated further as 
follows:  It is arguable that there may be a minimal connection between the obligations to 
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prospect and mine continuously and optimal exploitation of mineral resources.  However, such 
a minimal connection is insufficient for extended legality and the inquiry cannot end there.1095  
If evidence is presented regarding the possible negative effect of the lack of any exceptions 
regarding these obligations, extended rationality review requires answers from the government.  
The government does not have to show that legislative choices are reasonable or that the 
legislative measures substantially further their objectives.1096  However, extended legality 
requires some justification for the absence of any exceptions that will allow right holders to 
interrupt operations and retain their rights.  It is arguable that the government can achieve the 
objective of optimal exploitation without forcing right holders to continue operations if they 
clearly run the risk that they will make significant losses.  The failure to provide any exceptions 
regarding the obligations to prospect and mine continuously renders the connection between 
means and end is too wide; i.e. not close enough.  This means that the obligations to prospect 
and mine continuously are not rationally related to the legitimate government objective of 
optimal exploitation of minerals and mineral resources.  In this regard, the MPRDA violates 
rule-of-law standards.   
A closer connection between means and end can be established here by providing exceptions 
regarding the obligations of holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to prospect and 
mine without any interruptions.  To minimise the risks and disadvantages that are associated 
with situations when mineral resources are not exploited optimally, the exceptions should be 
limited and closely circumscribed.  According to the suggestions in chapter 4:1097 Holders of 
prospecting rights and mining rights must be allowed to interrupt operations and retain rights 
when they can prove that they are unable to develop mines profitably as a result of objective 
market-related and infrastructure-related reasons.  Establishing a closer connection between 
means and end, considers and protects the competing interests of the government (optimal 
exploitation of mineral resources) and of right holders (freedom to choose when to interrupt 
operations).  To comply with extended legality, the MPRDA should be amended to allow 
holders of prospecting rights and mining rights to interrupt operations while retaining their 
rights in appropriately circumscribed circumstances.   
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Application of extended legality to overcome vague drafting and wide governmental discretion 
that is not based on objective, closely circumscribed criteria can be illustrated by using the 
social and labour plan.  Section 24(3) of the MPRDA places an obligation on the Minister to 
renew mining rights if certain criteria are met.  According to section 24(3)(c), one of the criteria 
is that right holders must comply with the prescribed social and labour plan.  The objectives of 
the social and labour plan indicate the purpose of section 24(3)(c).  The objectives include 
promoting employment and advancing the social and economic welfare of all South 
Africans.1098  Further objectives are to contribute to the transformation of the mining 
industry1099 and to ensure that holders of mining rights contribute towards the socio-economic 
development of the areas in which they operate.1100  These are without doubt important 
objectives.  Furthermore, these objectives probably are at the appropriate level of generality 
for the purpose of section 24(3)(c).  At this level of generality, it will be possible for a court to 
find, if empirical evidence is presented, that the legislative provision does not achieve its 
purpose.  Identical to the obligation to prospect and mine continuously, an inappropriate level 
of generality will be to regulate prospecting and mine.  Similar to the obligation to prospect 
and mine continuously, it is also inappropriate to reduce the means to the end.  It will thus be 
inappropriate if the purposes are to ensure that holders of mining rights promote equitable 
access to mineral resources, to advance employment and to contribute towards socio-economic 
development in the areas where they operate.     
The difficulty with the social and labour plan is that its requirements are extremely vague.1101  
This vagueness leads to wide and uncircumscribed governmental discretion when the Minister 
considers applications for renewals of mining rights.1102  Since it is unlikely that the 
Constitutional Court will find that the MPRDA infringes fundamental rights, the Court will 
probably show high levels of deference for this vagueness and discretion.1103  It is thus expected 
that the Court will apply a lenient test when considering whether the vagueness and discretion 
violate the rule against vagueness.1104  Still, similar to the obligation to prospect and mine 
without interruption, the vagueness and discretion can have austere negative consequences for 
individual entities and for the mining industry.  If mining rights are not renewed, holders of 
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mining rights and investors face risks regarding profitable development of mines maximising 
returns on investments.  Such obstructions to profit-making can deter investment into the 
country’s mining industry.     
Extended legality can be used to overcome the difficulties with vague drafting and wide 
discretion.  It is arguable that it is not only the purpose of section 24(3)(c) that must be 
determined, but also the purpose of the vagueness and the discretion.  The objectives pursued 
by the social and labour plan probably require some leeway regarding precise drafting and also 
require some discretion on the part of the government.  However, the means used, namely 
vague drafting and discretion, must be rationally connected to the purpose.  In this regard, the 
vagueness and discretion certainty have a minimal connection to the objectives pursued.  Any 
amount of vagueness and discretion has the potential to further the objectives of the social and 
labour plan.  However, according to extended legality, a minimal connection between means 
and end is not sufficient.1105  As with the obligation to prospect and mine continuously, the 
government does not have to show that the vagueness and discretion (the means) is necessary 
to, meaningfully and substantially, further the purpose or that the means and the ends are 
proportional.1106   
Extended legality requires rejecting the two extremes, namely mere rationality and 
proportionality, and finding a middle-way that will protect the interests of the government and 
the interests of right holders.1107  Such a middle-way can be reached by accepting that the extent 
of the vagueness and the discretion are not rationally related to the objectives pursued.  The 
extent of the vagueness and the discretion result in the connection between means and ends 
being too wide and therefore not rationally related. The extent of the vagueness and the 
discretion thus violate the principle of legality and rule-of law standards.  
A closer connection between means and end can be established, and compliance with legality 
ensured, by amending the requirements of the social and labour plan to be less vague.  
According to the suggestion offered in chapter four regarding bursary plans:1108  The social and 
labour plan should be amended to express the bursaries that mining companies must give to 
employees and to external applicants as a percentage of a company’s profit during a specified 
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time.  A closer fit between means and will create more certainty than the current requirement 
in this regard, namely, that mining companies must provide the government with budgets and 
timeframes regarding their bursary plans.    
6. Summative remarks 
Some provisions of the MPRDA pose challenges to mineral tenure security as a result of three 
features, namely vague and unclear drafting (“simple vagueness”), excessive regulatory 
measures and wide governmental discretion that is not based on objective, closely 
circumscribed criteria (“compound vagueness”).  This chapter argues that justification for 
amending the MPRDA to overcome these challenges can be found in the Constitutional 
framework.  The Constitutional framework provides this justification despite the fact that it is 
unlikely that the Constitutional Court will, in the near future, declare the MPRDA 
unconstitutional for infringing fundamental rights.  The principle of legality, as an aspect of 
the rule of law, provides justification for amending the MPRDA to overcome the difficulties 
with mineral tenure security in the Constitutional framework. 
The principle of legality includes the rule against vagueness and rationality review.  In case of 
“simple vagueness”, the approach of the Constitutional Court to the rule against vagueness is 
sufficient to justify that some provisions of the MPRDA violate the rule against vagueness.  
The rule against vagueness, according to the jurisprudence of the judiciary, can thus be invoked 
to overcome the challenges that “simple vagueness” in the MPRDA poses for mineral tenure 
security. 
However, regarding “compound vagueness” and the means-end analysis of rationality review, 
the approach of the Constitutional Court falls short to justify amending the MPRDA to 
overcome the challenges that wide discretionary powers, i.e. “compound vagueness”, and 
excessive regulatory measures pose for mineral tenure security.  This chapter argues that these 
challenges can be overcome by “extended legality” and specifically “extended rationality”.  
“Extended legality” should be applied only to legislation, such as the MPRDA, that establishes 
large-scale regulatory regimes that do not infringe fundamental rights but that have a significant 
negative impact on individuals and entire industries.  “Extended legality” incorporates three 
features.   




First “extended legality” requires setting the purpose of a legislative measure at the appropriate 
level of generality.  Second, “extended legality” requires an appropriate level of connection 
between legislative means and objectives.  The third feature of “extended legality” requires a 
court to consider empirical evidence regarding the extent to which legislative measures achieve 
legitimate governmental objectives.   










South Africa’s mineral resource wealth does not guarantee local or foreign investment into its 
mining industry.  Stability, certainty and predictability of the regulatory framework, above all, 
is what motivates investment.1109  Mineral tenure security is an aspect of such a regulatory 
framework.  There are ample studies confirming that mineral tenure security is important for 
mining investors.1110   
Conceptually, mineral tenure security defies a single definition.1111  The concept includes 
aspects regarding certainty of right holders for the entire life duration of a mine, i.e., throughout 
the different phases of the mining sequence.1112  The requirements of the concept depend on 
whether a specific regulatory regime is based predominantly in public law or private law.1113  
This thesis proposes that mineral tenure security means the stability of rights granted for the 
life of a mine.1114  The certainty created by mineral tenure security is achieved through 
minimization of risks and uncertainties that may prevent profitable development of such 
mines.1115  Mineral tenure security includes, on this premise, certainty that prospecting and 
mining can occur and that it can be interrupted when necessary to ensure profitable 
development.1116  Profitable development further requires the ability to transfer and mortgage 
rights to raise funds for mineral development projects.1117 
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Before the MPRDA came into operation, South African mineral law straddled public law and 
private law.1118  That is to say, in the regime immediately preceding the MPRDA, mineral 
tenure security was influenced by the rules of public law as well as the rules of private law.1119  
The premise of this thesis is that the MPRDA changed the theoretical underpinnings of the 
regulatory regime pertaining to minerals and established a regulatory regime that is 
predominantly based in administrative law.1120  According to the MPRDA, mineral resources 
are the common heritage of the people of South Africa and the state is the custodian thereof for 
the benefit of the nation as a whole.  Through the implementation of a rigorous regulatory 
regime in the form of the MPRDA, the government abolished private holding of minerals and 
mineral resources as well as rights to minerals.1121   
Upon the abovementioned premise, the thesis follows two courses of inquiry.1122  First, the 
thesis investigates whether the rules of private law continue to strengthen mineral tenure 
security.  The outcome of this inquiry is that rules of private law play a very limited role in 
strengthening mineral tenure security.  Furthermore, in certain instances, the rules of private 
law places limitations on mineral tenure security.  This outcome leads directly to the second 
inquiry namely how the MPRDA provides tenure security to holders of rights to minerals 
regarding some of the aspects of the concepts that are traditionally connected to private law. 
The outcome of this inquiry is a set of recommendations to address difficulties encountered 
with mineral tenure security in the current regime.  The thesis’ conclusions may be summarised 
as follows: 
2. Mineral tenure security and the rules of private law 
Traditionally, ownership of minerals and mineral resources protect mineral tenure security by 
allowing holders of rights to minerals to prospect and mine, to choose not to prospect and mine 
and to dispose of minerals found.1123  Furthermore, traditionally, the nature of rights, as real 
rights in property, can strengthen mineral tenure security as a result of the private-law rules of 
registration and enforceability of real rights.1124  In the current regulatory regime, the private-
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law rules of ownership and the nature of rights, play a limited role in strengthening mineral 
tenure security. 
2.1. Ownership and mineral tenure security 
Ownership of unmined minerals no longer plays a role in strengthening mineral tenure 
security.1125  In this regard, ownership of unmined minerals traditionally impacts on mineral 
tenure security by influencing the abilities of holders of rights to minerals to prospect and mine 
and to choose not to prospect and mine.1126  In the regime under the MPRDA, ownership of 
unmined minerals no longer has any bearing on these abilities.1127  The abilities to prospect and 
mine and to choose not to prospect and mine flow from the administrative provisions of the 
MPRDA only.1128  Holders of rights to minerals are allowed to prospect and mine and to choose 
not to prospect and mine only as far as the MPRDA allows them.1129  Thus, in the current 
regulatory regime, ownership of unmined minerals has no effect on creating certainty or 
minimizing risks and uncertainties that may prevent profitable development of mines.1130    
Apart from not having any impact on mineral tenure security, ownership of unmined minerals 
has very little practical impact in general.1131  This research casts doubt on the continued 
suitability of analysing rights to minerals from a private law paradigm.1132  The time has 
perhaps come to accept that the custodianship-model in section 3 of the MPRDA must be 
interpreted from a public law paradigm and not from a private law paradigm.1133 
Ownership of mined minerals, however, continues to play a limited role, however, in the 
provision of mineral tenure security.1134  Traditionally, ownership of mined minerals 
strengthened mineral tenure security by allowing holders of rights to remove and dispose of 
minerals.1135  In this regard, ownership of mined minerals traditionally confers the rei 
vindicatio on holders of rights.1136  The availability of the rei vindicatio means that right holders 
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have a strong real remedy at their disposal to vindicate minerals that were mined and carried 
away by an unauthorized entity, or minerals that were stolen after they were extracted by 
holders of prospecting rights, mining rights and mining permits.1137  The MPRDA does not 
confer a remedy on right holders to vindicate minerals and it is therefore necessary to rely on 
the rules of private law, and especially the rei vindicatio, to confer such a remedy on holders 
of rights.1138  Thus, in the current regulatory regime, the rules of private law continue to create 
certainty, albeit to a very limited extent, and to minimise risks and uncertainties that may 
prevent profitable development of mines.1139   
However, the rules of the rei vindicatio do not solve all problems relating to vindication of 
minerals.1140  This is specifically apparent in situations where the government needs to 
vindicate minerals that were mined without the necessary permission in the form of mining 
rights or mining permits.1141  The inability of the rei vindicatio to address these situations casts 
doubt on whether a private law paradigm is suitable for the protection of mineral tenure 
security.1142  In the administrative regime created by the MPRDA, the Act should be amended 
to regulate situations where it is necessary for right holders or for the government to vindicate 
minerals.1143  Such an amendment is necessary to prevent the necessity of relying on rules of 
private law that are ill-suited in the current regulatory regime, to protect mineral tenure 
security.1144 
2.2. Limitations of a private-law rights-based approach  
The MPRDA classifies prospecting rights and mining rights as limited real rights.1145  The Act 
is silent regarding the nature of mining permits.1146  According to the rules of private law and 
the subtraction from dominium test used by the courts to determine the nature of rights, mining 
permits can be classified as limited real rights.1147  From a private-law paradigm, holders of 
rights to minerals acquire these limited real rights through a derivative method of acquisition 
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when the government grants rights.1148  Generally, registration of rights is a requirement for 
the derivative acquisition of real rights.1149  Before registration, rights are personal in nature.  
This means that, generally, unregistered rights are not enforceable against third parties.1150  
Before registration, rights are enforceable only against the other contracting party.1151  One 
exception to this is found in the doctrine of notice.1152  According to the doctrine of notice, 
unregistered rights are enforceable against persons who had knowledge of their existence.1153   
According to these rules of private law, rights to minerals are personal rights when the Minister 
grants them.1154  At this stage, rights are enforceable against the government (the other 
contracting party) and against the current landowner (according to the doctrine of notice).1155  
However, rights are unenforceable against third parties, for example, subsequent landowners 
who did not have knowledge of the existence of the rights.1156  If private parties can prevent 
right holders from exercising their rights as a result of non-registration, the risks that mines 
cannot be developed profitably and that returns on investments cannot be maximised, 
increase.1157  The rules of derivative acquisition of real rights thus weaken mineral tenure 
security.1158 
The private-law rules explained above operate in a system where rights in land are registered 
in the Deeds Office that adheres to a hierarchical approach to rights.1159  According to the 
hierarchy, registered real rights are stronger and better enforceable than unregistered personal 
rights.1160  The hierarchical approach to rights means that registered prospecting rights, mining 
rights and mining permits are real and thus stronger and better enforceable than rights that are 
personal as a result of non-registration.  Such a hierarchical approach to rights not only weakens 
mineral tenure security but is also against the transformative nature of the MPRDA. 
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Furthermore, the MPRDA suggests that the consequence of non-registration of rights is that 
the government can take administrative steps against right holders to ensure that they comply 
with their obligation to register rights.1161  The Act does not suggest that right holders can be 
prevented from exercising their rights by private parties due to non-registration.1162   
On face-value, the MPRDA and the MTRA must be criticised for reiterating the rules of 
property-law regarding registration and enforceability of rights to minerals.1163  It remains to 
be seen how the courts interpret the provisions of the MPRDA and MTRA regarding 
registration and enforceability of rights.1164  This research suggests that registration in the 
Mineral and Petroleum Titles Registration Office should follow a different approach than 
registration in the Deeds Office.1165  According to this approach, registration is an important 
aspect of mineral tenure security.1166  Similar to registration of rights in the Deeds Office, 
registration in the Mineral and Petroleum Registration Office serves the important function of 
publicizing rights.1167  However, the consequences of registration, from a private-law 
paradigm, namely that private parties can prevent right holders from exercising their rights, 
have a negative impact on mineral tenure security and should not be followed.1168   
It is desirable that the MPRDA and the MTRA are amended to remove the possibility that the 
courts may interpret their provisions regarding registration and enforceability to denote that 
private parties can prevent right holders from exercising their rights if rights are not 
registered.1169  This can be achieved by removing the semantic classification of prospecting 
rights and mining rights as limited real rights through the elimination of all references to 
“limited real rights”.1170   
Apart from indicating that classification of rights to minerals as limited real rights weakens 
mineral tenure security, this thesis also argues that it may not be appropriate to continue to 
analyse rights to minerals according to private-law categories of rights.1171  In this regard, it is 
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argued that rights to minerals, granted in terms of the MPRDA, are not statutorily conferred 
limited reals rights with the same characteristics as common-law real rights.1172  Instead, the 
government administratively grants certain abilities to right holders, for example, to transfer 
and mortgage rights, that resemble characteristics of private-law limited real rights.1173 
3. Mineral tenure security in the MPRDA 
As stated, the second course of inquiry investigates how the administrative regime that the 
MPRDA establishes provides mineral tenure security to holders of rights to minerals regarding 
some aspects of the concept that traditionally have strong connections with private law.1174  The 
aspects of the concept that are analysed are: the abilities to prospect and mine, to remove and 
dispose of minerals, to choose not to prospect and mine, and to transfer and mortgage rights.1175 
This thesis accepts that an evaluation of the certainty of right holders to prospect and mine, to 
remove and dispose of minerals, to choose not to prospect, and to transfer and mortgage rights, 
requires that legitimate government reasons and objectives for limiting the abilities are taken 
into account.1176  Although unfettered freedom regarding these abilities will best serve mineral 
tenure security, the government has legitimate and important reasons for limiting the abilities 
in the pursuit of important objectives such as optimal exploitation of mineral resources and 
transformation of the mining industry.1177  Optimal mineral tenure security is understood here 
to mean a regulatory regime that creates a state of certainty in relation to rights to minerals that 
is most attractive to investors, whilst supporting the legitimate and important objectives of the 
government.1178 
This thesis demonstrates that, considering legitimate governmental objectives, the MPRDA is 
reasonably successful in strengthening optimal mineral tenure security.  However, through an 
analysis of the abilities of holders of rights to minerals to prospect and mine, to choose not to 
prospect and mine and to transfer and mortgage their rights, certain shortcomings of the current 
regulatory regimes emerge.  These shortcomings, often, increase risks associated with 
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profitable development of mines and maximising returns of investments.1179  Such an increase 
in risks weaken mineral tenure security.  
3.1. Shortcomings of the current regulatory regime  
The first shortcoming of the current regulatory regime is that the MPRDA is at times drafted 
in unclear and imprecise language that causes uncertainty.  While it is accepted that vaguer 
drafting is at times necessary to pursue complex and conflicting objectives,1180 this research 
reveals instances where the MPRDA is unnecessarily vague and imprecise. 1181  Imprecise and 
vague drafting that is not in pursuit of any legitimate governmental objective is unacceptable 
and unreasonably weakens mineral tenure security.1182  Vague and imprecise drafting is also 
unacceptable when the objective that the government pursues can be achieved adequately with 
clearer and more precise language.1183 
The second shortcoming of the current regulatory regime is that it allows wide governmental 
decision-making power that is not based on objective and closely circumscribed criteria when 
decisions are made in certain instances.1184  Again, it is accepted that closely circumscribed 
criteria for decision-making will not in all instances be appropriate due to the complexity that 
the decision-making power pursues.1185  However, wide discretion that is not in pursuit of any 
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governmental objective or that is simply unnecessary for the objective pursued, result in an 
unnecessary and unjustifiable weakening of mineral tenure security.1186 
Closely connected to the second shortcoming, the third shortcoming of the current regulatory 
regime is that the MPRDA, in certain instances, excessively regulates the abilities of holders 
of rights to minerals.1187  Excessive regulation, that is disproportionate to the objectives 
pursued, unjustifiably limits mineral tenure security.1188 
3.2. Recommended solutions 
Vague and unclear drafting, excessive regulatory measures and wide discretionary powers that 
are at times encountered in the MPRDA, pose challenges for mineral tenure security.  Despite 
these challenges, it is unlikely that the Constitutional Court will, in the near future, decide that 
the MPRDA is unconstitutional for infringing fundamental rights.1189  This thesis argues that 
although the MPRDA does not infringe fundamental rights, justification for its amendment, to 
strengthen mineral tenure security, can be found in the Constitutional framework.1190 
Specifically, the justification for the MPRDA’s amendment can be found in the constitutionally 
developed principle of legality, as derived from the rule of law, which includes the rule against 
vagueness and rationality review.1191   
The rule against vagueness requires that legislation must be clear and accessible so that those 
who are affected by it will have reasonable certainty regarding what is expected from them to 
act in accordance with the legislation.1192  Rationality review involves some sort of analysis 
between the legislative means and legitimate governmental objectives that the legislation 
pursues, i.e. a means-end analysis.1193  The rule against vagueness draws attention to the 
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challenges that vague and unclear drafting pose for mineral tenure security1194 while rationality 
review speaks to the challenge that excessive regulatory measures pose for mineral tenure 
security.1195   
The rule against vagueness can be invoked to justify amending the MPRDA where vague and 
unclear drafting weakens mineral tenure security and creates unnecessary uncertainty regarding 
profitable development of mines and maximising returns on investments.1196  In this regard, 
the Constitutional Court’s approach to “simple vagueness” justifies amending certain 
provisions of the MPRDA.1197  Furthermore, the rule against vagueness can be invoked when 
wide governmental discretionary powers, not based on objectively circumscribed criteria, 
unnecessarily creates uncertainty and increases the risks of right holders and investors 
regarding profit-making.1198  In this regard, the Constitutional Court’s approach to “compound 
vagueness” falls short of justifying the challenge that wide governmental discretion in the 
MPRDA poses for mineral tenure security.1199  The deficiency in approach to “compound 
vagueness” is a result of the level of deference that the judiciary shows to wide governmental 
discretion when legislation does not infringe fundamental rights.1200  The challenge that 
“compound vagueness” poses for mineral tenure security can be overcome by adopting an 
extended approach to legality, in particular an extended approach to rationality review.1201 
The Constitutional Court’s approach to rationality review of legislation that does not infringe 
fundamental rights requires a very lenient test, namely “mere rationality”.1202  “Mere 
rationality” requires a very limited connection between the legislative means and the legitimate 
governmental objectives that it pursues.1203  As with “compound vagueness”, the Constitutional 
Court’s approach to rationality review, in particular the means-end analysis, is insufficient to 
overcome the challenge that excessive regulatory measures poses for mineral tenure 
security.1204  Similar to “compound vagueness”, this deficiency is a result of the judiciary’s 
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approach to rationality review when legislation does not infringe fundamental rights.1205  The 
challenge that excessive regulatory measures in the MPRDA pose for mineral tenure security 
can be overcome by adopting an extended approach to rationality review.1206   
Such an extended approach to rationality review, and legality in general, is justifiable in the 
light of two interrelated factors.  The first factor is the scale and extent of the regulatory regime 
that the MPRDA establishes for the mining industry.1207  The second factor is the potential 
negative impact, of some aspects of this large-scale regulatory regime, on individuals (right 
holders and investors) and on the entire mining industry.1208  The negative impact is particularly 
apparent in the uncertainty that the MPRDA creates regarding profit-making in certain 
instances. 
“Extended legality” incorporates three features.1209  Firstly, the purpose of a legislative measure 
must be set at an appropriate level of generality.1210  The appropriate level of generality is one 
that allows the possibility for a court to find that the means chosen by the legislature does not 
further legitimate governmental objectives. 1211 Secondly, the level of connection required 
between the legislative means and legitimate governmental objectives, i.e. the means-end 
analysis, must exclude the two extreme tests.1212  In this regard, the most tenuous connection 
(a very limited connection) and proportionality and reasonableness (a very strong connection) 
must be excluded.1213  “Extended legality” requires finding a middle-ground between the two 
extreme tests for the means-end analysis.1214  Thirdly, “extended legality” requires that a court 
must consider empirical evidence regarding the extent to which the legislative means achieves 
legitimate governmental objectives.1215  Consideration of empirical evidence does not mean 
that the government has an onus to prove that the legislative means achieve legitimate 
governmental objective.1216  Instead, any party before the court may present empirical evidence 
regarding the extent to which to which the legislative means achieves legitimate governmental 
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objectives.1217  Upon consideration of this evidence, the court must strike legislation down for 
being irrational if it is clear that the legislative means do not achieve legitimate governmental 
objectives.1218  The court must further strike down legislation down if the empirical evidence 
shows that the negative impact of the legislative means are disproportionate to achieving 
legitimate governmental objectives.1219   
This thesis demonstrates how the three features of “extended legality” overcome the challenges 
that wide governmental discretion “compound vagueness” and excessive regulatory measures 
pose for mineral tenure security.1220 
4. Final remarks 
It was stated in chapter one that logic requires accepting that in regimes pertaining to minerals 
that are predominantly based in administrative law, administrative aspects of the concept 
“mineral tenure security” will be more important than those aspects of the concept that are 
traditionally associated with rules of private-law.  The conclusions in this thesis substantiate 
that this is indeed the case and that future research on mineral tenure security requires analysis 
of the administrative-law aspects of mineral tenure security.  In this regard, the right to 
administrative justice comes to the fore. Regarding the rules of private-law, future research can 
investigate the continued role of the rules of private law in mineral law more generally. The 
MPRDA does not regulate all aspects of mineral law traditionally associated with rules of 
private law comprehensively and it is therefore necessary to rely on private-law rules at times. 
The compatibility of these rules with the administrative regime established by the MPRDA 
needs to be investigated.    
Future evaluation of mineral tenure security thus requires analysing whether the MPRDA 
complies with the rules of just administrative action.  Furthermore, due to the administrative 
nature of the regime, governmental discretion throughout the different phases of development 
of a mine should be investigated in detail.  Limiting discretion in decisions, regarding the ability 
of holders of rights to minerals to continue from the exploration phase to the mining phase will, 
for example, be paramount to strengthen mineral tenure security.  Governmental discretion that 
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can result in time delays when applicants apply for renewal of rights or when key documents 
are processed also comes to mind as an aspect of mineral tenure security that requires future 
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